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INTRODUCTION

In the modem financial services industry, thrifts' engage in an unprecedented range of complex and risky commercial transactions. Consequently, the receiver of a failed thrift, which in most cases is the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) appointed by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB),2 is likely to face a host of
complex claims. These claims arise not only from the thrift's deposit
liabilities but also from its investment transactions and the incidental disputes generated by such activities. The scene of a thrift failure is often
already strewn with litigation, and the receivership itself is likely to generate still more.3 Even if litigation has not yet commenced, the receiver
has to pay the thrift's valid credit obligations and so has to distinguish
good claims from bad and quantify the former. In the process of accepting, settling or rejecting a diverse and complex range of creditor
claims, disputes concerning their validity will have to be resolved informally or, if this cannot be done, either through the judicial process or by
administrative adjudication. The latter process is the subject of this
study.
The importance of this claims determination process has grown with
the escalation of thrift failures in recent years. 4 Although, with the
assistance of the FSLIC, many insolvent thrifts can be restored to finan1. "Thrift" is used throughout this article to refer to federally chartered and state-chartered,
federally insured building associations, savings and loan associations and savings banks. See infra
notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
2. For a general discussion qf the power to appoint receivers, see infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 228-43 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
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cial health, sold or merged, a significant number have already proven so
irretrievable that the FHLBB has had to place them into liquidation. As
of July 1, 1988, the FSLIC was administering 84 liquidating receiverships
involving $8.2 billion in receivership assets and considerably more in uninsured creditor claims. 5 Insofar as they help to avoid litigation, the
claims determination procedures employed by the receiver are very important in expediting and reducing the cost of thrift liquidations. On the
other hand, these procedures have to satisfy conflicting considerations.
They must be capable of processing claims efficiently and resolving disputes between creditors and receivers. They should also remain fair to
both parties and they must, of course, rest upon a sound legal
foundation.
The FHLBB and the FSLIC have asserted exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims against thrift receiverships. These agencies argue that
their claims determinations are subject not to independent, de novo judicial determination, but only to the limited judicial review provided under
the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 6 This view has become known as the "Hudspeth doctrine," after the Fifth Circuit decision
in which it was first accepted. 7 Yet, because of the enormous adjudicatory power that the Hudspeth doctrine concedes to these agencies, the
doctrine has provoked controversy concerning the quality, fairness and
efficacy, as well as the legal and constitutional validity, of the agencies'
procedures. Although Hudspeth has been reaffirmed many times by the
Fifth Circuit, and has attracted a large following in the district courts
and some state courts, 8 the Ninth Circuit has refused to follow it, holding
that the FSLIC has no statutory authority to adjudicate claims to the
preclusion of the courts. 9 The Texas Supreme Court has taken the same
view in affirming the decision of a state court of appeals that had ruled
that the FSLIC has indeed been granted adjudicative authority by statute
but that this authority is unconstitutional. 10 The plethora of conflicting
5. Telephone interview with Judith L. Friedman, Associate General Counsel, FHLBB (Aug.

29, 1988). As of December 31, 1986 (the most recent date for which figures are available), creditor
claims already exceeded $8 billion. 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 27-35 (1987).

6. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (scope ofjudicial review for agency action); see infra text accompanying notes 498-509.
7. North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1054 (1986). For a discussion of Hudspeth, see infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.

8. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
9. See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1987),petition

for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87451); see infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
10. See FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd., 750 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. 1988) (per
curiam), aff'g 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (discussed infra at notes 135-40 and-accompanying text).
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*decisions has produced an unusual situation in which two circuits-the
Fifth and the Ninth-are in direct conflict," a third-the Seventh-is
somewhat equivocal, 12 state courts within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Fifth Circuit have either followed the ruling of the Ninth Circuit 13 or
gone even further, 14 and state courts within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Ninth Circuit have followed the Fifth Circuit, 15 while district courts
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit have gone in op16
posite directions.
This riotous state of affairs will be partly resolved this Term by the
Supreme Court. Of four petitions for certiorari that have now been ified,
the Court has chosen to hear the one-CoitIndependence Joint Venture
v. FirstSouth, F.A. 17-that is couched in the broadest terms; 18 the out11. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
12. See Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987)
(discussed infra at note 134). The decision in Lyons elicited a comment from District Judge
Roszkowski that the Seventh Circuit is "never one to rush in where angels fear to tread." Homestead Say. v. Life Say. & Loan Ass'n, 668 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (N.D. IlM.1987) (opinion vacated and
removed from bound volume, but appears in West's advance sheets, see infra notes 738-39 and
accompanying text).
13. See Glen Ridge I, 750 S.W.2d at 759; Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC, 742 S.W.2d 446,
453 (Tex. CL App. 1987).
14. See Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374, 386 (rex. Ct. App.
1986) (holding statutory grant of adjudicative authority to FSLIC unconstitutional), aff'd on other
grounds, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. See Modem Supply Co. v. FSLIC, 50 Wash. App. 194, 748 P.2d 251 (1987) (split decision);
FSLIC v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 336, 225 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1986).
16. See Homestead Say., 668 F. Supp. at 1121. Contra Rigali v. Life Say. & Loan Ass'n of Am.,
No. 87-C-2543 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1987) (Westlaw, 1987 WL 12677).
17. 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988).
18. The questions presented place in issue (i) the statutory authority of the FSLIC as receiver to
adjudicate state-law causes of action asserted against failed thrifts; (ii) the acceptability of such a
scheme under article III of the Constitution; (iii) the compatibility of such a scheme with the due
process clause; and (iv) whether the scheme violates the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at i, Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1987) (No. 87-996).
A number of briefs have been filed in the Colt appeal. For those supporting the petitioner, see
Brief for Petitioner; Petitioner's Reply Brief; Brief Amicus Curiae of Joseph M. Hudspeth in Support
of Petitioner; Brief of Amicus Curiae United States League of Savings Institutions in Support of
Petitioner; Brief Amicus Curiae of George S. Watson, A. Starke Taylor III and Watson & Taylor
Realty Company in Support of Petitioner. For those supporting the FHLBB and the FSLIC, see
Brief for the Respondent; Motion of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas, Federal Home Loan
Bank of San Francisco, and Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka for leave to file Brief as Amici
Curiae and Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance; Brief of Amnicus Curiae National Council
of Savings Institutions in Support of Respondent. It is interesting to note the opposition of the two
major thrift lobbies. Most surprising is the respondent's brief filed by the Solicitor General:
notwithstanding the favorable holding in Hudspeth, the position consistently maintained by the
FSLIC in subsequent litigation, and the FHLBB's publication of rules establishing an adjudicative
process, the respondent's brief disavows any statutory authority on the part of the FSLIC to "adjudicate" claims and argues only that creditors are mandatorily required to exhaust the administrative
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come of this case will have an automatic effect on the others. 19 Mean-

while, the pending uncertainty makes it difficult to provide a coherent
administrative law evaluation of the Hudspeth procedures, since they
might not be constitutionally valid at all.
Yet it is unlikely that the Supreme Court's decision will be entirely
dispositive. Its jurisprudence in the constitutional areas traversed by

Coit Independence has become overtly pragmatic. 20 This suggests that,
even where the Court is disposed to find a particular administrative
scheme unconstitutional, there might be other ways of devising a scheme
that would be constitutional. The Court is unlikely to declare unequivocally that creditor claims require primary adjudication by full-fledged ar-

ticle III courts alone. 21 To the extent that the FHLBB's desire to avoid
routine judicial resolution is dictated by severe financial and organizational constraints, 22 the Board will probably still want to devise a primary administrative adjudication scheme that is acceptable from the

constitutional and administrative law points of view. Coit Independence
can provide guidance only as to the outer constitutional constraints on
any such scheme. And if, as is possible, the Court declares that the

FHLBB merely lacks present statutory authority,23 the FHLBB still has
the option of seeking such authority from Congress. On the other hand,
even if the Court rules that the FHLBB does have statutory authority
and that this authority is constitutionally valid, many issues regarding
the fairness and efficiency of the adjudicative process implemented by the
Board are likely to remain in controversy. The fundamental question,

then, of what would constitute a fair administrative procedure for adjudiclaims process before resorting to the courts. Presumably this leaves it open for claimants to assert
the right to de novo review after exhaustion of their administrative remedies. The amici briefs filed
in support, on the other hand, adopt more fully the position of the FHLBB and FSLIC, which denies
anything other than limited, APA review in the courts.
19. See FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W.
3165 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1987) (No. 87-255); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209
(9th Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S.
Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451); Murdock-SC Assocs. v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F.
Supp. 948 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987), petitionfor
cert.filed sub nom FSLIC v. Murdock-SC Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87452). The claims in the Morrison-Knudsen case have now been settled. See Brief for the Respondent
at 37 n.27, Coit Independence (No. 87-996).
These petitions raise only the question "[w]hether claims against the assets of an insolvent,
federally insured savings and loan association must be presented in the first instance in federal receivership proceedings in accordance with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulations for the
administrative resolution of such claims." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at I, Murdock-SC Assocs. (No. 87-452).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 510-657,
21. See infra text accompanying notes 545-600.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 325-429.
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eating creditor claims in thrift receiverships is likely to remain important
for as long as the crisis in the thrift industry persists and the present
24
system of thrift regulation survives.
This article seeks to provide some general answers to this basic question by drawing upon general constitutional and administrative law principles. Part I describes the background to the Hudspeth controversy by
tracing the emergence and evolution of federal thrift regulation, the
changing market environment, the attempts by the FHLBB to adapt to
the escalation in thrift failures while coping with the rapid depletion of
the federal deposit insurance fund, and the recent conflict in the courts
concerning the validity of the FSLIC's assertions of adjudicatory jurisdiction. Part II describes the general receivership process and, more particularly, the Hudspeth process as it hag now been developed by the Bank
Board. Part III turns to examine the constraints by which the Hudspeth
procedures must be judged. This involves an investigation of the statutory authority supporting the adjudicatory scheme, the applicability of
the APA, and the constitutional principles that should inform the drafters of the scheme. Part IV evaluates the existing Hudspeth procedures
according to the criteria identified in Part III, and this in turn leads to
the recommendations, in the Conclusion, for clarifying the FHLBB's
mandate and for improving its adjudicatory structure and claims resolution procedures.
24. It is, of course, conceivable that the industry might stabilize and that thrift failures might
decline. If this were to happen, the FHLBB might find it more practical to rely on judicial resolution
of disputed creditor claims in the few receiverships that remained.
It should also be emphasized that the entire problem might be the product of the present regulatory system. For example, it has been argued that the system of federal deposit insurance, the price
of which is not risk-related, has become a major contributor to thrift (and commercial bank) failure
because, in the competitive world of modem banking, it removes market disciplines. In other words,
it eliminates the incentive for depositor scrutiny that would restrain industry entrepreneurs from
engaging in bad-risk activities, and it transfers the costs of risk-taking from the entrepreneurs to the
insurance funds and, ultimately, the general public. See, eg., E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 7-15 (1985); Barth, Brumbaugh, Sauerhaft & Wang, Insolvency and
Risk-Taking in the Thrift Industry: Implicationsfor the Future, CONTEMP. PoL'Y Iss., Fall 1985, at
I; Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation ofBanks andBank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L.
REv. 301, 312-18 (1987); Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank
Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129 (1986) (concluding that depositors generally are not able to control
the level of their bank's risk-taking); Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of MarketDiscipline, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1988) (same); Isaac, The Role of DepositInsurance
in the Emerging FinancialServices Industry, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 204 n.30 (1984); Macey &
Garrett, MarketDiscipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and EmpiricalArguments, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 215 (1988); O'Driscoll, DepositInsurance in Theory and Practice,in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLuTION 165 (C. England & T. Huertas eds. 1988); Scott & Mayer, Risk and
Regulation in Banking: Some Proposalsfor FederalDepositInsurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv.
857 (1971). This article assumes no fundamental reforms to the present system.
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EMERGENCE OF THE HUDSPETH DOCTRINE

The present system of federal thrift regulation is the product of hastily enacted New Deal legislation that has been modified in a reactive,
piecemeal fashion during the last half century. The model created by the
Home Owners' Loan Act and the National Housing Act did not fully
address the problem of liquidating thrifts in receivership; instead the legislators, to the extent that they thought about the problem at all, seemed
concerned with the receiver's power to dispose of thrift assets rather than
the method by which the validity of creditor claims should be handled.
25
Claims determination was not directly addressed at all.
To gain a full perspective, it is helpful to place the thrift industry
within the broader context of the financial services industry and to describe the manner in which federal thrift regulation has evolved. We
then need to examine the ways in which the thrift industry has developed
since the inception of federal regulation. It is these developments that
have created a need for an administrative claims settlement procedure.
A.

Thrifts and the Banking Industry.

Liquidation procedures are not uniform throughout the banking industry, and we should take some account of the special position that
thrifts occupy within banking. Thrifts are one of the three principal
kinds of depository institutions, all of which are still governed by structures devised during the New Deal. 26 The other components are commercial banks and credit unions. 27 Together, thrifts-savings and loan
associations and savings banks-account for approximately 20% of the
private assets held by all financial intermediaries, 2 8 and for a little more
29
than 35% of those held by depository institutions.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 363-87.
26. The relevant legislation for present purposes is the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch.
64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982)), the National Housing Act

of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.

§§ 1701-1750g (1982)) (governing

the FHLBB and the FSLIC), the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982)) (governing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), the Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982))

(same), and the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, ch. 750, 48 Stat. 1216 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795 (1982)) (governing the National Credit Union Administration).
27. See generally 1 M. MALLoY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS § 1.2, at 4-21 (1988).
28. See 2 id. app. at 923 chart 1.1. "Financial intermediaries" include insurance companies,
real estate investment trusts, mutual, state and local government retirement funds, etc., in addition

to the three sets of depository institutions. Id.
29. See id. at 924 chart 1.2. The actual breakdown among depository institutions (as of De-

cember 31, 1983 and excluding international liabilities) was: savings and loan associations-28.7%;
mutual savings banks-6.75%; commercial banks-61.0%; and credit unions-3.55%. Id
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Thrifts, like commercial banks and credit unions, can be chartered
as state or federal institutions. Even if chartered by a state, a thrift can
be federally insured.3 0 Various components of the industry are regulated
by different authorities. Federally chartered and federally insured, statechartered savings and loan associations are subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the FHLBB and the FSLIC. Federally chartered savings
banks are subject to the supervision of the FHLBB and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Commercial banks are subject to
the separate regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board (the
"Fed"), the Comptroller of the Currency (the "Comptroller"), and the
FDIC. Federal credit unions are regulated by the National Credit Union
31
Administration Board (NCUAB).
Although originally formed to serve different functions, 32 savings
and loan associations and savings banks have come increasingly to resemble commercial banks in their services, investment patterns, and in
the conduct of their business activities. 33 Nevertheless, despite calls for
the establishment of a unitary system of regulatory machinery, 34 they
continue to be regulated by separate agencies and according to separate
regulatory principles and procedures. This structure has facilitated the
development of thrift liquidation procedures that differ from those employed by the FDIC when the latter liquidates banks. For example, except when appointed by the FHLBB as receiver of a savings bank, 35 the
FDIC has not attempted to adjudicate the validity of creditor claims;
instead, it relies upon judicial determination in the courts. When acting
as receiver of state-chartered banks, the FDIC is also subject to the jurisdiction of the relevant local state law in its conduct of each
36
receivership.
Having once been fairly narrowly confined, the business transactions
in which the thrift industry has more recently become involved have exposed thrifts to a broader range of creditor claims than was the case
before 1980. The size and complexity of claims have greatly increased,
30. The overwhelming majority of thrifts are federally insured, with only Massachussetts-

chartered thrifts retaining a significant level of independence from federal regulation. See W.
LOVETr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INsrITUTIONs LAW 237-38, 251 (2d ed. 1988) (Massachussetts
state insurance system is only significant remaining state insurance system for savings banks; by
1981, savings and loan associations insured by FSLIC represented 98% of all savings and loan

assets).
31. On the structure, jurisdiction and powers of these agencies, see generally 1 M. MALLOY,
supra note 27, § 1.3, at 21-72.
32. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
34. See generally, eg., 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 27, § 1.4, at 72-79.

35. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 448-52.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:422

simultaneously magnifying the potential for disputes concerning their validity. These developments have rendered inadequate the traditional liquidation processes employed by the FSLIC. They have created financial
pressures that have induced the FHLBB and the FSLIC, in an attempt to
contain the costs of liquidation, to devise new strategies for handling
failed thrifts and for processing the claims of creditors administratively.
At the same time, the complexity of many creditors' claims seems to
have spurred attempts by creditors to litigate their claims in the courts. 37
With the convergence of thrift and commercial bank business, and
the kinds of claims in receivership that this business tends to generate,
the differences between the in-house, administrative claims determination
procedures employed by the FHLBB and the FSLIC, on the one hand,
and the external, judicial procedures relied upon by the FDIC, on the
other, have begun to appear anomalous. It is not surprising, therefore,
that those opposing the Hudspeth doctrine have argued that if the FDIC
can rely on judicial settlement of creditors' claims, so too should the
38
FSLIC.
Yet one should not overlook the historical differences between commercial bank and thrift regulation, or the differences that still remain.
The notion of a separately regulated thrift industry is premised upon the
long-standing American concern for the protection and encouragement
of private home ownership. It has been thought important that funds
should always be channeled in the direction of private home purchasers,
and the concept ofjoint commercial bank/thrift regulation carries with it
the danger that the private home buyer would be unable to compete for
credit in the commercial marketplace. 39 This concern has tended to promote a paternalistic outlook on the part of the thrift regulators, one that
perhaps contributes to the desire to maintain an internal, self-sufficient
and inexpensive liquidation process.
B. Development and Structure of the Regulatory Framework
Before 1932 the federal government had no involvement in the thrift
industry. State chartering and regulation of thrifts had existed, however,
in a number of states since the early nineteenth century.40 Thrifts, bear37. For an indication of the scale of recent litigation, see infra notes 228-43.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 430-46.

39. See, eg., Gray, The Role of Regulation in the Thrift Industry, 6 ANN. REv. BANING L.
235, 236-37 (1987); Wallace, Home Ownership Drives the Thrift System, OUTLOOK, Sept.-Oct. 1986,

at 9.
40. See generally W. LOVETT, supra note 30, at 232-35; E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, BANKING
LAW 51-52, 54-56 (2d ed. 1984); UNITED STATES BLDG. & LOAN LEAGUE, HISTORY OF BUILDING
AND LOAN IN THE UNITED STATES 123-32 (H. Bodfish ed. 1931) [hereinafter HISTORY OF BUILDING AND LOAN]; Barth & Regalia, The Evolving Role ofRegulation in the Savings and Loan Indus-
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ing various titles such as "building associations," "savings and loan associations," and "savings banks," were chartered under the laws of the
various states and were usually confined to narrowly localized operations.4 1 They were also subjected to increasingly intensive regulation and
supervision, especially during the latter quarter of the nineteenth
century. 42

Federal regulation of the thrift industry came in the wake of major
legislation governing commercial banks,4 3 and commenced with the creation of the Home Loan Bank System in 1932. 44 More important was the
enactment of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 4 5 which empowered
the recently created FHLBB4 6 to charter federal savings and loan associations and subject them to the FHLBB's regulation. A year later
Congress established the FSLIC to provide federal deposit insurance for,
exercise supervision over, and act as conservator or receiver in respect of,
federal thrifts. At their option or that of their chartering state, statechartered building associations, savings and loan associations, homestead
associations and cooperative banks could also apply for FSLIC insurance. The insurance fund was to be self-financing and replenished from

premiums levied on the deposits of insured thrifts. The FSLIC was to
act under the direction of the FHLBB.47
During the ensuing four decades the powers and jurisdiction of the
FHLBB and FSLIC were extended in various directions (often together

with those of the FDIC in respect of commercial banks). The FHLBB,
for example, was granted powers to issue cease and desist orders, appoint
the FSLIC as receiver for state-chartered thrifts, charter savings banks,
try, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 113, 115-24; Lockwood, Thrift
Industry Passes Its 170th Anniversary, OUTLOOK, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 20. For a fuller discussion of
the directly relevant legislative history, see infra notes 355-419 and accompanying text.
41. National institutions, which operated through branch offices and the mail, were driven out
of business by opposition, largely from local thrifts and their lobby, the U.S. Savings and Loan
League, during the economic depression of the 1890s. See W. LovEr, supra note 30, at 246-47;
HISTORY OF BUILDING AND LOAN, supra note 40, at 105-15; Barth & Regalia, supra note 40, at 120.
42. See HISTORY OF BUILDING AND LOAN, supra note 40, at 123-29; W. LOVETr, supra note
30, at 247.
43. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832
(1982)). This legislation created the FDIC and, adding § 12(B) to the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38
Stat. 251 (1913), established a system of federal deposit insurance for banks. Section 12(B) was later
designated as a separate act, known as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. See Act of September 21,
1950, ch. 967, § 1, 64 Stat. 873 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 264 (1982)).
44. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, § 17, 47 Stat. 725, 736-37 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982)) (creating the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and twelve
home loan bank districts); see also infra text accompanying notes 357-60.
45. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982)).
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. National Housing Act of 1934 § 402, 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1982) (current section includes
minor amendments to original section 402).
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and convert state thrifts to federal charter. The FSLIC was given powers
to terminate federal insurance, extend financial assistance to troubled
48
thrifts, and borrow money to replenish its insurance fund.
The picture that emerges is that of the FHLBB exercising chartering
and directory powers over two insuring agencies, the FSLIC and the
FDIC (in the limited case of federal savings banks), each of which in turn
exercises extensive regulatory powers over the thrifts insured by them
and each of which is appointed in a separate institutional capacity as the
receiver of any such thrifts when they fail.
Concern for protecting small investors has not been the only force
driving the growth of federal thrift regulation. Thrifts are an important
element in the maintenance of the public supply of money, 49 and the
maintenance of public confidence in the thrift system is thought to be an
essential national concern.50 It is not surprising, therefore, that "the financial industry, particularly the depository institutions segment, is one
of the most heavily regulated industries in America."5 1
C.

Transformation of the Thrift Industry.

The original function of savings and loan associations was the narrow one of receiving deposits from would-be home owners and providing
loans to depositors for the purpose of building or acquiring real property,
particularly housing. Only at a later stage did savings and loan associations begin lending to borrowers who were not also their depositors. Savings banks, on the other hand, were philanthropic, being originally
designed to provide financial services for the small saver. The only significant creditors of both savings and loan associations and savings
52
banks, traditionally, were their depositors.
In recent years, however, savings and loan associations and savings
banks have not only tended to converge, both structurally and functionally, 53 but they have become exposed to a novel range of concerns. From
48. See infra text accmpanying notes 388-419 (describing some of the relevant legislation).
49. See M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHVWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1867-1960, at 662-72 (1963).
50. See, eg., Barth, Brumbaugh, Sauerhaft & Wang, supra note 24, at 2-3; Note, The
"Brokered Deposit" Regulation: A Response to the FDIC'sand FHLBBs Efforts to Limit Deposit
Insurance, 33 UCLA L. REV. 594, 603-04 (1985).
51. Barth & Regalia, supra note 40, at 114; cf Fahey v. Mallonree, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947)
(Jackson, J.)
("Banking is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of all public
callings." (referring to the regulatory powers of the FHLBB)).
52. See generally FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM, A GUIDE TO TEE FEDERAL HOME
LOAN BANK SYSTEM 5-6 (5th ed. 1987) [hereinafter FHLB GUIDE]; HISTORY OF BUILDING AND
LOAN, supra note 40, at 11-18; Barth & Regalia, supra note 40, at 115-16; Gray, supra note 39, at
238-40; Lockwood, supra note 40, at 20.
53. See, eg, E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 40, at 57-58.
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the early 1960s, a series of developments completely altered the economic

environment within which thrifts function. The most important of these
developments were:

(i) increasing competition between thrifts and

banks; (ii) the deregulation and volatility of interest rates; and (iii) the
54
decline in inflation and the collapse of the oil boom.

In the 1960s, thrifts found themselves under increasing competition
from commercial banks for small savers. The Fed permitted banks to

pay higher interest rates on certain popular kinds of deposits, and thrifts
suffered severe disintermediation (loss of funds). The Act of September
21, 1966,55 which permitted thrifts to offer slightly higher rates on sav-

ings deposits than commercial banks, restored some protection for
thrifts.56 But, with the passage of the Housing and Urban Development

Act of 1968, 57 which gave thrifts broader investment powers, thrifts entered into direct competition with banks in the provision of many financial services.
By the late 1970s both banks and thrifts were facing external compe-

tition from money market funds. This development induced Congress to
enact the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980,58 the purpose of which was to phase out ceilings on maximum interest rates. But one effect was to plunge thrifts into a "trial by
interest rates" 59 as they competed for deposits while finding themselves

locked into long-term mortgages that bore much lower rates of return. 6°
Attempting to resolve this dilemma, Congress enacted the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.61 The Act allowed thrifts

to diversify and expand their portfolios into other investments, subject to
a limitation that these new assets not exceed 10% of their total assets.
Some states, including California and Texas, went further and lifted all

asset limitations from their state-chartered thrifts. 62 Deregulation paved
the way for thrifts to enter whole new areas of business activity and,
54. See generally F. BALDERsToN, THRIFrs IN CRisis 4-9 (1985); A. CARRON, THE PLIGHT OF
THE THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 11-21 (1982); FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 13-23; W. LOVETT,supra
note 30, at 227-32; Kriz, The Sick Get Sicker, 1987 NAT'L J. 874, 875-76; Pfeiler, FSLICAdjudication of Claims Against Receiverships: Has the Search for Efficiency Lost Sight of Due Process?, 53
LEGAL BULL. 433, 433 n.1 (1987); Note, supra note 50, at 608-12.
55. Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (amending the
Federal Reserve Act, Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and Federal Home Loan Bank Act).
56. See, e.g., Lockwood, supra note 40, at 23.
57. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. ch. 13).
58. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3524 (1982)).
59. FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 18.
60. See F. BALmDERSTON, supra note 54, at 5-6; A. CARRON, supra note 54, at 12-13.
61. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
62. For a recent survey of the extensive difficulties currently confronting state-chartered and
state-regulated thrifts, see Bancroft, Banking on Deregulation Can Be Hazardous to Your State's
FinancialInstitutions, GOVERNING, Jan. 1988, at 44.
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through high-risk business ventures accompanied by the ability to offer
automatic federal insurance to potential depositors, 63 to grow at "astronomical rates" until the FHLBB placed caps on growth rates in 1983.6 4
The next blow came from the decline in the inflation rate and the
sudden slump in oil-driven economic prosperity, particularly in the
Southwest. Anticipating exponential increases in the value of real estate,
thrift managers had often grossly overextended themselves.6 5 When the
oil boom ended, the poor asset quality of their investments threw well
over 100 thrifts into difficulties with the FHLBB's minimum asset requirements, and dozens immediately became insolvent.6 6 Hence the primary cause of thrift failure had shifted by the mid-1980s from the
interest rate squeeze of the late 70s and early 80s to imprudent investment strategies, 67 and a major contribution to the difficulties in which
thrifts have found themselves has been the relative inexperience of thrift
managers in the new areas of enterprise into which deregulation has so
68
rapidly thrust them.
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986,69 which adversely affected the
value of real estate development, has probably also had a significant impact on the asset portfolios of the more fragile thrifts. 70
D. Escalation of Thrift Failuresand Depletion of the FSLIC's
InsuranceFund.
To cope with the ailing state of the industry, Congress has given the
FHLBB broader powers for dealing with failed or failing thrifts, 71 and
63. On the distortions produced by the deposit insurance "subsidy," see E. KANE, supra note
24, ch. 5,
64. See Kriz, supra note 54, at 875-76.
65. See id. at 877; Note, supra note 50, at 611-12.
66. See Kriz, supra note 54, at 877.
67. "In [1982], most of the thrift problems stemmed from interest rate risk (spread problems),
whereas in 1986 the cases were almost exclusively related to credit risk (bad-asset cases)." 1986
FHLBB ANN. REP. 26-27 (1987).
68. Speaking on the diversification permitted thrifts as a result of the Garn-St Germain Depositary Institutions Act, the former general counsel of the FHLBB, Harry Quillian, has remarked,
"'You had 4,500 institutions at that time that were suddenly thrown into, or thought they must
jump into, business activities that they were not used to and not really prepared for, to make more
money to recoup their positions,'. . . . " Kriz, supra note 54, at 875.
Managerial incompetence, however, is not confined to ailing thrifts. According to the Comptroller of the Currency, citing a study of the causes of bank failures from 1979 to 1987, "banks
continue to fail the old-fashioned way: through managerial incompetence.
... Bank-Failure
Causes Cited, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1988, at D9, col. 5 (city ed.).
69. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A.).
70. For an analysis of the Act's likely impact on real estate and mortgages, see Johnson, Financial Impact of the 1986 Act on Real Estate Investments-A View from the Spreadsheets, 36 TAX
NOTES 309 (1987).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 407-19.
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the FHLBB has taken various forms of action itself. For example, in
1976 it promulgated a regulation permitting federal thrifts to incorporate
"due-on-sale" clauses in their loan instruments as a device for escaping
their commitments on sales of the mortgaged property.72 In 1985 the
FHLBB issued a rule requiring supervisory approval of direct investment
by FSLIC-insured thrifts in excess of certain specified thresholds. 73 A
"management consignment program," designed to enable the FSLIC to
take control and improve the health of troubled thrifts before they become too great a burden on the FSLIC, has been instituted, 74 and, in an
effort to improve the quantity and quality of its regulatory supervision
force, the Board has transferred its examination functions and examiners
75
to the twelve District Banks.
These and other measures, 76 while helping to contain the problem,
have not proven enough to stem the tide. The number of "brain dead"
and "terminally ill" thrifts77 that are so irretrievable as to compel their
liquidation has grown rapidly in recent years. Whereas during the entire
period from 1934 to 1980 the FHLBB put only 13 thrifts into liquidation,
in 1987 alone it put 25 into receivership and liquidated 17,78 and the
72. 12 C.F.R. § 545.34(a) (1988); see Fidelity Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141 (1982) (upholding the validity of the regulation over state law prohibiting such clauses). Express
preemption, under certain circumstances, of due-on-sale provisions was incorporated in the Thrift
Institutions Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341, 96 Stat. 1496, 1505 (1982) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982)).
73. See 1985 FHLBB ANN. REP. 17 (1986). This measure was bolstered by the Thrift Industry
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 406, I01 Stat. 604, 614 (1987) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464
(West Supp. 1988)), which empowers the FHLBB to establish minimum capital requirements and to
treat the failure to observe these requirements as an unsound or unsafe practice.
74. See 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 17, 28 (1987). But see infra note 152.
75. See 1985 FHLBB ANN. REP. 21 (1986); Gray, supra note 39, at 242-44.
76. See, eg., Pfeiler, supra note 54, at 434 n.4 (restructuring and increasing staff size).
77. See Kriz, supra note 54, at 875.
78. The number of receiverships during the life of the FSLIC is as follows:
1934-39
0
194041
7
1942-65
0
1966-71
6
1972-80
0
1981
1
1982
1
1983
6
1984
9
1985
- 11
1986
- 21
1987
- 25
1988 (to July 1) - 30
See 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 31-35 (1987); FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 18, 21-22; Grant, The
FSLIC: Protection Through Professionalism, FHLBB J., Feb. 1981, at 9; telephone interview with
Judith L. Friedman, Associate General Counsel, FHLBB (Aug. 29, 1988). In addition, 24 thrifts
were placed into the management consignment plan in 1987 and one more added as of July 1, 1988.
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Board's present chairman recently estimated that the agency will close
one thrift a week in 1988. 79 In Texas alone the FHLBB plans to close or
merge 104 thrifts during 1988.80
The potential magnitude of receivership claims is evident from the
fact that approximately 340, and perhaps as many as 510,81 thrifts-rep8 2
resenting 10% of the industry-are currently estimated to be insolvent.
The pressure of depositor payouts drove the federal insurance fund itself
into a $6.3 billion deficit by the beginning of 1987.83 A congressional/
executive compromise culminated in the Competitive Equality Banking
Act of 1987,84 title III of which authorized the FSLIC to recapitalize its
insurance fund (thereby enabling a fresh batch of moribund thrifts to be

put into receivership).
Yet even this measure has proved inadequate. Healthy thrifts have
protested their obligation to support, through the emergency special insurance assessments levied on their deposits, the mismanagement of their
ailing counterparts. Those eligible to do so have embarked upon a "silent
run," electing to leave the FSLIC insurance system and seek FDIC insurance.8 5 Some thrift industry experts believe a second bailout, possibly
6
involving an appropriation of taxpayer funds, will soon be required.
And the General Accounting Office recently reported to the Senate
79. See Day, More Hard Times for S & Ls, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1987, at 22, cols. 1, 4 (weekly
ed.). By late July, 44 thrifts had actually failed in 1988, as compared with 48 for the whole of 1987.
See Hilder, Shaky Coverage, Wall St. J., July 27, 1988, at 1, col. 6, 16, col. 2.
80. See Hayes, Bank Board Plan Near on Texas Savings Units, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1988, at
21, col. 5 (national ed.) (Texas's "troubles represent about half of our problems nationwide," (quoting M. Danny Wall, Chairman, FHLBB)). In the space of six weeks the FHLBB recently had to
double the estimate of its costs in closing or merging insolvent Texas thrifts, from $7 billion to $15.2
billion. See Nash, Bank Board Doubles Texas Cost Estimate, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1988, at 23, col. 4
(national ed.),
81. The amount varies according to whether generally accepted accounting principles, which
the thrift industry will have to use beginning in 1989, or regulatory accounting principles, which
produce lower figures, are used. See Nash, RecordLoss forSavings Industry, N.Y. Times, March 25,
1988, at DI, cols. 3, 5 (city ed.).
82. See Day, supra note 79, at 22, col. 3; Hayes, supra note 80; Nash, supra note 81, at DI,
cols. 3-5. In a report to the Senate Banking Committee, the General Accounting Office recently
noted that the FHLBB has identified more than 200 hopelessly insolvent thrifts and another 300 that
are insolvent under generally accepted accounting principles. See Nash, A Gloomy Report on
F.S.L.I.C., N.Y. Times, May 20, 1988, at 27, col. 3, 28, col. 3 (national ed.).
83. See 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 25 (1987).
84. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A.).
85. See Nash, FSLIC's Second Bailout Is Studied, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1988, at 23, col. 6, 26,
cols. 3-4 (national ed.).
86. See id. at 23, col. 6. This situation has led one of the nation's major thrift industry lobbies,
the National Council of Savings Institutions, among others, to propose a contingency plan involving
the merger of the FSLIC and the FDIC and their insurance funds. See id. at 26, col. 1; Statement by
J. Morgan, Chairman of the National Council of Savings Institutions, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2,
1988).
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Banking Committee that at the end of 1987 the federal insurance fund
deficit had grown to $13.7 billion-more than twice the level at which it

87
had stood only one year before.
Pressures on the insurance fund have been accompanied by an escalation in the costs of administering the increasing volume of receiverships. For example, in 1986 alone annual insurance settlement and
88
administrative costs increased from $31.2 million to nearly $57 million.

E. Reaction and Adaptation at the FHLBB.
The financial difficulties of the Insurance Fund, and the rapid increase in the cost of assisting and liquidating failed thrifts, forced the
FHLBB and FSLIC to investigate ways of reducing expenses and expe-

diting its procedures. For those thrifts that are thought to be salvageable, the FHLBB and the FSLIC have developed various techniques
designed to avoid either having to place a thrift in receivership8 9 or, if
this is unavoidable, having to liquidate it once it has been placed in re-

ceivership. 90 In these ways the FSLIC has been able to reduce significantly the actual and potential payouts from the insurance fund that it
might otherwise have to make.
The agencies have also tried to contain the costs of receiverships by
developing exclusive, internal claims adjudication procedures. The importance to the agencies of thege procedures is expressed in a report, referring to the FSLIC's victory in the Hudspeth decision, 91 by the
Litigation and Special Projects Division of the FHLBB's Office of General Council:
The Division won a significant decision establishing the exclusivity of
the FSLIC's procedures for administrative adjudication of creditors'
claims against the assets of institutions in receivership. The decision
confirmed that the FSLIC, as receiver, must make an initial determina87. See Nash, supra note 82, at 27, col. 3. A short while earlier the FHLBB itself announced
that at the end of 1987 the federal insurance fund deficit had grown to $11.6 billion. See Day, Deficit
Growing at FSLIC, Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1988, at Al, A8; Nash, Fund to Insure SavingsIndustry in
CriticalState, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at I, col. 1 (national ed.). More recently, the chairman of
the FHLBB and an undersecretary of the Treasury estimated that an amount of $30 billion would be
required to bail out the nation's thrift industry. See Nash, Treasury Says Savings Aid Shouldn't Tax

the Taxpayer, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, at 25, col. 4 (national ed.) (reporting on hearings conducted
by the Senate Banking Committee). The following day the chairman of the FDIC disagreed, stating
that in his view a sum of $50 billion was required. See Hershey, FSLIC'sNeed Put at $50 Billion,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1988, at 25, col. 6 (national ed.).
88. See 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 25 (1987). According to one report, legal fees charged to the
FSLIC by outside counsel rose to $87 million for 1987, compared with $37 million for 1986. See
Brogan, Bank FailuresSpell Success for Firms, Legal Times, June 6, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 189-95.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 98-117.
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tion concerning the validity and priority of a creditor's claim, with
further administrative review by the Board, before the courts may intervene. This decision will promote the efficiency of
the liquidation
92
process and result in enormous savings in legal fees.

The administrative procedures existing when Hudspeth was decided
were virtually nonexistent, however, so the Adjudication Division of the
Office of General Counsel of the FHLBB has since been engaged in de-

veloping new procedures. This process remains incomplete: a series of
proposed and interim rules amending existing procedures have been published since late 1985, but final rules have still not been published by the
Board. 93 Meanwhile, however, the agencies have found themselves embroiled in litigation challenging both the statutory and the constitutional
bases of their asserted adjudicative power. 94 Hence the procedures that
have so far been instituted remain not only fluid and experimental but
also of uncertain legal status.
F. Conflict in the Courts.
To establish and enforce its asserted power as receiver to adjudicate
creditors' claims, the FSLIC has adopted the practice of seeking to have
claims suits that have been initiated in state courts removed to the federal
courts, where the FSLIC then moves for them to be dismissed for want
of subject matter jurisdiction. The FSLIC's argument is that, as receiver,
it has been vested with the power to determine for itself the validity of
creditor claims, 95 and that the jurisdiction of the courts to make independent determinations has been precluded. 96
This strategy has often proved successful. Having secured some ac97
knowledgement of its position from the federal district court in Hawaii,
92. 1985 FHLBB ANN. REP. 46 (1986). On the other hand, the motives underlying the agencies' propagation of the Hudspeth doctrine have been questioned by a former General Counsel of the
FHLBB. See Leibold, The Hudspeth Doctrine: Its Conception, Birth and Possible Demise 1 (Oct. 67, 1988) (unpublished paper to be delivered at ALI-ABA Course of Study: Failing Financial Institutions, Washington, D.C.) ("The Hudspeth doctrine was conceived because, I believe, legal counsel
for the FSLIC, not as receiver but as insurer-creditor, although counsel were wearing both hats,
attempted to raise any possible legal argument to frustrate what they concluded to be 'black hat'
creditors who had obtained verdicts or judgments in civil courts, usually prior to the appointment of
a receiver for the association.").
93. See infra text accompanying notes 201-05.
94. See infra notes 97-148 and accompanying text.
95. The FSLIC relies on § 406(d) of the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d)
(Supp. IV 1986). See infra text accompanying note 186 (quoting the subsection).
96. Here the FSLIC relies on § 5(d) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 178 (quoting the subsection).
97. See First Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251, 255-56 (D.
Haw. 1981); cf First Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988, 994, 99697 (D. Haw. 1982). Contra W-V Enters. v. FSLIC, 234 Kan. 354, 372, 673 P.2d 1112, 1125 (1983)
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the FSLIC's interpretation of the legislation was firmly endorsed by the
Fifth Circuit in North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hudspeth, 98 which quickly became the leading case on the subject.
1. Hudspeth: The "'AdministrativeTrack" Hudspeth involved a
dispute between a thrift (Old North) and its former president (Hudspeth). When in 1977 Mississippi law required all state-chartered thrifts
to obtain FSLIC insurance, the FSLIC refused to approve insurance for
Old North unless Hudspeth was replaced. He resigned and Old North
began paying him a regular monthly amount, which Hudspeth claimed
to be a deferred compensation agreement. This agreement was repudiated by Old North in 1982, when the thrift filed in Mississippi chancery
court for a declaration that the agreement either did not exist or was
terminable. Hudspeth filed a counterclaim for contractual damages and
specific performance.
During these proceedings the State of Mississippi placed Old North
in receivership and appointed the FSLIC as receiver. On the same day
the FHLBB federalized the receivership and named the FSLIC as sole
receiver. 99 The FSLIC, following one of its usual practices in liquidations, 1°° then formed a new thrift (New North) and transferred to New
North all of Old North's assets and liabilities except its liabilities to
stockholders and any obligation owed to Hudspeth. The FSLIC then
terminated payments to the former president.
After the FSLIC, as receiver for Old North, had unsuccessfully
moved for dismissal of Hudspeth's counterclaim, Hudspeth filed an
amended counterclaim joining New North as a party, the latter being an
alleged transferee in interest. The FSLIC and New North then removed
the action to a federal court and moved sucessfully to dismiss the counterclaim. Hudspeth's motion to remand to state court was denied. The
(FSLIC unsuccessfully argues for the dissolution of an attachment order on the grounds that the

order "interfere[d] with its liquidation of [the defendant thrift]").
98. 756 F.2d 1096 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The scope of this decision is not
clear. For example, the Fifth Circuit has declared Hudspeth inapplicable to the resolution of claims
liabilities assumed by transferee thrifts in a purchase and assumption transaction. See Bean v. Independent Am. Say. Ass'n, 838 F.2d 739, 742 (5th Cir. 1988). Hudspeth was also ignored in a case
in which the FSLIC unsuccessfully asserted exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether certain deposits were insured. See Jugum v. FSLIC, 637 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (W.D. Wash. 1986); cf. Herbert
v. National Credit Union Admin. Bd., 663 F. Supp. 833, 839-44 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (doubting Hudspeth's applicability in the case of insured deposits). On the justiciability of insurance claims, see
infra text accompanying notes 468-72.
99. For the conditions under which this is permissible, see infra text accompanying notes 170-

75.
100. See infra text accompanying note 193.
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case then took a remarkable course: a panel of the Fifth Circuit'0 1 first
upheld Hudspeth's appeal in part, 10 2 then a few weeks later dismissed it

altogether. 103
In its withdrawn opinion, the court had agreed that the presence of
New North and the FSLIC rendered the action removable to the federal
court, and the panel agreed that the district court had "properly dismissed all of Hudspeth's claims against New North and much of his ac-

tion against Old North."' 0 4 The court accepted that Hudspeth's
assertion that the FSLIC was not authorized to set aside his contract
was, as a result of the operation of 12 U.S.C. sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and
1729(d), t0 5 "route[d] to the administrative process.' u 0 6 But the court
concluded that Hudspeth's claim against Old North for payment of past

services rendered was not barred and should be remanded to the state
court. 10 7 The panel agreed with Hudspeth that neither section
1464(d)(6)(C) nor section 1729(d) barred the judicial determination of
the validity of Hudspeth's claim against Old North. Relying upon

Supreme Court decisions, 08 the court took the view that "the adjudication of claims against a debtor, as opposed to the allocation of assets to
101. Judge Higginbotham wrote the panel's opinions, with Judges Thornberry and Reavley
concurring.
102. The court's initial opinion, dated April 5, 1985, was reported in West's advance sheets as
North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Hudspeth,
withdrawn]. The opinion is reprinted as Appendix A to Pfeiler, supra note 54, app. at 471-75.
103. The second opinion is contained in West's bound volume. See North Miss. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986) [hereinafter
Hudspeth].
104. Hudspeth, withdrawn, supra note 102, 756 F.2d at 1098.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
106. See Hudspeth, withdrawn, supra note 102, 756 F.2d at 1101.
107. See id. at 1098-99, 1103. The court had been briefed on the possible unconstitutionality of
the FSLIC's claimed adjudicative powers and on the question whether the statutory authority to
adjudicate existed; in its opinion, however, the court, chose to address only the issue of statutory
adjudicative authority. The constitutional questions raised were whether the claimed adjudicative
power violated article III of the U.S. Constitution, whether the administrative procedures available
for determining the claim were inadequate when measured against the requirements of procedural
due process, and whether the FSLIC's conflict of interest in determining claims while being one of
the creditors violated due process. Telephone interview with Wylene W. Dunbar, counsel for Hudspeth (Mar. 18, 1988).
108. Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 711 n.19 (1982); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Riehle v. Margolies, 279
U.S. 218 (1929); cf Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 346 (1967) (determination of existence of a
*security" is distinct from question of thepriorityof claims in receivership, and is ajusticiable issue);
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp., 69 F.2d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 1934) (determination, or
"liquidation," of creditor claim is a proceeding in personam against insolvent debtor, and does not
directly deal with receivership assets or receivership itself); Tocci Corp. v. Yankee Bank for Fin. &
Say., FSB, No. Civ. A. 87-3121-K (D. Mass. 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 70344) ("At common law,
receivers have no power to adjudicate claims.").
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satisfy those claims, is not a receivership function."10 9
The FSLIC then petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the effect of
the court's decision would be to place in further jeopardy the already
precarious insurance fund. The FSLIC referred to the legislative history
of the 1966 and 1968 amendments to the powers of the FHLBB and
FSLIC in support of its argument that, as receiver, it possessed the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims. 110 Hudspeth was not called
upon to respond to the petition."' The court decided to revise its decision, this time accepting the FSLIC's arguments in their entirety, and the
Supreme Court subsequently denied Hudspeth's petition for certiorari.112
In its revised opinion, the panel adopted the view that legislative
history 1 3 indicated that "Congress wanted the FSLIC to be able to act
quickly and decisively in reorganizing, operating, or dissolving a failed
institution,"' 1 4 and that the legislation expressed "the overriding Congressional purpose of expediting and facilitating the FSLIC's task as receiver." 1 5 Hence, Judge Higginbotham opined, "resolution of even the
facial merits of claims outside of the statutory reorganization process
would delay the receivership function of distribution of assets"' " 6 and, in
violation of section 1464(d)(6)(C), would constitute a restraint of the receivership. He concluded:
In short, all of Hudspeth's claims are switched to the administrative
track by section 1464(d)(6)(C). Hudspeth can challenge the FSLIC's
actions before the117FHLBB, and, if unsatisfied, can seek judicial review
under the APA.

The revised Hudspeth decision was a major victory for the FHLBB
and the FSLIC. It was rapidly followed in a host of district court deci109. See Hudspeth, withdrawn, supra note 102, 756 F.2d at 1102. The court's conclusion is
worth noting, since it rests upon a long-standing distinction between the recognition of pre-receivership claims and the exercise of general receivership powers. The court concluded:
When read in concert, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(C), 1729, and 1730(k)(1) construct an or-

derly scheme. In suits against a state savings institution in a federalized receivership,
where the relief requested would interfere with or overturn the effect of any exercise of
receivership power, the suit must be dismissed in favor of administrative proceedings
before the FHLBB. If, however, an action is based on the pre-receivership conduct of the
failed institution, the debt due may be judicially established.

d at 1103. On the distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 347-53. On subsection
1730(k)(1), see infra text accompanying notes 449-52.

110. On this legislative history, see infra text accompanying notes 395-412.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Telephone interview, supra note 107.
Hudspeth v. North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
On the court's use of the legislative history, see infra notes 381-410.
Hudspeth, supra note 103, 756 F.2d at 1101.
Id. at 1102.
Id

117. Id at 1103.

444

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:422

sions, 11 8 in those of a significant number of state courts, 119 and has been
reaffirmed in a series of subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions. 120 It was also
followed in a somewhat equivocal decision of the Seventh Circuit. 121 In
122
addition, a panel of the Ninth Circuit, dealing with the special case of
a claim brought by an insolvent thrift against the FSLIC for having alleg118. See Blakely Airport Joint Venture II v. FSLIC, 678 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Peoples' Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 677 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Kan. 1988); Vernon
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Homes Int'l Dev. Corp., 676 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Resna Assocs. v.
Financial Equity Mortgage Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1371 (D.NJ. 1987); FSLIC v. Florida 100 Dev.
Group, 670 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1987); York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100
(M.D. Pa. 1987), vacated and remanded, 851 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1988); Acquisition Corp. of Am. v.
Sunrise Say. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp.
609 (D. Utah 1987); FSLIC v. Hall Whispertree Assocs., 653 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. Tex. 1986);
Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Mont. 1987); FSLIC v. Quality Inns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918
(D. Md. 1987); Baskes v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Baer v. Abel, 649 F. Supp. 25
(W.D. Wash. 1986); Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Wash. 1986); Colony First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp. 410 (C.D. Cal. 1986); FSLIC v. Sajovich, 642 F. Supp. 74 (C.D.
Cal. 1986); Sunrise Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lir Dev. Co., 641 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Fla. 1986); First Am.
Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Wash. 1986); Rembold v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Wash. 1985), rev'd sub nor. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451); Murdock-SC
Assocs. v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987),petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Murdock-SC
Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-452); Gibraltar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. State
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 607 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1985); cf First Fin. Say. & Loan v. FSLIC, 651 F.
Supp. 1289 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (Hudspeth decision recognized but FSLIC held estopped from reconsidering merits of claims already determined in state court). Unreported decisions have been omitted to save space.
119. See Modem Supply Co. v. FSLIC, 50 Wash. App. 194,748 P.2d 251 (1987) (split decision);
Keller v. Antioch Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 143 Ill. App. 3d 278, 492 N.E.2d 937 (1986); FSLIC v.
Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 336, 225 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. CL 949 (1987);
Union County Bank v. Knox Capital Corp., No. C/A 657 (Tenn. Ct..App. Apr. 18, 1986) (Westlaw,
1986 WL 4598); see also FSLIC v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d I (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing the
general proposition enunciated in Hudspeth. but rejecting the argument that the FSLIC is entitled to
redetermine the validity of claims that a court and jury have already adjudicated).
120. See Red Fox Indus. v. FSLIC, 832 F.2d 340, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1987); Coit Independence
Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. grantedsub nom. Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S. CL 1105 (1988); FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391,
1393-94 (5th Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert filed sub nom. Zohdi v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3196 (U.S.
Aug. 5, 1987) (No. 87-255); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269, 1270 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290, 1292-94 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming decision of district court to
deny motion for reconsideration of order granting dismissal of depositors' claim that their deposit
was insured). But cf Northshore Dev. v. Lee, 835 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1988). In Northshore, the
court held that when a judgment has already been entered prior to receivership, FSLIC can, on the
basis of the Hudspeth doctrine, remove the action to federal court and have it dismissed. Id at 593.
The court, however, then noted that this does not imply that the district court must also vacate the
judgment-FSLIC must choose between pursuing an appeal or securing dismissal and accepting the
judgment. Id (district court's denial of motion to vacate held not an abuse of discretion).
121. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987); see
infra note 134.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 241-43.
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edly transferred its assets negligently to a buyer, has held that ection
1464(d)(6)(C) strips the district courts of jurisdiction to hear the

action. 123
2. Morrison-Knudsen: No Statutory Authority. After a year and
a half of uncritical acceptance in federal courts, the Hudspeth doctrine
received its first major setback at the hands of a panel of the Ninth Circuit in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International,Inc. 124 The case
involved an insolvent, federally chartered thrift, Westside Federal Savings and Loan Association (Westside), for which the FSLIC had been
appointed receiver. Westside was involved in five pre-receivership
claims 12 5 that the FSLIC, once it had been appointed Westside's receiver,
sought to have dismissed by the respective adjudicating and supervising
district courts. The FSLIC's motions in the first four claims had been
granted on the basis of the Hudspeth doctrine, but the supervising court
in the motion involving the fifth claim had denied the FSLIC's motion.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that there was no appellate jurisdiction in two of
the claims, but reversed the orders of dismissal in the other three.
The court was faced with challenges to both the FSLIC's statutory
authority to adjudicate claims and its constitutional authority to do so
1 26
It
given the provisions of article III of the United States Constitution.
engaged in an extensive analysis of the statutory framework and legislative history of the FSLIC, its powers under sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and
1729(d), and the regulations promulgated by the FHLBB for processing
claims in receiverships, and concluded that the legislation was not intended to confer adjudicatory powers on the receiver.1 27 While acknowledging that the FSLIC has been vested with full receivership powers, the
Court rejected the assumption in the second Hudspeth opinion that these
included adjudication.
123. See Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. FSLIC, 834 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1987).
124. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs.,

56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451). The Ninth Circuit opinion was written by
Judge Sneed, joined by Judges Kennedy and Beezer. For a criticism of Morrison-Knudsen, see Huber, Enforcement Powers of FederalBankingAgencies, 7 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 123, 160-61 (1988)
(describing the case as "a decision for the home team").
125. In the first claim it had been impleaded as a third-party defendant, having allegedly guaranteed repayment of a loan in default for which another thrift was being sued. In the second claim, a
developer (CHG), to whom Westside had lent $6.5 million, had declared bankruptcy; a co-participant in a loan agreement sought declaratory orders against Westside regarding the validity of the
agreement, as well as damages and an order quieting title. The third and fourth claims against
Westside involved contractual damages and equitable relief arising out of the bankruptcy of CHG.
The fifth claim was filed by Westside itself in CHG's bankruptcy proceedings. Morrison-Knudsen,
811 F.2d at 1213.
126. See infra note 538 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 in full).
127. See 811 F.2d at 1222.
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The rock upon which FSLIC's arguments break is that a receiver's
ordinary functions do not include adjudication. Judicial adjudication
... does not restrain or affect a receivership; it simply determines the
existence and amount of claims
that a receiver is to honor in its even12 8
tual distribution of assets.
The court buttressed its statutory interpretation by addressing the
constitutional challenge as well. While declining to go so far as to hold
the FSLIC's assertions of adjudicatory jurisdiction to be in violation of
article III, the court was not persuaded that "the powers [the FSLIC]
seeks easily survive Northern Pipeline scrutiny." 129 This apprehension induced the court to read sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) so as to avoid
the constitutional difficulty. Though the court recognized that Congress
might, "with careful limitations like those governing FSLIC's adjudication of regulatory violations... have crafted an adjudicatory jurisdiction
for FSLIC in its receivership capacity that would pass constitutional
muster," it found itself "convinced" that Congress had "not attempted to
do so. ''130 In other words, the court, anticipating serious article III difficulties, read the statutory provisions upon which the FSLIC had relied
narrowly and rejected the FSLIC's assertion that they conferred an adjudicatory jurisdiction. 131
The strict interpretive approach of the Ninth Circuit has subsequently been followed in a number of federal and state courts1 32 includ128. Id. at 1217 (citing, as did the first Hudspeth opinion, Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947));
see supra note 108.
129. 811 F.2d at 1221 (referring to Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982), in which the Court had ruled the bankruptcy court scheme established by the
1978 Bankruptcy Act to be a violation of article III); see infra text accompanying notes 545-59.
130. 811 F.2d at 1222. Here the court was, in effect, merely applying the well-established principle that a statute should be construed, if possible, so as to save it from constitutional infirmities. See,
eg., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2614 (1988); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986).
131. The court did, however, recognize that a creditor might be required to exhaust her administrative remedies, and the three claims were remanded for the district court to address this issue. In
deciding whether to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the panel thought the trial
court should consider whether: (i) resort to the administrative process would be futile; (ii) the administrative process was well-understood and well-developed; (ii) a prompt decision as to all of the
contested issues in the case was likely; (iv) an exhaustion requirement would be fair to the parties in
light of their resources; (v) it would be fair to other parties in the case whose interests might be
affected; (vi) the interests of judicial economy would be served by requiring exhaustion; and (vii) the
agency demonstrates that not requiring exhaustion would unduly interfere with its functioning. See
811 F.2d at 1223-24.
132. See, eg., Murdock-SC Assocs. v. Beverly Hills Say., 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987), petition
for cert.filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Murdock-SC Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No.
87-452); Homestead Say. v. Life Say. & Loan Ass'n, 668 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (opinion vacated and removed from bound volume, but appears in West's advance sheets, see infra text
accompanying notes 738-39); FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405, 1416 (D. Utah
1987); Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC, 742 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); cf FSLIC v.
Frumenti Dev. Corp., 676 F. Supp. 957, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (applying Morrison-Knudsen reason-
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ing, most recently, the Supreme Court of Texas. 133 On the other hand,
Morrison-Knudsen has also been expressly rejected in favor of the Hudspeth doctrine by a number of other courts. 134
3. Glen Ridge: A Violation of Article III Even if statutory authority to adjudicate does exist, neither the Morrison-Knudsen decision
nor the decisions that have followed it have directly addressed the question whether such authority would be constitutional. The Constitution
did, however, play a decisive role in the Texas court of appeals' decision
in Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. Federal Savings & Loan Insur136
ance Corporation.13 The court, in two carefully reasoned opinions,
concluded that the FSLIC had been granted statutory authority to adjudicate claims and that such authority was a violation of article III.
Although the Texas Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional
issue, 137 the court of appeals' decision is worth considering since it is the
only one to date that has directly addressed underlying constitutional
concerns.
big in remanding to a state court a claim involving only state-law rights and obligations, even though

the FSLIC was a party); Peninsula Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 506, 509-11
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (distinguishing Hudspeth and partially applying principles enunciated in MorrisonKnudsen relating to exhaustion of remedies).
133. See FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam), aff'g
on other grounds 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). The decision of the court of appeals is
discussed infra in text accompanying notes 135-40.
134. The Seventh Circuit, in Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 828 F.2d
387, 391-95 (7th Cir. 1987), decided, in the absence of fuller argument, to follow Hudspeth. A
number of district courts have expressly chosen Hudspeth over Morrison-Knudsen. See, e.g., Peoples' Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 677 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (D. Kan. 1988);
Vernon Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Homes Int'l Dev. Corp., 676 F. Supp. 247,249 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Resna
Assocs. v. Financial Equity Mortgage Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1371, 1377 (D.N.J. 1987); FSLIC v.
Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp. 1577, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1987); York Bank & Trust Co. v.
FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Pa. 1987), vacated and remanded, 851 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1988);
Acquisition Corp. of Am. v. Sunrise Say. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138, 140 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Utah 1987).
135. 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988)
(per curiam).
136. In the court of appeals there were two motions for rehearings. The first was granted and
the court withdrew its initial order affirming the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the
FSLIC as receiver for Empire Savings and Loan. It reversed the judgment of the trial court and filed
an opinion on December 30, 1986. Then, through a new panel in which only one of the original
three judges remained, the court denied the second motion for rehearing and, on June 25, 1987, filed
a supplemental opinion in support of its earlier decision, taking into account the opinions in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), the most recent Supreme Court
decision on the application of article III to administrative agencies. See infra text accompanying
notes 589-95.
137. See FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, 750 S.W.2d at 758-59 (affirming the court of
appeals' decision on the ground that statutory authority was lacking).
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The Empire Savings and Loan Association (Empire) had partly financed real estate investment by Glen Ridge. When Empire went insolvent and the FSLIC was appointed its receiver, the FSLIC posted Glen
Ridge's property for executive foreclosure pursuant to the relevant deeds
of trust. Glen Ridge sued the FSLIC, Empire and the various trustees in
state court for cancellation of the deeds of trust, damages, injunctive re-

lief, and attorneys fees. Some claims were based on state law and others
on federal law. The FSLIC, relying upon Hudspeth, had secured dismissal by the trial court of Glen Ridge's claims.
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court insofar
as the state-law claims were concerned, but affirmed the dismissal of the

federal law claims.1 38 Confining itself to the state-law claims, the Texas
court went even further than the Ninth Circuit had done in MorrisonKnudsen, ruling that sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) did indeed purport to grant adjudicatory jurisdiction and that, insofar as this jurisdic-

tion included state-law claims, it violated article

111.139

Motivating the

court was the view that the adjudicatory scheme established by the
FHLBB and the FSLIC fell far short of the criteria laid down by the

United States Supreme Court for permissible departures from the literal
provisions of article 111.140

Prior to Glen Ridge a district court had rejected an article III challenge on the basis that "NorthernPipeline does not apply to administrative claims procedures,"1 41 a conclusion that seems clearly wrong. The
holding in Glen Ridge itself has apparently not yet been fully considered
in subsequent decisions involving the FSLIC. The article III question
has, however, been raised in a few other cases, including two currently
pending before the Supreme Court.1 4 2 In each case the lower courts have
1 43
treated the article III issue as not yet ripe for decision.

138. 734 S.W.2d at 387.
139. See id. at 385-87.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 568-73, 582, 590-95 (discussing these criteria).
141. See Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576, 581-82 (N.D.
Il1. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987).
142. See Thomes v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 837 F.2d 1317, 1318 (5th Cir. 1988); Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted
sub nom. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S.Ct. 1105 (1988); American Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Westside Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. C-85-323-C, slip op. (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4,
1986), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit at 38a, FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87451) [hereinafter Stevenson Petition], rev'd sub nom. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811
F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987),petitionfor cert.filed sub nor. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W.
at 3249.
143. In Thomes v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 831 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987), a panel of the
Fifth Circuit, while applying the Hudspeth doctrine insofar as the appellant's non-constitutional
challenges were concerned, took note of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Morrison-Knudsen and as-
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4. Other ConstitutionalIssues. Various other constitutional challenges to the FHLBB and FSLIC procedures have also been raised (unsuccessfully so far). Of the most important, it has been argued that the
grant of adjudicatory power to the FSLIC constitutes a violation of the
nondelegation doctrine,144 that it violates the seventh amendment by denying the right to a jury trial, 145 and that it constitutes a violation of due
process, either because it deprives the creditor-claimant of a constitutionally adequate hearing or because the FSLIC, as both receiver and insurer,
146
has conflicting interests when adjudicating creditors' claims.
In less important challenges, a litigant has contended that the effect
of applying the FSLIC's argument, in this case so as to nullify a prior
attachment order in the creditor's favor, constitutes an unconstitutional
taking of a compensable property right, 147 and the question of sovereign
immunity has been invoked several times, sometimes with success, by the
FSLIC in order to buttress its assertion of exclusive jurisdiction to determine claims. 14 8 The takings and immunity questions will not be examined in this article.
signed for oral argument the appellant's article III challenge to the FSLIC's exercise of adjudicatory
jurisdiction. See id. at 559. But the court subsequently dismissed the constitutional challenges as
unripe because the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. Thomes, 837 F.2d at
1318.
144. See Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 78 (W.D. Wash. 1986); First Am. Say. Bank, F.S.B. v.
Westside Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93, 100 (W.D. Wash. 1986); American Fed Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, No. C-85-323-C, slip op., reprintedin Stevenson Petition, supra note 142, at 49a-50; see
also infra text accompanying notes 520-37.
145. See Colt Independence Joint Venture, 829 F.2d at 565; Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 77-78; see also
infra text accompanying notes 638-57.
146. See Colt Independence Joint Venture 829 F.2d at 564-65; FSLIC v. Florida 100 Dev.
Group, 670 F. Supp 1577, 1583 (S.D. Fla 1987); Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 78; FirstAm. Say. Bank 639
F. Supp. at 100; Modem Supply Co. v. FSLIC, 50 Wash. App. 194, 205, 748 P.2d 251, 257-58
(1987); see also infra text accompanying notes 601-37.
147. See, eg., FSLIC v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 336, 343, 225 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425-26
(1986) (issue not ripe for review), cerL denied, 107 S. CL 949 (1987).
148. The contexts within which the claims of immunity have been made have varied, and the
response of the courts has been mixed. See, eg., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811
F.2d 1209, 1214-15, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1987) (FSLIC's sovereign immunity held waived by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(b)(1)(B)), petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249
(U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451); FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405, 1417 (D.
Utah 1987) (FSLIC's claim of adjudicatory power under 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) rejected along with
claim of sovereign immunity); Baer v. Abel, 649 F. Supp. 25, 26-27 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (court declared that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear counterclaims against FSLIC where FSLIC
acted as receiver and defendants had not exhausted administrative remedies); Baer, 648 F. Supp. at
75-77 (FSLIC held immune from suit where FSLIC acted as receiver and plaintiffs did not bring
claim in administrative forum); Colony First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp. 410,
414-15, 417-18 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (FHLBB held immune from suit challenging its appointment of a
conservator; claims against individual officers banned where they acted in their official capacities);
Modern Supply Co., 50 Wash. App. at 194, 748 P.2d at 251 (state court lacked jurisdiction over
claim against FSLIC in its capacity as receiver); Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC, 742 S.W.2d 446,
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Optionsfor Dealing With Troubled Thrifts.

1. Sales and Financial Assistance. 14 9 Thrifts are continuously
monitored for safety and soundness by the examinations staff of the District Banks and the FHLBB's Office of Regulatory Policy, Oversight and
Supervision. A primary concern is to try to prevent thrifts from failing
in the first place; to this end the FSLIC has been granted extensive statutory powers to obviate outright receivership by lending assistance to
troubled thrifts. 150
When the FHLBB's Office of Regulatory Policy, Oversight and Supervision believes that a thrift is in imminent danger of default, it calls
upon the FSLIC's Mergers and Acquisitions Division to determine if
some method short of receivership can be devised to rehabilitate the
thrift or dispose of it in a manner that would protect all the parties involved. The FSLIC can provide loans or contributions to the troubled
thrift, acquire its assets or liabilities, financially assist its merger with
another institution, consolidate it with others, or convert it from mutual
to stock ownership in order to infuse it with new capital.15 1 The FSLIC
has also developed a Management Consignment Program, under which
the thrift's management is replaced, pending the arrangement of a
merger.152
454 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (FSLIC not, in this instance, a court-appointed receiver, and enjoys no
judicial immunity); Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374, 384 (rex. Ct.
App. 1986) (case held not to involve automatically a "public right," thus justifying an administrative
tribunal, simply because Congress waived FSLIC's immunity), aff'd, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988)
(per curiam); cf FHLBB v. Hague, 664 F. Supp. 245, 251 (W.D. La. 1987) (FSLIC and FHLBB
enjoy sovereign immunity from suits sounding in tort and contract, and thus may not be sued directly), aff'd, 840 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1988); Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Mont.
1987) (federal court jurisdiction over claims against FSLIC as receiver precluded until administrative procedure complete); Colony FirstFed Say. & Loan Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. at 416-17 (dealing with
immunity under Federal Tort Claims Act).
149. See generally FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 49-53; W. LovETr, supra note 30, at 131-44;
E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 40, at 600-03 (bank regulation context).
150. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1729(f) (West Supp. 1988).
151. See FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 49; Williams, Thrift Acquisitions andMergers= Statutory and Regulatory Framework and Current Issues, in OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SEMINAR 715, 981-93 (1987). As this article went to press, the
FHLBB published guidelines regarding FSLIC's policy on financial assistance. See FSLIC Statement of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Insured Institutions Absent a Requirement for an
Immediate Merge Acquisition by a Third Party, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,714 (1988).
152. The Management Consignment Program is designed to minimize the ultimate cost of rehabilitation, merger or liquidation by facilitating FSLIC intervention where a thrift's assets are being
dissipated. See FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 51-52; 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 28 (1987); Williams, supra note 151, at 985-86. The program has been criticized by some observers as ineffective.
See Stevenson, A Good Idea Gone Sour: Savings Talent on Loan, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1988, at DI,
col. 4, D9, col. 2 (city ed.).

Vol. 1988:422]

THE HUDSPETH DOCTRINE

2. Receivership. If it is not feasible to rehabilitate or merge the
insolvent thrift, the FHLBB places the thrift into receivership, and ap15 3
points, as appropriate, either the FSLIC or FDIC as receiver.
Because of the need to avoid loss of confidence in the thrift industry
as a whole, large thrifts have tended to be treated more favorably than
their smaller counterparts. An example is the highly publicized assistance given recently by the FSLIC to the American Savings and Loan
Association.1 54 Following the example of action taken the previous day
by the FDIC to assist the subsidiary banks of the First Republicbank
Corporation of Dallas, 15 5 and in order to prevent a crisis of public confidence, the FHLBB announced that all deposits in American, regardless
of size, would be guaranteed by the FSLIC. The effect of such a measure
is not only to provide unlimited deposit insurance' 56 but also to keep
open the doors of a thrift, thereby maintaining the ordinary legal rights
of creditors. If the Hudspeth doctrine is valid, this means that the rights
of creditors depend significantly on the decision whether to assist a thrift
or place it into receivership.
3. FederalAsset DispositionAssociation. In the process of assisting or liquidating a troubled thrift, the FSLIC frequently takes over
thrift assets with a view to managing and ultimately realizing them at
their optimal value. To provide specialist attention to this function, the
FHLBB chartered a private company, wholly owned by the FSLIC, in
1985. This is the Federal Asset Disposition Association, which has a ten157
year charter.

153. See infra text accompanying notes 166-75.

154. See Nash, U.S. Aids FinancialCorp. Uni N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1988, at 17, col. 3 (national
ed.).
155. See Nash, Large Texas Bank to get $1 Billion in Federal Rescue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1988, at 1, col. 6 (national ed.).
156. Deposit insurance is limited by statute to $100,000 per individual depositor. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1724(b) (1982).
157. See FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 53-54; 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 29 (1987). The
FADA, which Congress recently placed under the audit authority of the Comptroller General, see
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 403, 101 Stat. 552, 609 (codified at

31 U.S.C.A. § 9105(a) (West Supp. 1988)), has been subjected to severe criticism for having failed to
achieve its purposes and for becoming insolvent itself. The House Banking Committee has recom-

mended its abolition. See H.R. 5094, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 703, introduced, 134 CONG. REc.
H5887 (daily ed. July 26, 1988); H.R. REP. No. 822, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 143 (1988);
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANcE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
FEDERAL ASSET DISPOSITION ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO ITS OPERATIONS AND

PERFORMANCE (Comm. Print), reprintedin 134 CONG. REc. H2203-06 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988).
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Placing Thrifts into Receivership.

1. The Agencies Involved. When a thrift is federally insured, two
of three federal agencies are involved in its supervision and receivership. 158 The FHLBB exercises overall regulatory control. The FSLIC,
which is always under the direction of the FHLBB,15 9 acts a receiver for
the thrifts it insures. The FDIC, which is under the direction of the
FHLBB when appointed the receiver of a federal thrift,l 6° acts as re1 61
ceiver for federal savings banks.
The three agencies deal with three categories of thrifts. First are
federal thrifts: those savings and loan associations and savings banks
chartered, or converted to federal charter, by the FHLBB under the
Home Owners' Loan Act 62 and insured by either the FSLIC or the
FDIC. Second are those state-chartered thrifts that are insured by the
FSLIC subject to the direction of the .FHLBB. Third are state-chartered
-savings banks, which can be insured by the FDIC without any FHLBB
involvement.1 63 Because the FDIC has only adopted the Hudspeth doctrine when it has been appointed receiver by the FHLBB, 164 this article
will consider only receiverships involving the first two categories.
2.

Power to Appoint Receivers.

a. Federally chartered thrifts. In the case of federally chartered
thrifts, the FHLBB has exclusive authority under the Home Owners'
Loan Act to appoint a receiver.1 65 If the thrift is insured by the FSLIC,
158. State-chartered savings banks are a narrow exception in that, even if insured by the FDIC,
they are not subject to the regulation of the FHLBB.
159. See 12 U.S.C. § 1725(a) (1982).
160. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 167-69.
162. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982).
163. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(a), 1815(a) (1982).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 444-46.
165. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A)-(B). The grounds for appointing a receiver (or conservator)
are one or more of the following:

(i) insolvency in that the assets of the association are less than its obligations to its creditors and others, including its members; (ii) substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due

to any violation or violations of law, rules, or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound
practice or practices; (iii) an unsafe or unsound conditions [sic] to transact business; (iv)
willfull violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become final; (v) concealment of

books, papers, records, or assets of the association or refusal to submit books, papers,
records, or affairs of the association for inspection to any examiner or to any lawful agent
of the Board[;] ...

... [or] in the event that (i) the association, by resolution of its board of directors or of

its members, consents to such appointment, or (ii) the association is removed from mem-

bership in any Federal home loan bank, or its status as an institution the accounts of which
are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation is terminated.
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the FSLIC must be appointed receiver. 166 If, on the other hand, the
thrift is a savings bank chartered under section 1464(o) and insured by
the FDIC, 167 the FDIC must be appointed receiver.' 68 Whereas the
FHLBB has frequently appointed the FSLIC as a receiver, the FDIC has
69
to date been appointed only once by the FHLBB.1
b. State-chartered thrifts. In the case of state-chartered thrifts
that are insured by the FSLIC, the FHLBB has exclusive authority
under the National Housing Act to appoint the FSLIC as receiver if the
thrift is in a stat of insolvency, if it is losing assets due to violations of
law or unsafe or unsound practices, or if it is in an unsafe or unsound
condition to transact business. 170 The FSLIC then has all the receiver17 1
ship powers it enjoys as a receiver for a federal thrift.
If, on the other hand, a state decides to place a state-chartered thrift
into receivership and that thrift is insured by the FSLIC, the FSLIC may
be appointed receiver by the state authority; if so, it possesses the same
powers as those it enjoys as a federal receiver. 172 The FHLBB will then
"federalize" the receivership and assume supervisory control of the
FSLIC as receiver.1 73 The legislation also leaves open the possibility that
the state authority could place a thrift into receivership and not appoint
the FSLIC as receiver,1 74 though in most cases the FHLBB would in any
175
event be entitled to federalize the receivership and appoint the FSLIC.
c. Exclusivity of the FHLBB'spower of appointment and removaL
The Home Owners' Loan Act authorizes the Board to appoint receivers
without notice, 76 but the association is entitled to challenge this appoint166. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(D), 1729(b)(1) (1982).
167. The FDIC is required to insure the accounts of federal savings banks. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 1726(a)(1) (1982).
168. See 12 U.S.C.

§§ 1464(d)(6)(D), 1821(c) (1982).

169. Telephone interview with Judith L. Friedman, Associate General Counsel, FHLBB (Mar.
21, 1988); see 52 Fed. Reg. 49,204 (1987) (appointing the FDIC as receiver for Yankee Bank for
Finance and Savings, FSB).

170. See 12 U.S.C.
171. See 12 U.S.C.

§§ 1729(c)(1)(B), 1464(d)(6)(A)(i)-(iii).
§ 1729(c)(1)(B)(i)(II).

172. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(1)(A).
173. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(1)(B)-(c)(2); see also Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 689
F.2d 803, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1982) (statutory requirements were satisfied for appointment of the
FSLIC as federal receiver), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
174. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(1). If the thrift is federally insured but the FSLIC is not appointed
receiver, the FSLIC is required to pay the insurance and is entitled "(1) to bid for the assets of the
insured institution in default, (2) negotiate for the merger of the insured institution or the transfer of

its assets, or (3) make any other disposition of the matter as it may deem in the best interests of all
concerned." Id.
175. See 12 U.S.C.
176. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 1729(c)(2).
§ 1464(d)(6)(A)-(B).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

454

[Vol. 1988:422

ment in a federal district court within thirty days. 177 Subject to this exception, section 1464(d)(6)(C) provides that
no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any conservator or receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board, restrain or
affect the8 exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or
receiver. 17

3.

Powers Upon Appointment.

a. Powers conferred by statute. When the FHLBB was given regulatory responsibility over federal savings banks, the insuring and receivership role of the FDIC was retained. This created the possible anomaly
that thrift receiverships might be governed, depending on which agency
was appointed receiver, by two separate pieces of legislation: if the
FSLIC were appointed, the National Housing Act would apply; if the
FDIC were appointed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act would apply.
The FHLBB's rules relating to federal receiverships purport, however, to
apply to both the FSLIC and the FDIC, 179 and there is statutory language to support this view.' 80 Hence the powers of both the FSLIC and
the FDIC acting under the supervision of the FHLBB will be treated as
being the same. 8 1 In any event, the general receivership practices of the
FDIC are sufficiently similar to those of the FSLIC for present purposes
82
to permit focus upon the FSLIC.
177. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A).
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C); see infra text accompanying notes 394-403.
179. See 12 C.F.R. § 549.1(b) (1988); cf Conservators and Receivers, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970,
48,973 (proposed Nov. 8, 1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 549.2) (extending the application of
the FHLBB's Hudspeth procedures to the FDIC).
180. The receivership power (to buy at its own sale) conferred upon the FSLIC as receiver by 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(D) is expressly stated to be applicable to the FDIC as receiver of a closed savings bank. And the powers conferred upon the FSLIC as receiver in 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b) are stated
to be applicable to federal savings banks as well. Id
181. In the only receivership in which it has been appointed by the FHLBB, see supra note 169,
the FDIC has successfully secured the dismissal of at least one creditor's complaint from a federal
district court on the basis of Hudspeth principles. See Rivers v. Yankee Bank for Fin. & Say., FSB,
No. 88-0004-C (S.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 81615) (single-page memorandum
decision). On the other hand, a Massachusetts district court, in a fully reasoned opinion, has subsequently refused to recognize the FDIC's and FHLBB's claims to exclusive jurisdiction and has in
effect rejected the Hudspeth doctrine for FDIC savings bank receiverships. See Tocci Corp. v. Yankee Bank for Fin. & Say., FSB, No. 87-3121-K (D. Mass. May 25, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 70344).
182. On FDIC receiverships, see generally FDIC, THE FiRsr FIFrY YEARS: A HISToRY OF
THE FDIC 1933-1983 ch. 5 (1984); E. SYMONS & J. WHrrE, supra note 40, at 600-707; Skillera,
FederalDepositInsurance Corporationand the FailedBank- The PastDecade (pts. 1 & 2), 99 BANKING L.". 233, 292 (1982); Note, FailingBanks: Creditors'Rightsandthe DistributionofBank Asset.
7 AM. REv. BANKING L. 325 (1988); Comment, Bank Failureand the FDIC: .4 Survey of Legal
Rights and Relationshipsof the Client and the Insolvent Bank, 18 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1193 (1987);
Note, The ModifiedPayoffofFailedBanks:. A Settlement Practiceto Inject MarketDisciplineinto the
Commercial Banking System, 73 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1987); Note, Creditors' Remedies Against the
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Under the National Housing Act, when the FSLIC is appointed as
the receiver of a thrift, it is authorized as receiver
(i) to take over the assets of and operate such association;
(ii) to take such action as may be necessary to put it in a sound solvent
condition;
(ii) to merge it with another insured institution;
(iv) to organize a new Federal association to take over its assets;
(v) to proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner; or
(vi) to make such other disposition of the matter as it deems appropriate; whichever it deems to be in the best interest of the association, its
savers, and the [FSLIC] ....183

In addition, the receiver "shall pay all valid credit obligations of the
association."

18 4

Section 1729 supplements these powers and duties by granting a
wide range of powers to the FSLIC to contract, form new federal thrifts,
and lend financial and managerial assistance to existing ones. 185 Subsection 1729(d) also provides that:
[i]n connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the
[FSLIC] shall have power to carry on the business of and to collect all
obligations to the insured institutions, to settle, compromise, or release
claims in favor of or against the insured institutions, and to do all other
things that may be necessary in connection therewith, subject only to
the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or, in cases
where the [FSLIC] has been appointed conservator, receiver, or legal
custodian solely by a public authority having jurisdiction over the matter other than
said Board, subject only to the regulation of such public
186
authority.

FDICas Receiver ofa FailedNationalBank, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1429 (1986). For differences between
the powers of the FDIC and the FSLIC, see infra text accompanying notes 447-52.
183. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(A). The legislation formerly required the FSLIC to act in the best
interest of the "insured members of the association in default." National Housing Act of 1934, ch.
847, § 406(b), 48 Stat. 1246, 1260. The amendment was contained in the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 122(b), 96 Stat. 1469, 1481.
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(B).
185. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1729(a), (f) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
186. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). The original section 1729(d) was amended in 1982 by the
Gan-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 122(g), 96 Stat. at 1482-83.
Section 1729(d) had previously read:
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions in default, the [FSLIC] shall have
power to carry on the business of and to collect all obligations to the insured institutions, to
settle, compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions, and to
do all other things that may be necessary in connection therewith, subject only to the
regulation of the court or other public authority having jurisdiction over the matter.
National Housing Act, ch. 847, § 406(d), 48 Stat. at 1260. The Garn-St Germain Act therefore
substituted a new final clause emphasizing the exclusive regulatory authority of the FHLBB when
the FHLBB appoints the FSLIC as the receiver of a state thrift. The amendment was subject to an
automatic sunset that came into effect on October 13, 1986, but it was restored in August 1987 by
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 509(a), 101 Stat. 552, 635
(1987). Whether the amendment makes any difference for our purposes is doubtful. Indeed, prior to
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b. The Board's regulatorypowers. The Home Owners' Loan Act
also grants to the FHLBB a general power to regulate the conduct of
receiverships:
The Board shall have power to make rules and regulations for the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation, and dissolution of associations,
for the merger of associations with associations or with any institutions
the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, for associations in conservatorship and receivership, and for the conduct of conservatorships and receiverships; and
the Board may, by regulation or otherwise, provide for the exercise of
functions by members, directors, or officers of an association during
87
conservatorship or receivership.1
The FHLBB has promulgated rules under this section, including the
88
rules governing the Hudspeth process.
4. StrategiesDeveloped by the FSLIC.189 When it has been determined that a receivership is necessary, responsibility for the troubled
thrift shifts to the Insurance Division of the FSLIC. A team from the
Division, acting on a written order of seizure of the FHLBB, moves to
seize the institution in question. 190 The operation is performed secretly
and quickly in order to avoid public panic or last-minute maneuvering by
the thrift's management to improve their own financial positions. The
senior management is relieved of its duties immediately, the institution's
doors are sealed, and the Insurance Division arranges a direct or indirect
payout to insured depositors.
To conserve the insurance fund, the FSLIC tries to avoid a direct
payout and liquidation wherever possible. In most cases it now uses its
powers under section 1729(b)(1)(A) 19 1 to arrange "purchase and assumption transactions":19 2 either a simple transfer of insured accounts to anthe Garn-St Germain Act, section 1729(c)(3) had stated that "[i]n connection with the liquidation
of any [state-chartered] institution, the language 'the court or other public authority having jurisdic-

tion over the matter' in subsection (d) of this section shall mean the said Board." Bank Protection
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, § 6, 82 Stat. 294, 296, repealed by Gan-St Germain Depository

Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 122, 96 Stat. at 1482; see Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC,
742 S.W.2d 446, 449 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (determination of which version of section 1729(d)
applies is inconsequential); see also infra text accompanying notes 415-19.
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(11); see infra text accompanying notes 404-06.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 203-05.
189. See generally FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 52-53; Pfeiler, supra note 54, at 441-42 (discussing the FSLIC's adoption of "comprehensive administrative procedure for handling receiverships"); Williams, supra note 151, at 981-1002 (reviewing FSLIC techniques for resolving
supervisory acquisitions and mergers).
190. See FHLB GUIDE, supra note 52, at 52.
191. See supra text accompanying note 183.
192. Though a well-established practice, see, eg., 12 C.F.R. § 569a.13 (1988), purchase and assumption transactions were first fully addressed and defined only in 1985, by the FHLBB's proposed
rules relating to conservatorships and receiverships, see infra note 201.

Vol. 1988:422]

THE HUDSPETH DOCTRINE

other institution (which will have bid for these at a slight premium), or

193
an asset-backed transfer of accounts to a newly created mutual thrift.

Where the transferee assumes all the liabilities of the failed thrift, the
problem of processing the claims of creditors disappears since creditors
continue to enjoy their ordinary rights against the transferee institution. 194 If some of the liabilities of the thrift in receivership are not transferred, however, the creditors will retain only a right of claim against the
FSLIC as receiver for the failed thrift.19 5 Hence it is only where the
FSLIC decides on a direct payout and liquidation, or on a partial
purchase and assumption transaction, that the claims of creditors require
resolution, and it is in this context that we turn to examine the administrative process devised by the FHLBB for handling these claims.
5. Claims Procedures. Claims against failed thrifts are institutionally and procedurally separated at the FSLIC.1 96 Those made by in193. In 1986, for example, 8 of the 10 completed liquidations involved transfers of accounts
rather than direct payouts. 1986 FHLBB ANN. REP. 27 table 5 (1987).
194. See, eg., Bean v. Independent Am. Say. Ass'n, 838 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1988). In Bean, a
panel of the Fifth Circuit, per Judge Higginbotham (who wrote the opinion in Hudspeth), refused to
extend the Hudspeth doctrine to creditors whose claims have been assumed by a new thrift. "[B]y
transferring a liability or asset the FSLIC has determined that claims related to it should not be
switched to the administrative track .... " Id at 743.
195. When this happens, the remaining creditors are prejudiced in that they have to share in a
distribution from a balance of assets that is, by virtue of the insolvency of the thrift, likely to be
insufficient to meet their claims in full. See Pfeiler, supra note 54, at 442. Whether this preference is
either authorized or fair is an open question.
Here, as in the initial decision whether to lend a thrift financial assistance or place it in receivership, see supra text accompanying notes 149-56, the decision is crucial to the rights of creditors.
The question of fairness to general creditors is also raised by the FHLBB's recent creation of an
express depositor priority in certain purchase and assumption transactions and in the payment of
claims from proceeds of certain thrift liquidations. The FHLBB has recognized the general principle
that the claims of general creditors should rank equally with those of insured depositors. See Conservators and Receivers; Priority of Claims, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,129, 25,133 (1988) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 569c.11(a)(6)). In the case of state-chartered thrifts chartered in states that have themselves enacted depositor-priority legislation, however, and in the case of claims against federally
chartered thrifts that are competing with depositor claims booked or registered in states with such
legislation, the FHLBB has now established its own depositor-priority system. See Conservators and
Receivers; Priority of Claims; Depositor Priority, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,665, 30,667-68 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.11(a)(6)). Given the parlous state of many insolvent thrifts, this new priority is likely in effect to extinguish general creditor claims altogether. See, eg., FHLBB Resolution
No. 88-378P (May 18, 1988) (appointment of receiver for Lamar Savings Association, Austin,
Texas) (finding "the Association's general creditors' claims... worthless" after applying the available proceeds to the satisfaction of the Association's secured and deposit liabilities). Not only does
this action severely stretch the FHLBB's asserted statutory authority, but it also seems to cast further doubt on the agency's ability to act as a genuinely impartial adjudicator in the case of claims
fied by general creditors.
196. Whereas it is governed by the FHLBB's Hudspeth procedures when processing the claims
of uninsured creditors, the FDIC applies its own procedures in determining and paying the claims of
insured depositors. Cf Conservators and Receivers, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,992 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
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sured depositors are handled by the Insurance Division of the Office of
the FSLIC (OFSLIC), 197 and claims involving uninsured depositors and
other creditors are processed by FSLIC as receiver of the failed institution in question, functioning through the FSLIC's Operations and Liquidations Division (with the assistance of a division of the Office of General
Counsel). FSLIC Corporate would then itself become a claimant against
198
the thrift in receivership (FSLIC Receiver).
Though the procedures for processing the claims of insured depositors are fairly well-developed and well-codified, 9 9 the procedures for
processing uninsured and general creditor claims are still highly informal
and in a state of development. This is partly because the increase in the
range of creditor claims and the number of outright liquidations are
fairly recent developments, 2°° and partly because judicial approval in
Hudspeth for the administrative adjudication process came only in 1985.
Late in 1985 the FHLBB published a set of proposed rules codifying the
Hudspeth procedures, 20 1 but these have not yet been converted into final
rules. 20 2 At present the procedures for processing claims are governed by
an earlier set of rules, 20 3 supplemented by a set of unpublished guidelines, 204 which were formerly made available to individual claimants by
§ 569c.7(b)(4)) (proposed Nov. 8, 1985) (exempting the FDIC from the application of FHLBB rules
governing the processing of depositor claims). See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982).
197. See 12 C.F.R. § 500.20(a) (1988).
198. To avoid confusing these two capacities, the discussion will distinguish "FSLIC Corporate"
and "FSLIC Receiver."
199. See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 564 (1988).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 52-88.
201. Conservators and Receivers: Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg: 48,970 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 547, 548, 549, 563, 569a, 569b, 569c) (proposed Nov. 8, 1985).
202. The FHLBB recently gave notice that proposed rules published by it and upon which no
action has been taken by the Board will automatically lapse after six months. Regulatory Review
Procedures, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,156 (1988). The expiration date for the Board's 1985 proposed Hudspeth rules was, however, extended to October 11, 1988. See Extension of Time Period for Board
Action on Certain Outstanding Proposals, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,282 (1988).
Meanwhile, agency staff are currently preparing a further, shortened notice of proposed
rulemaking for consideration by the Board. Telephone interview with Judith L. Friedman, Associate General Counsel, FHLBB (May 2, 1988). The Board has subsequently published a Supplemental
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, see Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; Receivers,
53 Fed. Reg. 21,474 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 575, 576, 577) (proposed May 26, 1988), which
incorporates the modifications made to informal procedures that have been in effect since July 1,
1986. As this article was going to press, the Board apparently was planning to publish final rules
that would conform with those published in the supplemental notice.
203. See 12 C.F.R. pts. 549, 569a (1988) (addressing federal thrift receiverships and state thrift
receiverships). Section 549 applies to both the FSLIC and the FDIC. See id § 549.1(b).
204. See Instructions for Filing Claims with the FSLIC as Receiver (Feb. 12, 1987) (FHLBB
internal memorandum); Procedures for the Administration and Determination of Claims Filed with
the FSLIC as Receiver (Feb. 12, 1987) (FHLBB internal memorandum); Procedures for the Processing and Determination of Administrative Appeals from Decisions of the FSLIC as Receiver (July 3,
1986) (FHLBB internal memorandum); Procedures for the Administration and Determination of
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receivers and which have now been published in modified form as "In20 5
terim Procedures" and as revised proposed rules.
C.

Depositor Claims.

When an insured institution fails and the institution is placed in receivership, FSLIC Corporate is required to pay each insured account as
20 6
soon as possible, either in cash or by means of a transferred account.
In practice, depositors' claims, whether insured or not, are processed by
the Insurance Division, OFSLIC. Depositors, to the extent that their
claims are uninsured, receive certificates of claims in liquidation, copies
of which are then provided directly to the FSLIC Receiver by the Insur20 7
ance Division.
1. Notice to PotentialClaimants. Upon default of the insured institution, the FSLIC gives written notice to all insured members of the
time and place of insurance payments and, if the failed institution has
outstanding debts in the form of negotiable instruments, it must
promptly publish a similar notice in a local newspaper. 20 8 Insurance
20 9
claims are processed by the staff of the Insurance Division.
2. Initial Determinations. The FSLIC may require proof of
claims and, where not satisfied as to the claim's validity, may require the
insured member to secure a final determination of the claim in a court of
competent jurisdiction. 210 The general principles governing the Director's determination as to the validity of a claim to insured status are codified. 211 For those claims accepted as valid and insured, the FSLIC must
Requests for Expedited Relief from Decisions or Threatened Actions of the FSLIC as Receiver
(Mar. 1987) (FHLBB internal memorandum). The latter three sets of guidelines are reprinted in
Pfeiler, supra note 54, apps. C-E, at 490-510.
205. See Conservators and Receivers; Interim Procedures, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,105 (1988). These
consist of: Procedures for the Administration and Determination of Claims Filed with the FSLIC as
Receiver, 53 Fed. Reg. at 13,105-10 [hereinafter Claims Procedures]; Procedures for the Processing
and Determination on Review of Determinations of the FSLIC as Receiver, id at 13,110-12 [hereinafter Review Procedures]; Procedures for the Administration and Determination of Requests for
Expedited Relief from Decisions or Threatened Actions of the FSLIC as Receiver, id. at 13,112-13
[hereinafter Expedited Relief Procedures]. The interim procedures have since been incorporated in
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; Receivers, 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,474-82 (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. §§ 575.1-577.5). See id at 21,475 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.1).
206. See 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982); see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 1729(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988) (obligating the FSLIC as receiver to pay the "insurance as provided in section 1728" (emphasis added)).
207. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.6); Claims Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,107 (para. II(D)).
208. 12 C.F.R. § 564.1(a) (1988).
209. 12 C.F.R. § 564.1(d) ("[t]he Director or Acting Director ... or his or her designee").
210. See 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b).
211. 12 C.F.R. § 564.2.
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either pay out in cash 212 or transfer the account of the insured member to
another insured institution.213
If all or a portion of the accountholder's account is determined to be

uninsured, the Director must give written notice of this determination
and supply the accountholder with a "certificate of claim in liquidation"
from the FSLIC "in its capacity as receiver." This enables the accountholder to share in the proceeds. of the liquidation of the insured
institution. 214
3. Insurance Appeals ("Reconsiderations"). A dissatisfied accountholder may request reconsideration of the determination. 215 Failure to do so is deemed acceptance of the initial determination.2 16 In
practice, insurance reconsiderations are adjudicated by a member of the
Adjudication Division of the Office of General Counsel.2 17

If the procedural requirements are complied with, the Director must

grant or deny the request 2 18 and, within a further 180 days, must issue a
decision on the merits of the reconsideration (a "determination on recon-

sideration").2 19 If a determination on reconsideration is not issued
within this time the request for reconsideration is deemed to have been
denied.220

Since the handling of these requests was taken over by the Adjudication Division, the reversal rate stands at 8.2%.221

4. JudicialReview.

Actions must be brought within three years

of the date of default or, if the claim was presented to the receiver and
212. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b).
213. That institution may either be one newly created in the same community, or an existing
one. Id.
214. 12 C.F.R. § 564.1(d)(2). The surrender and transfer to the FSLIC of an insured account
shall subrogate the Corporation with respect to such insured account, but shall not affect
any right which the insured member may have in the uninsured portion of his account or
any right which he may have to participate in the distribution of the net proceeds remaining from the disposition of the assets of such association.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1729(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
215. 12 C.F.R. § 564.1(d)(3).
216. Id. §§ 564.1(d)(2), (d)(3)(iv).
217. This responsibility was transferred from the Regulations and Legislation Division of OGC,
effective November 1, 1986. See Adjudication Division: Processing of Initial Insurance Determination Reconsideration Requests (undated FHLBB internal memorandum).
218. See 12 C.F.R. § 564.1(d)(3)(ii)(c).
219. Id. § 564.1(d)(4).
220. Id.
221. That is, 34 cases of a total of 414, involving decisions in favor of claimants to a total value
of $1,848,353. Telephone interview, supra note 202.
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denied, within two years of the date of denial. 222 According to the
Board's rules, an accountholder must exhaust the remedies already described; an initial determination for which the accountholder does not
request reconsideration is taken to have been accepted, 223 so failure to
request reconsideration in a timely fashion will effectively prevent the
holder from seeking review. 224
D. Uninsured and Nondepositor Claims: The Hudspeth Process.
1. Types of Claims Involved. The FHLBB's Hudspeth procedures
are intended to encompass all types of claims that might be made against
the thrift in receivership, with the exception of claims by insured depositors.22 5 Under the FHLBB's interim and proposed rules, a "claim" is
defined as "the assertion of a right to payment or other relief" and includes demands for recoupment, setoff, security, priority, or preference,
requests to foreclose or oppose foreclosure by the receiver on security
226
property or assets, demands for interest, employee wages, etc.
"Claimants" include, "but [are] not limited to," holders of claims that
appear in the thrift's books or records, or otherwise are known to the
Receiver, owners of participation interests, borrowers, guarantors, secured creditors, lien holders and "[a]ny person(s) or entities seeking to
recover civil money damages or equitable relief against the association or
' '227
the Receiver.
This encompasses a breathtaking range and variety of claims. In
order to appreciate the comprehensive coverage of the Hudspeth procedures and the potential complexity of the claims involved, it is worth
reviewing some of the of the types of claims that have been asserted in
recent cases.
222. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(c). As to the applicability of the Hudspeth doctrine to the claims of
insured depositors, see infra text accompanying notes 390-91.
223. 12 C.F.R. § 564.1(d)(2).
224. Id. § 564.1(d)(5). In Jugum v. FSLIC, 637 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (W.D. Wash. 1986), this
limitation was rejected as invalid. See infra note 390 (discussing Jugum, which has been vacated as
moot).

225. See Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; Receivers, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,474,
21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.6(a)) (proposed May 26, 1988); Claims Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,107 (para. II(D)). Depositors with other claims are also claimants for the purposes of
the rules. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.6 (c)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,107 (para. II(D)).
226. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,475 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(h)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,106 (para. I(B)(9)).
227. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(h)(3)); Claims Procedures,

supra note 205, at 13,106 (para. I(B)(10)). Secured creditors and owners of participation interests
might enjoy some exemption from the published procedures. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,475 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.1); Supplementary Information, 53 Fed. Reg. at 13,105.
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a. Claimsfiled prior to receivership. Prior to being placed in re-

ceivership, a thrift might have initiated litigation against a former officer
with a view to repudiating claims being made against it for the continued
payment of deferred compensation. 22 8 Or it might have launched fore-

closure proceedings against one of its mortgage holders. 229 The thrift
might have found itself embroiled with other thrifts in litigation involving a participatory loan agreement, litigation that could involve claims of
breach of contractual or other obligations 230 and perhaps even charges of

securities fraud and racketeering, 231 antitrust violations, 232 or race
233
discrimination.
b. Claims adjudicated prior to receivership. The validity of a
creditor's claim might already have been judicially determined, yet the

claim might still be unpaid. A plaintiff might have secured an as yet
unexecuted judgment against the thrift.234 The parties might have en-

tered into and already partly implemented a judicially supervised settle-

235
ment agreement.

c. Postreceivership litigation. When the FSLIC or the FDIC is
appointed receiver, the FSLIC Receiver steps into the shoes of the thrift

itself. The situation can then become even more complex. The receiver
will not only inherit the thrift's pre-existing litigation responsibilities but
228. See, e.g., Hudspeth, supra note 103, 756 F.2d at 1096; see also supra text accompanying
notes 98-1 17.
229. See, e.g., FirstSouth, F.A. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, No. 86 C 10247 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1987)
(Westlaw, 1987 WL 16895).
230. See, eg., Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987)
(claims of usury, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing), cert
granted sub nom. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988).
231. See, e.g., Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1987).
232. See, e.g., Red Fox Indus. v. FSLIC, 832 F.2d 340, 341 (5th Cir. 1987).
233. See, e.g., Resna Assocs. v. Financial Equity Mortgage Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1371 (D.N.J.
1987).
234. See, e.g., Homestead Say. v. Life Say. & Loan Ass'n, 668 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. I11. 1987)
(jury verdict for creditor of $6.2 million, already paid over to clerk of court "'in full satisfaction of
the judgment'" prior to thrift being placed in receivership) (opinion vacated and removed from
bound volume, but appears in West's advance sheets, see infra text accompanying notes 738-39);
First Fin. Say. & Loan v. FSLIC, 651 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (letter opinion entered by state
court judge but judgment order not yet signed; FSLIC held estopped from litigating claims); FSLIC
v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d I (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming judgment entered in favor of creditor
against thrift for recovery of certificate of deposit originally pledged as collateral in loan transaction
subsequently breached by thrift); Union County Bank v. Knox Capital Corp., C/A657 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 18, 1986) (Westlaw, 1986 WL 4598) (decree in favor of plaintiff issued prior to receivership of defendant; judgment entered after receivership but nune pro tune to date of opinion).
235. See, eg., FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987), petitionfor cerL filed sub nom.
Zohdi v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3196 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1987) (No. 87-255).
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might also generate new ones. For example the FSLIC Corporate might
find itself repudiating and defending claims by depositors to the payment

of insurance. 236 Or, as receiver, it might reject claims filed by general
creditors, arising out of prior action by the failed thrift, and then have to
defend a suit, or multiple suits, based on contract, tort or some other
2 37
cause of action.
The FSLIC Receiver might have to initiate or pursue litigation-for
example, foreclosure proceedings, actions to recover receivership assets,

or petitions to enjoin thrift directors from dissipating recoverable assets-as part of the liquidation proceedings. 238 It might have to file
2 39
claims, on behalf of the receivership, in other bankruptcy proceedings.
Finally, the possibility of the FSLIC or the FDIC suing "itself" in two
separate receivership capacities is not confined to the realm of the classroom hypothetical. 240
d. Claims against the exercise of receivershippowers. The FSLIC
might even be sued in tort for the manner in which it has conducted the
236. See, e.g., York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Pa. 1987), vacated
and remanded, 851 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1988); Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Mont. 1987);
Baskes v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. 11. 1986).
237. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Utah 1987) (multiple
parties; securities fraud, federal and state RICO); Acquisition Corp. of Am. v. Sunrise Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (multiple parties; fraud and deceit, state RICO, breach of
contract, civil theft); Kohlbeck 651 F. Supp. at 1233 (negligence, fraud and racketeering); FSLIC v.
Quality Inns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918 (D. Md. 1987) (counterclaim based on unjust enrichment and
conversion of assets); Keller v. Antioch Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 143 Ill. App. 3d 278, 492 N.E.2d 937
(1986) (false representation, breach of contract).
238. See e.g., FSLIC v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1987) (preliminary injunction to prevent
dissipation of possibly recoverable assets by directors); FSLIC v. Ticktin, 832 F.2d 1438 (7th Cir.
1987) (action against thrift directors for breach of fiduciary duties); Red Fox Indus. v. FSLIC, 832
F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1987) (action by borrower to enjoin collection of debt by thrift and subsequent
receiver); Blakely Airport Joint Venture II v. FSLIC, 678 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (foreclosure); FSLIC v. Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (foreclosure); FSLIC v.
Hall Whispertree Assocs., 653 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (foreclosure); FSLIC v. Oldenburg,
658 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1987) (complaint by assignment of rights from lead lender); FSLIC v.
Quality Inns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918 (D. Md. 1987) (action for recovery of receivership assets); Baer
v. Abel, 649 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (FSLIC intervention as plaintif, asserting claims
against former thrift officers for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty of care, breach of contract,
violation of federal regulations, recovery of compensation, and contribution or indemnification);
FSLIC v. Sajovich, 642 F. Supp. 74 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (action brought by FSLIC as conservator
against thrift directors and independent corporations for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and
money had and received); Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd., v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (foreclosure), writ denied, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam).
239. See, eg., In re Miller Dev. Corp., 71 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987).
240. See FDIC v. United States Nat'l Bank, 685 F.2d 270, 271 (9th Cir. 1981) (FDIC, as receiver for lending bank, brought action against itself as receiver for borrowing bank); see also Skillern, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Failed Bank- The Past Decade (pt. 2), 99
BANKING L.J. 292, 325 (1982) (discussing case in which bank that had failed and was placed under
FDIC receivership sued another FDIC receivership).
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receivership. 24 1 In these circumstances one should bear in mind that the
exercise of the FSLIC's statutorypowers are under challenge and not the
validity of creditor claims against the thrift itself. The Federal Tort
2 43
Claims Act 242 and questions of sovereign immunity become relevant.
2. Structures and ProceduresDeveloped by the FHLBB.
a. Internal receivership arrangements. When the FHLBB resolves to appoint the FSLIC as receiver, the Director, OFSLIC, 244 with
the concurrence of the General Counsel,2 4 5 designates a "Special Representative" to bear primary responsibility for the administration of the
claims procedure, conduct the claims procedure, and determine the merits of claims.2 46 The Special Representative may then designate
"Agents" "to perform certain functions, which include but are not limited to maintaining a tracking system of the claims filed with the Receiver and performing an initial review of the Proofs of Claim submitted
to the Receiver." 247 The Special Representative, with the consent of the
General Counsel, will also designate legal counsel, known as "Claims
Counsel," "to represent the Receiver . . . [and] to perform specified
24 8
tasks" (set out in the Claims Procedures).
In practice, 249 the United States has been divided into five receiver241. See, e.g., Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. FSLIC, 834 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1987) (First Savings and
Loan Association, which had been placed into receivership, brought action in state court against
FSLIC, which had been appointed as receiver, challenging the transfer of assets); Kohlbeck v. Kis,
651 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Mont. 1987); Colony First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp.
410 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (FSLIC sued for damages it allegedly caused when thrift was placed inreceivership); Glen Ridge I Condominiums, 734 S.W.2d at 387 (debtor of failed thrift brought action to
enjoin FSLIC, as receiver of failed thrift, from foreclosing on its property).
242. Title IV, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982) (current sections include minor amendments to
original title IV).
243. For cases in which the FSLIC has attempted to argue that it enjoys sovereign immunity
insofar as ordinary creditor claims are concerned, see supra note 148.
244. See 12 C.F.R. § 500.20 (1988). This structure is currently undergoing reorganization: the
position formerly held by the Director, OFSLIC, will be held by an Executive Director of the
FSLIC. Telephone interview, supra note 202.
245. See 12 C.F.R. § 500.17. This may be an attorney in the Office of General Counsel designated by the General Counsel. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(q));
Claims Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,107 (para. I(B)(18)).
246. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(z)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,107 (para. I(B)(26)).
247. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,475 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.2(c)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,106 (para. I(B)(4)).
248. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.20)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,107 (para. I(B)(l 1)); see also 12 C.F.R. § 549.3(b)(1) (1988) (receiver may
employ any attorney(s) for legal advice and assistance).
249. The information that follows was obtained during an interview with Judith L. Friedman,
Director of the Adjudication Division of the Office of General Counsel, FHLBB, on October 21,
1987, and from internal FHLBB memoranda that Ms. Friedman made available to the author.
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ship regions: the Northwest, West, South, Central and East. Each of
these regions has a "Claims Coordinator" who manages the claims for
receiverships within that region. Claims Coordinators are nonlawyer
auxiliaries who provide administrative services to the Special Representatives and who bill each receivership for their time. In order to avoid
premature agreement on payouts to creditors, they are presently required
to be assisted by Claims Counsel from the moment a thrift is seized. In
addition, the lead attorney from the Adjudication Division of the
FHLBB's Office of General Counsel meets with Claims Counsel immediately prior to the takeover in order to explain the procedures and ensure
the proper implementation of the claims process. The lead attorney remains available for consultation throughout the takeover process and is
frequently available on site. In order to minimize conflicts of interest,
Division attorneys are instructed not to discuss the particulars of any
transaction that might give rise to a claim against the receivership and to
absent themselves from any debriefing of the thrift officers by Claims
Counsel and the FSLIC.
It is common for a team of Special Representatives to be appointed
for each receivership. The team is headed by a Chief Special Representative, who is also referred to as the "Managing Officer." This officer internally reviews and supervises the initial determination of claims, though
the degree of centralization varies from region to region. For example,
the Southern region is very centralized, whereas the Western region is
very decentralized. Special Representatives need not be lawyers, and in
practice usually are not.
It is important to appreciate the informal, non-adversary and administrative quality of the claims determination process at the receivership level. Even Claims Counsel play the role of often confidential legal
advisers to the Claims Coordinators and Special Representatives. They
are private, fee counsel, occupying no formal adjudicative position in the
receivership. It is also important to note that the FHLBB does not now
regard the receiver, or any of its officers, as performing an "adjudicative"
role at the initial claims determination phase; rather, the claims determination process assumes an adjudicative posture only at the administrative
250
"review" stage.
b. Notice to potential claimants. Promptly after the date of appointment, the receiver must publish a notice directing all potential
claimants to present their claims promptly. 25 1 In the notice a final date
250. See infra note 275.
251. See 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(a); 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.3);
Claims Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,107 (para. II(A)). Claimants must be provided at least 90

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:422

for the filing of proof of claims must be stipulated. 252

c. Determinationsby the receiver. The regulations require the receiver "[t]o allow any claim seasonably received and proved to its
3
satisfaction." 25
The interim Claims Procedures make provision for an "initial review" of claims. 25 4 This review is performed by claims agents who enter

the claims in a control log 255 and review them for proper filing. 25 6 If a
claim is not properly filed the claimant must be sent a "deficiency notice" 25 7 and be given an opportunity to correct the deficiencies. 258 Once
this has been done the claim is reviewed on the merits 259 and the claimant must be notified whether the claim has been allowed or retained for

further review.260

If the claim is "retained for further review," the Special Representative will decide, according to the "nature of the task," the "issues in-

volved in the claim" and, "where no significant legal issue is presented,
the cost-savings involved," whether to assign reviewing responsibilities to
an Agent, an Agent acting under the direction of a Claims Counsel, and/
26 1
or to a Claims Counsel.

When conducting further review of the claim, the Special Representative may require the claimant to file additional information or documentation, make nonprivileged documents available for inspection and
days from the date of first publication of notice to present their claims, and the notice must be
republished 30 and 60 days after first publication. See 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(a) (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. at
21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 575.4, 575.5); Claims Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,107

(paras. 11(B), (C)).
252. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(a) (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,476 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.4);
Claims Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,107 (para. 1I(B)). This date must not be less than 90 days
after the date of the first notice.
253. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b).
254. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 575.7-575.11); Claims Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,107-08 (paras. III(A)-(E)).
255. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.8); Claims Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,107 (para. III(B)).
256. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.9); Claims Procedures, supra note
205, at 13,107-08 (para. 111(C)).
257. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.9(a)); Claims Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,108 (para. III(C)(1)).
258. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.9(a), (b)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,108 (paras. III(C)(1), (2)).
259. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 575.9(d), 575.10); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,108 (paras. III(C)(4), (D)).
260. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.11); Claims Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,108 (para. III(E)).
261. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.12(b)); Claims Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,108 (para. IV(A)(2)).
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copying, and file sworn responses to written questions. 2 62 He may also
review "documents or other written information relevant to the claim in
the custody of or subject to the control of any person or entity, including
the writing from any persons including the claimant or his employees,
and may obtain sworn statements ... .,"263 These form part of the administrative record 264 and, to the extent that they are not privileged, may
be inspected and copied by the claimant.265 The Special Representative
may grant requests by the claimant to appear before an Agent, may require such an appearance, or may require the claimant to give statements, discuss the claim, and negotiate, subject to the Special
Representative's approval, compromises of the claim.26 6 The claimant's

oral statements must be reduced to writing, sworn to, and made part of
the administrative record, but statements by both parties during settlement negotiations do not constitute part of the receiver's record. 267 The
Special Representative may require the claimant to submit a written legal
memorandum on the issues; in such cases, this memorandum also becomes part of the record.268 An indexed record must then be compiled
269
and made available to the claimant for inspection and copying.
Claims Counsel then consults with the Special Representative in order to provide "confidential, privileged legal advice as may be necessary
to assist the Special Representative to reach a proposed determination
with respect to the claim." 270 The Special Representative must then prepare a memorandum of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
an analysis of the issues and a recommended proposed determination
(proposed determination memorandum), as well as a proposed determination of claim in the form of proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law (proposed determination). Claims Counsel assists in this process,
but any proposed determination memorandum he prepares that is super262. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,477-78 (to be codified at 12 C.I R._ § 575.13(b)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,108 (para. IV(B)(2)).
263. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(c)); Claims Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,108 (para. IV(B)(3)).

264. Id.
265. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(d)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,108-09 (para. IV(B)(4)).
266. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(e), (f)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (paras. IV(B)(5), (6)).
267. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(f)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (para. IV(B)(6)).
268. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(g)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (para. IV(B)(7)).
269. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(i), (j)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (paras. IV(B)(9), (10)).
270. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(k)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (para. IV(B)(11)).

468

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:422

seded does not constitute part of the record.27 1 The proposed determination is then mailed to the claimant 272 and, if no request for
'2 73
reconsideration is filed, it becomes the "receiver's determination.
The proposed determination must advise the claimant of his right to
file (within thirty days) a written "request for reconsideration." Such
request must state the grounds of objection and may present proposed
alternative findings and conclusions. The Special Representative must
then promptly reply in writing, stating agreement or partial or complete
disagreement. The request and reply become part of the administrative
record. 274 After consideration
of the record, the receiver must issue a
"receiver's determination," 275 signed by the Special Representative, 276
and a "record of claim" stating the amount of the claim recognized. 277
271. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,478-79 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(/),(m)); Claims Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,109 (para. IV(B)(12)).
272. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(n)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (para. IV(B)(13)).
273. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(o)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (para. IV(B)(14)) (formerly "initial determination").
274. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(p)(5)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,110 (para. IV(B)(15)(e)).
275. Formerly known as a "final determination." The term "final determination" came to be
regarded as a misnomer because it suggested greater formality in the claims determination by the
receiver than is really the case in practice. The alternative term, "receiver's determination," is
thought to convey the nature of the receiver's decision more accurately. Interview with Judith L.
Friedman, Associate General Counsel, FHLBB, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 1987).
276. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(d)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,110 (para. IV(B)(l5)(f)).
277. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(s)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,110 (para. IV(B)(18)).
There is no rigid limit on the permitted time lapse between a creditor's initial filing of a claim
and the determination by the receiver. The stipulated (and unstipulated) time limitations are as
follows:
Action
Days
To Be Codified at
Deficiency notice
Notice of allowance or retention
Further review:
* Further filing
* Written response
* Response to request
* Additional documents
* Receiver's memorandum
* Request for reconsideration
special representative's reply
* Determination

30
180
30
30
30
30
"prompt"
30
"prompt"
?

12 C.F.R. § 575.9(a)
Id § 575.11
IM
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

575.13(b)(1)
575.13(b)(3)
575.13(g)
575.130)
575.13()
575.13(p)
575.1 3 (p)(4)
575.13(p)(6)

Assuming that where maximum times are not specified the receiver's agents comply within 30 days,
the total time lapse might be as long as 15 months. It appears that some determinations are taking
even longer. See infra text accompanying notes 722-28. The interim and proposed rules permit a
claimant to request expedited processing of a claim, but such processing is available only upon a
showing of good cause, and even after such a showing, expedited processing remains a matter "in the
sole discretion of the Receiver." See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.14);
Claims Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,110 (para. IV(C)).
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d. Administrative reviews. The FHLBB regulations contemplate
"approval" by the Board of claims disallowed by the receiver. 278 Interim
provisions for "reviews" (formerly referred to as "appeals") of decisions
of the receiver have been established. 279 Though formally directed to the
Board, the authority to hear these appeals has been delegated by the
Board ta the Director, OFSLIC,280 who has, in turn, subdelegated the

authority to the Director of the Adjudication Division of the Office of
General Counsel. 28 1 Review determinations recommending the reversal,

in whole or in part, of decisions by the receiver on the merits disallowing
claims in excess of $5 million must, however, be submitted to the Board
itself for final determination, 282 and the Adjudication Division will, in
practice, submit other determinations to the Board that it believes merit
283
the Board's personal attention.

When, on reconsideration, a receiver's determination has been issued, 284 or if the claimant does not request reconsideration,2 85 the claimant is entitled to-and must, in order to preserve the right to judicial
review-seek review of the determination by the Bank Board.28 6 Notice
of the right to seek review must be given to the claimant with the pro28 7
posed determination by the receiver.
Written notice of a request for review must be filed with the Board

within sixty days,2 8 and the request must contain a statement of the
facts and arguments on which the request is based, a statement of the
alleged factual and legal errors, references to the record and statement of
278. See 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b), (d) (1988).
279. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576); Review Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,110-12 (paras. A-L).
280. FHLBB, Resolution No. 86-1161 (Nov. 17, 1986).
281. Delegation of Authority from the Director, Office of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation to the Associate General Counsel for Adjudication to Perform Routine Procedural
and Ministerial Functions Respecting the Implementation of Interim Claims Procedures. (Jan. 15,
1987) [hereinafter Delegation of Authority].
282. FHLBB, Resolution No. 86-1161, supra note 280.
283. Interview, supra note 275.
284. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(q)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,110 (para. IV(B)(16)).
285. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(o)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,109 (para. IV(B)(14)).
286. In practice, extensive legal support is provided to the Board by the General Counsel and the
Director of the Adjudication Division. See supra text accompanying note 281.
287. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,479 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 575.13(q)); Claims Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,110 (para. IV(B)(16); 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 576.2); Review Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,111 (para. B(l)).
288. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.3(a)); Review Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,111 (para. C(l)).
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any new facts upon which the request is based. 28 9 Unless more information is required, 290 the request will be subjected to a "preliminary review" within 60 days. 291 Further evidence may only be introduced on a
292
showing of good cause.
The record is then reviewed to determine whether it constitutes a
sufficient basis for decision. If so, notice is given that the record is complete, and the record is closed. 293 Within 180 days of closure of the rec294
ord a decision on the merits of the review will be issued by the Board.
e. Board review. In more complex cases, the Board, on the advice
or request of the General Counsel, and "in its sole discretion," "may
entertain oral argument, or other supplementary proceedings. '295 Failure on the part of the Board to take such action, or failure to make a
decision within the 180-day period, renders the receiver's determination
the "deciion of the Board." The Board will provide a written decision
accompanied by its reasons 2 96 and, to the extent that the claim is recognized, will provide the claimant with a "satisfaction of claim

certificate. "297
f Judicial review. The Board's decision or inaction constitutes
final agency action for the purpose of judicial review. 298 The Review
Procedures purport to be a mandatory prerequisite to the availability of
289. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.4(a)); Review Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,111 (para. D).
290. If so, more time may be required. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 576.4(b)(2), (3)); Review Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,111 (para. D(2)).
291. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.4(b)); Review Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,111 (para. D(2)).
292. 53 Fed. Reg. at 12,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.5(b)); Review Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,111 (para. E).
293, See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.5(a)); Review Procedures,
supra note 205, at 13,111 (para. E(4)). The Board, however, reserves the right to "make its own
findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the Administrative Record." 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.5(e)).
294. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.7); Review Procedures, supra note
205, at 13,111 (para. G(1)). The decision is given in the name of the Board.
295. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.7); Review Procedures, supra note
205, at 13,111 (para. G). This must be done within 30 days of closure of the record, in which case
the 180-day period is suspended until the supplementary proceedings are complete.
296. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.8); Review Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,111 (para. H).
297. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 576.11); Review Procedures, supra
note 205, at 13,112 (para. K).
298. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 576.8, 576.9, 576.1 l(b)); Review
Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,111-12 (paras. H, I, K(2)).
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judicial review.299
3. "Expedited Relief " Entirely independent of the claims procedures just described are the provisions for expedited relief from decisions
or threatened actions of the receiver. 30° This procedure is designed to
enable the FHLBB, through its delegate, to grant appropriate forms of
equitable relief. Since its inception the remedy has expanded into a form
of general injunctive relief available and applicable to both claimants and
to the receiver itself (most frequently for correcting procedural irregularities). 30 1 In practice requests for expedited relief are adjudicated, as in
the case of creditor appeals and insurance appeals, by the Director of the
Adjudication Division, under subdelegation from the Director,
OFSLIC. 302

Any person affected by "[a]ny decision or threatened action by the
FSLIC as Receiver" may seek "extraordinary intervention by the Board
outside of the routine claims process" by filing a "request for expedited
relief. ' 30 3 An example of such a situation would be threatened foreclosure. 3°4 The rules state that a request for expedited relief does not involve the merits of any claim and is solely a request to the Board to
30 5
intercede on behalf of the petitioner.
The request must contain a statement of the facts and issues, alleged
factual and legal errors or omissions made by the receiver, legal analysis,
relevant documentation, an assessment of the likelihood of success on the
merits of the underlying claim, and a statement of the probable imminent
and irreparable harm that would occur if relief were not granted. Notice
30 6
of the request must be given simultaneously to the receiver.
299. 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.

§ 576.3(g));

Review Procedures, supra

note 205, at 13,111 (para. C(7)).
300. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481-82 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,112-13.
301. Interview, supra note 275; see also Pfeiler, supra note 54, at 446-47.
302. Delegation of Authority, supra note 281.
303. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.2(b)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,112 (para. A(2)). This must be done "within five work days from the
date of the Receiver's decision or action." The Board may extend the time limits for any expedited
relief proceedings. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.5); Expedited Relief
Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,113 (para. D).
304. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.5)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,113 (para. D).
305. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.3(a)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,112 (para. B(1)).
306. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 577.2(e), 577.3(a)(7)); Expedited
Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,112 (paras. A(5), B(l)(vii)).
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days30 7

and this re-

sponse, together with the request and accompanying documentation,
forms the basis for the administrative record on which the Board will

make its determination. 308 Any additional information required by the
Board must be supplied "by a date certain. ' 30 9 The Board will issue a
temporary restraining order, if necessary, instructing the receiver to stay
its threatened action pending resolution of the request for expedited
3 10
relief.
The Board then issues a final decision with reasons, "as soon as
3 11
practicable."
E.

Overview of the Adjudicatory Structure.

The overall picture that emerges is as follows:
" At the primary decisionmaking level there is one agency, acting

in two separate institutional capacities. For determinations involving insured deposits, the Insurance Division of FSLIC Cor-

porate is responsible. For determinations involving uninsured
deposits and general creditor claims, an agent of the FSLIC Re-

ceiver is responsible.
* At the Board level, the Director of the Adjudication Division of

the FHLBB is in practice responsible for adjudicating disputes
over both insurance and other claims, with the possibility of direct review and oral hearings by the Board.

" Finally, according to the Hudspeth doctrine, the determinations
of the Board, with the possible exception of those involving insured depositor claims, 3 12 are subject to limited judicial review
under the APA.
307. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.3(b)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,112 (para. B(2)).
308. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.3(c)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,112 (para. C(5)).
309. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.4(e)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,113 (para. C(5)).
310. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.4(g)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,113 (para. C(7)). The stay will remain in effect "for a period of time
sufficient to enable the party requesting relief to be provided with the Bank Board's Decision and an
opportunity to seek judicial review of that Decision." See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at
12 C.F.R, § 577.4(g)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,113 (para. C(7)).
311. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 21,482 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 577.4(d)); Expedited Relief Procedures, supra note 205, at 13,113 (para. C(4)).
312. The courts are divided on the question whether insured depositors are entitled to full, de
novo judicial review or only Hudspeth, APA-type review. See infra note 390 and accompanying
text.
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III.

CONSTRAINTS UPON AGENCY ADJUDICATION

In order to provide a framework for evaluating the general Hudspeth procedures, it is necessary to review the statutory, constitutional
and administrative law constraints within which the FHLBB must operate. Though not always recognized, these constraints share a subtle interdependency. For example, where, questions of constitutionality do not
arise, it is enough that an agency's authority to act be merely implied in
its governing legislation. 31 3 But where the-exercise of its powers appears
to encroach upon the prescriptions of article III, it may be necessary for
the agency's authority to be stated in fairly explicit terms. 314 Second, a
broad delegation of agency authority, which might once have been regarded as unconstitutional, 31 5 will be accepted if there are adequate procedural safeguards in, and judicial scrutiny of, the exercise of that
authority. 31 6 Third, the courts might be more willing to tolerate agency
authority that encroaches upon the preserve of article III if the exercise
of that authority is subjected to the standards of due process 317 and if
there is adequate judicial scrutiny of the agency's action. 318 Yet adequate judicial scrutiny might mandate the observance by the agency of
stricter procedural standards than might ordinarily be required, either by
the APA or by the requirements of procedural due process. 31 9 And the
application of the due process requirement of an impartial decisionmaker
will vary according to the internal structural arrangements of the
agency. 320 Finally, if the courts are satisfied that Congress has not violated article III in allocating decisionmaking power to an agency, they
are also likely to accept that the seventh amendment requirement of a
jury trial is inappropriate in the context of agency adjudication. 321
This interdependency suggests that Congress and the FHLBB, "in
devising a claims adjudication system, must take account of a whole network of statutory and constitutional restraints, none of which should be
seen in isolation from the others. At the same time, the Board has the
advantage of being able to secure a system of adjudication during a period in which the Supreme Court has been extraordinarily deferential
toward agencies. In the field of statutory interpretation, the Court has
initiated an era of deference toward the construction by agencies of their
313. See infra text accompanying notes 325-36.
314. See infra text accompanying notes 596-98.

315. See infra note 514.
316. See infra text accompanying notes 533-36.

317. See infra text accompanying notes 560, 573.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See
See
See
See

infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

555, 573.
681-84.
617-37.
638-52.
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congressional mandates. 322 In considering the role of agencies within the
constitutional framework, it has settled upon an ad hoc balancing test for
determining whether constitutional constraints have been breached. 323
And in considering the application of the APA, it has been reluctant to
enforce directly the observance of procedural standards beyond those expressly stipulated in the Act. 324
A. Legislative Constraints: The Authority to Adjudicate.
1. Statutory Interpretation in Modem Administrative Law. In
1984 the Supreme Court, in Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,Inc., 325 firmly indicated that courts were to defer to the
construction by agencies of their statutory mandates whenever those
mandates were not expressed in clear terms. Justice Stevens enunciated a
two-stage test:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 326
In determining whether the FSLIC and the FHLBB possess statutory authority to adjudicate creditor claims, the Chevron analysis dictates
that we should first ask whether the relevant legislation clearly addresses
the issue. If this is the case then the inquiry is answered automatically
and the adjudication power either exists or does not. If, on the other
hand, the legislation is "silent or ambiguous," then we should defer to
the agencies' view, provided this is "based on a permissible construction
of the statute."
The trouble is that this two-stage test is deceptively simplistic and it
should come as no surprise that subsequent application by the Court it322.
323.
324.
325.

See
See
See
467

infra text accompanying notes 325-36.
infra text accompanying notes 510-18.
infra text accompanying notes 489-92.
U.S. 837 (1984).

326. 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
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self of the Chevron analysis has generated confusion and controversy.3 27
It is not immediately obvious how we might determine whether "the in-

tent of Congress is clear." Will this depend upon whether Congress has
expressed itself in "plain" and "unambiguous" language? 328 Or will it

depend upon whether, applying the traditional principles of statutory
construction, the meaning of otherwise unclear language becomes
"clear"? 3 29 If the words are "clear," must the court's analysis be confined to the "purely linguistic level," 330 or can one resort to legislative
history in order to demonstrate that ostensibly clear words are in fact
unclear, so that one should defer to the agency that has chosen to disregard them?33 1 As one commentator has recently observed, "one judge's

plain meaning may be another's ambiguity."3 32

The Hudspeth court relied on Chevron in accepting the FHLBB's

construction of the FSLIC's powers under the Home Owners' Loan Act
327. See Hochberg, 'Two-Step' Method ofAnalysi: Still in TransitionAfter Chevron, Nat' L.J.,
May 16, 1988, at 22, col. 1. But see Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath; JudicialReview ofAgency
Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. Rlv. 301, 302 (1988) (Chevron amounts to
simple approach in complicated area); Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 283, 283-84 (1986) (Chevron eliminated ambiguity in Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977);
Starr, Sunstein, Willard, Morrison & Levin, JudicialReview ofAdministrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMiN. L. Rv. 353, 360 (1987) (Chevron provides clear, analytical framework for
analysis); Note, JudicialReview of the FederalBanking RegulatoryAgencies, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING
L. 365 (1988).
328. This is the view taken by the Court in Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 368 (1986) (Burger, C.J.) ("no amount of agency expertise-however sound may be the
result-can make the words 'legal right' mean a right to do something 'as a matter of practice;' "the
intent of Congress was therefore "clearly expressed"). Justice Scalia expressed a similar view in his
concurrence in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (criticizing the Court for
engaging in an "ill advised" analysis of legislative history where the language of the law was
"clear"). Cf NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. CL 413, 426-27 (1987)
(Scalia, J.,
concurring) (case was correctly decided "only because 'the statute is silent or ambiguous'
with respect to an issue relevant to the agency's administration of the law committed to its charge").
329. Cf Cardoza-Fonseca 107 S.Ct. at 1220-22 (examining legislative history of statutory provisions in question in determining a "pure question of statutory construction").
330. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985). The Court
sensibly characterized this approach as "simplistic." Id
331. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
In Chemical Mfrs, the majority, after examining the legislative history of a statutory prohibition on
"modifying" the requirements of the statute at issue, concluded that the prohibition was ambiguous
enough to warrant deference to the construction placed upon it by the agency. Ideat 126-29. The
dissent thought that the statute expressed the "clear intent of Congress." Iad at 135 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
332. Breger, Conference on Statutory Interpretation: The Role of Legislative History in Judicial
Interpretation-IntroductoryRemars, 1987 DuKE L.J. 362, 370. Of course, an investigation of
legislative history does not guarantee that clarity will emerge. For a recent debate on the wellknown difficulties associated with the use of legislative history, see Conferenceon Statutory Interpretation: The Role of Legislative History in JudicialInterpretation, 1987 DuKE LJ.at 361-86.
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and the National Housing Act. 333 But Chevron has probably failed to
simplify the task of identifying whether statutory authority for administrative claims adjudication exists or even whether the assumption that it
does is a "permissible" construction of the legislation. The decision is
better understood for present purposes as merely signaling a general, perhaps even necessary, 334 disposition of deference toward agencies under
circumstances in which there is no reason to mistrust their judgment. 335
The courts have proven accommodating in allowing significant reinterpretations of banking regulatory statutes (though not always in favor of
the agencies) as the appropriateness of the legislation has changed over
time.3 36 Hence, though we still need to examine the origin and evolution
of the statutory provisions upon which the FHLBB and the FSLIC rely
for their asserted jurisdiction, we should also bear in mind that statutory
construction will be influenced by the fact that the courts are likely to
display a benevolent attitude toward the banking agencies in their current difficulties.
2. Sections 1464(d)(6)(C), 1464(d)(11) and 1729(d): History, Context and Application. The FHLBB and the FSLIC rely upon three statutory provisions as constituting combined authority for administrative
claims adjudication. Section 1464(d)(11) supplies the general authority
to enact rules governing the adjudication of claims. 337 Section 1729(d)
333. See Hudspeth, supra note 103, 756 F.2d at 1103; see also Peoples' Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 677 F. Supp. 1104, 1106-07 (D. Kan. 1988); Keller v. Antioch Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 143 Il. App. 3d 278, 285, 492 N.E.2d 937, 941 (1986). In Morrison-Knudsen Co. v.
CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v.
Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451), the court recognized that
the FHLBB was entitled to Chevron deference but found that this deference could "not save an
agency interpretation that is contrary to clear congressional purpose." For a discussion of the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsencourts' conficting applications of Chevron, see Note, supra note 327, at
395-96.
334. See Strauss, One HundredFifty Cases Per Year: Some Implicationsof the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987). Strauss
suggests that the Court has two good reasons for commanding deference to agencies' construction of
their statutory mandates: the national responsibility of the agencies has a centralizing effect on the
application of the law, and conflicts arising from independent review of legal questions in the circuits
cannot be adequately resolved by the Supreme Court, given the limitations on its resources. Id.
335. Cf Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549
(1985) (advocating a presumption of deference toward agencies' construction of their governing statutes); Gerwin, The Deference Dilemma: JudicialResponses to the GreatLegislative Power Giveaway,
14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 289 (1987) (reviewing and criticizing the current mood of, and the inconsistencies associated with, deference in all aspects of judicial review of agency action).
336. Cf Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the JudicialProcess: The Revisionist Role of the
Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672 (1987) (studying the behavior of
courts faced with dilemma of interpreting obsolete statutes governing banking).
337. See supra text accompanying note 187 (quoting § 1464(d)(1 1) in full).
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supplies the FSLIC's power as receiver to adjudicate claims. 338 And section 1464(d)(6)(C) precludes the courts from "restraining" or "affecting"
the receivership, thereby according to the FHLBB and, in turn, the
FSLIC, exclusive authority to determine the disposition of creditor
339
claims.
In what follows, an attempt will be made to place these provisions in
their proper context by tracing their genealogy. 340 The conclusion will
be that it is unlikely that either section 1464(d)(6)(C) or section 1729(d)
was intended to confer claims adjudication authority on either the
FHLBB or the FSLIC. On the other hand, it will be recognized that if
the FHLBB were able to satisfy the many constitutional concerns involved, 34 ' the general regulatory authority possessed by the FHLBB
under section 1464(d)(1 1) might be sufficiently broad to provide statutory
authority for the creation by the FHLBB of an administrative adjudication scheme.
a. Early practices. There were no federally chartered thrifts
before 1933.342 State regulatory arrangements varied widely, though a
fairly common feature was the vesting of receivership responsibility in
the state agency responsible for the general supervision of thrifts, and the
exemption of thrifts from the ordinary provisions pertaining to bankruptcy. 343 On the other hand, it was also common practice to subject the
liquidation and claims determination process to the supervision of a state
court;344 indeed, this remains the case.345
During the nineteenth century there had, however, developed two
forms of receivership applicable to financial institutions. The first was
the traditional "equitable," or court-directed receivership, and the second was the statutory, or agency-managed receivership. 34 6 The latter
model reflected conscious efforts by particular states to impose a coher338. See supra text accompanying note 186 (quoting § 1729(d) in full).

339. See supra text accompanying note 178 (quoting § 1464(d)(6)(C) in full).
340. The most thorough judicial analysis to date is that contained in Summertree Venture III v.
FSLIC, 742 S.W.2d 446, 450-52 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).

341. See infra text accompanying notes 658-84.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
343. See HIsToRY OF BUILDING AND LOAN, supra note 40, at 129.
344. See Pfeiler, supra note 54, at 466 n.119 (citing California, Minnesota and Pennsylvania

statutes).
345. See eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 3310-5 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE
ANN. § 28-1-3.1-10 (Burns 1986); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, §§ 28-29 (Law. Co-op. 1987); MD.

FIN. INST. CODE ANN.

§§ 9-702, 9.708 (1986); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 623-624 (McKinney 1971);

Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-811 (Vernon 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1660 (1984).

346. See, eg., In re Union Bank, 176 A.D. 477, 481-82, 163 N.Y.S. 485, 488-89 (1917). See
generally Note, Statutory Control over the Dissolution ofBuilding and Loan Associations, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 265 (1935).
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ent scheme of banking regulation on financial institutions, and it was

designed to replace any traditional equitable receivership that might
otherwise be instituted in the event of a bank or thrift failure.
The evolution of the statutory receivership placed in question the
supervisory jurisdiction of the courts that would otherwise have retained
control over the receivership. The courts soon recognized that, as in

other areas where the legislature had vested statutory powers in an officer
or agency, it was not for them to gainsay the exercise of those powers by
the legislature's delegate. So, for example, when the Comptroller of the

Currency was empowered to appoint receivers for failed national banks,

347
the federal courts emphasized that, in the absence of abuses of power,
the discretionary actions of the receiver (for example, decisions as to the
realization and distribution of receivership assets) could not be modified

by the courts. 348 A plurality of the New York Appellate Division emphasized that the receivership decisions of the New York Superintendent

349
of Banks were not automatically subject to judicial proceedings.
But this deference extended only to the discretionarystatutory powers vested in receivers: where, on the other hand, the nondiscretionary
question of the existence of a valid claim was concerned, the courts

seemed to have no doubt that the decisions of statutory receivers, unlike
351
those of some equitable receivers, 35 0 were subject to de novo review.

For example, it was recognized that creditors of national banks in receivership could establish the validity of their claims in court, 3 52 and one
347. Review for abuse of power has always been contemplated. See, eg., United States v. Knox,
102 U.S. 422, 425 (1880); Hulse v. Argetsinger, 12 F.2d 933, 936 (W.D.N.Y. 1926); Fifer v. Williams, 5 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir. 1925); Union Bank 176 A.D. at 485, 163 N.Y.S. at 490-91.
348. See, e.g., Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U.S. 449, 454-55 (1900); Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U.S.
684, 685-86 (1897); Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 677, 681 (1876); Kennedy v. Gibson, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 498, 505 (1869); Argetsinger, 12 F.2d at 935-36; In re Earle, 92 F. 22, 22 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1899);
Merrill v. First Nat'l Bank, 75 F. 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 1896); Altman v. McClintock, 20 F.2d 226,
231, 233 (D. Wyo. 1927); see also Barse, A Summary ofthe Procedureand PrinciplesRelating to the
Liquidation ofNational Banks in Receivership, FED. B.A.J., Oct. 1932, at 3, 4 ("Such liquidation is
not subject to the supervision of either the state or federal courts, and is purely administrative in
character.").
349. Union Bank, 176 A.D. at 483, 163 N.Y.S. at 490.
350. See, e.g., State ex rel Pitts v. Peter Cooper Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 74 Mo. App. 167 (1898)
(refusing to conduct full de novo review of a court-appointed commissioner's determination of the
validity of a creditor's claim, the commissioner being viewed as equivalent to a referee in chancery).
e g., Cosmopolitan
351. Execution of the claim, on the other hand, was not permitted. S
Trust Co. v. Suffolk Knitting Mills, 247 Mass. 530, 143 N.E. 138 (1924) (creditor could secure
judgment as to the validity of its claim, but not set off); see also Barse, supra note 348, at 5.
352. See, eg., Earle, 178 U.S. at 455; Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
383, 401 (1871); Kennedy, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 506 (1869) ("The claims of creditors may be proved
before the comptroller, or established by suit against the association."); Schulenberg v. Norton, 49
F.2d 578, 580 (8th Cir. 1931) ("The statute provides an easy, speedy manner of determination of
claims by permitting such to be presented to a receiver appointed by the Comptroller, but this is
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state court even recognized that, notwithstanding its clearly established
deference towards receivers where the latter were exercising discretionary receivership powers, the actualpriorityof a creditor's claim (let alone
353
its mere validity) was a matter justiciable in the courts.
Thus the principle of limited, deferential judicial review with regard
to statutory receiverships was well established long before the imposition
of federal thrift receiverships. On the other hand, this deference was not
extended to the nondiscretionary decisions of statutory receivers. As we
have already seen, the FSLIC and the FDIC are directed, when appointed as receivers of federal thrifts, to "pay all valid credit obligations" 354-a formulation that does not obviously suggest discretion in the
receiver. So prior financial receivership law, however progressive, offers
little support to the FHLBB and the FSLIC in their efforts to establish
exclusive authority to adjudicate the validity of creditor claims.
b. Inception offederal regulationand deposit insurance. The first
federal involvement was in response to the drain on savings that occurred
during the Great Depression. 355 Although thrifts remained healthier
than commercial banks, people were forced to draw on their savings as
economic conditions deteriorated. This severely limited the flow of funds
to housing. 356 Congress therefore devised a scheme whereby a system of
regional "home loan banks" would be established for the purpose of providing an alternative source of funds to state thrifts. The scheme was
embodied in the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, signed by President
Hoover on July 22, 1932.357 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was
created for the purpose of chartering and supervising the regional home
loan banks,3 58 and state thrifts were eligible to become members of the
system by purchasing stock in one of the home loan banks. 359 The
quite different from limiting the ordinary and usual way of determining rights of creditors judicially."); Merrill, 75 F. at 153; Altman, 20 F.2d at 231-32; see also Barse, supra note 348, at 5:

Ifa claim is disallowed the creditor may file suit in either a state or a Federal court to
establish his claim, but the judgment can do no more than establish the claim, and no
execution can issue against the receiver, the time of payment being a matter vested in the
administrative discretion of the Comptroller.
353. See Huey v. Rinehart, 116 W. Va. 309, 180 S.E. 263 (1935); see also Allen v. United States,
285 F. 678, 683-84 (Ist Cir. 1923) (in a claim brought against an insolvent bank now run by the
Commissioner of banks, federal court had jurisdiction to determine whether cash deposits created a
trust in favor of the United States).
354. See supra text accompanying note 184.
355. For a valuable early account, see 5 FHLBB ANN.REP. 1-3 (1938).
356. See Barth & Regalia, supra note 40, at 124.
357. Ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
358. 12 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
359. Where state law prohibited them from purchasing stock, they were nevertheless permitted
to borrow from the home loan banks as nonmembers. 12 U.S.C. § 1426 (1982).
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scheme provided thrifts with access to a greater pool of funds, but it also
subjected them to federal regulation and supervision in that to remain
eligible for membership in, or borrowing from, a home loan bank they
had to comply with interest rate, liquidity and lending requirements imposed by the banks. 360
As the economy deteriorated, however, increasing numbers of
homeowners found themselves subjected to escalating interest rates and
foreclosures. Moreover, numerous thrifts had failed and the availability
of mortgage funds was drastically reduced or, in more than 1500 counties, had simply disappeared. 361 These circumstances prompted President Roosevelt, on April 13, 1933, to request emergency legislation from
Congress, and this request was met, less than two months later, by the
passage of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933.362
The Act created the Home Owners' Loan Corporation for the purpose of providing an emergency supply of mortgage funds in distress
cases. 363 It also facilitated, for the first time, the creation of federal savings and loan associations: the FHLBB was empowered to charter mutual thrift associations, 364 to allow state-chartered members of a home
loan bank to convert to federal charter, 365 and to regulate and provide
for the liquidation of these associations, "including the power to appoint
a conservator or a receiver to take charge of the affairs of any such association, and to require an equitable readjustment of the capital structure
of the same. ' '366 Federal thrifts were to be strictly confined in their operations to narrow geographic localities. 367
At this stage no guidance was given by Congress as to how thrifts
should be liquidated. The FHLBB was merely given the general authority already quoted. The legislative history is devoid of any reference to
the FHLBB's power to liquidate federal thrifts, the primary concern of
the legislators being the creation of the Loan Corporation and the provision of funds for home mortgages. 368 This is hardly surprising: not only
360. See 12 U.S.C. § 1431.
361. See H.R. REP. No. 55, 73d Cong., IstSess. 2 (1933); Barth & Regalia, supra note 40, at 124
& n.10.
362. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128; see Fidelity Fed. Sav..& Loan Ass'n v. De ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163

n.18 (1982).
363. Home Owners' Loan Act, ch. 64, § 4, 48 Stat. at 129-32, repealed by Act of June 30, 1953,
ch. 170, § 21, 67 Stat. 126 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1463).
364. Home Owners' Loan Act, ch. 64, § 5(a), 48 Stat. at 132.

365. Id. § 5(i), 48 Stat. at 134.
366. Id. § 5(d), 48 Stat. at 133.
367. See id. § 5(c), 48 Stat. at 132 (confining thrifts to a 50-mile geographic limit, with limited

exceptions).
368. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); H.R. REp. No. 55, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 210, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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was the legislation rushed through Congress, 3 69 but the nature of the
thrift industry as it was then would hardly have suggested complicated
claims determinations. The overwhelming bulk of thrift creditors would
have been depositors, for whom records would have been well-documented. Besides, the systems of state regulation provided ample precedents toward which a new federal agency might look for guidance as it
developed its own system of regulation. Hence it is reasonable to assume
that Congress would have regarded liquidation as a concern best left to
370
the FHLBB.
The provision of emergency, low-interest funds for home mortgages
actually exacerbated the difficulties of many thrifts. 37 1 This induced
Congress to enact the National Housing Act in 1934.372 Title IV of the
Act 373 instituted a system of deposit insurance, largely along the lines of
the system recently introduced for banks, 374 and created the FSLIC as an
agency to operate under the direction of the FHLBB. 375 Congress had
376
two objectives in passing the Act: first, to protect the small depositor;
but, perhaps even more importantly, to serve the vital public, monetary
function of restoring "to the community, as quickly as possible, circulating medium destroyed or made unavailable as a consequence of bank
failures. 37 7
c. Introduction of section 1729(d). In the National Housing Act
Congress was a little more specific about liquidations: the FSLIC was
required to pay out insured depositors or transfer their accounts, in the
event of a thrift account, 378 and was required to act as receiver if the
defaulting thrift was a federal one. 379 As receiver the FSLIC was re369. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163 n.18 (1982).
370. See infra text accompanying notes 522-24; cf Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947)
(recognizing the constitutionality of broad delegation to FHLBB in view of the "accumulated experience of supervisors, acting for many states under various statutes" that "has established well-defined
practices for the appointment of conservators, receivers and liquidators").
371. See Barth & Regalia, supra note 40, at 124.
372. Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (1982)).
373. Id. §§ 401-407, 48 Stat. at 1255 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730(g)).
374. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832
(1982)); see supra text accompanying notes 26, 43.
375. National Housing Act, ch. 847, § 402, 48 Stat. at 1255 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1725 (1982)).
376. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 11,200 (1934) (statements of Reps. Williams and Dirksen).
377. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of its Antecedents
and its Purposes, 75 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 189 (1960). The author is referring to bank deposit insurance,
but the same reasoning applies to thrift deposit insurance.
378. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982).

379. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b) (1982).
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quired to pay "all valid credit obligations" of the failed thrift.3 80 And it
was in this Act that the original provision codified at 12 U.S.C. section
1729(d) was first introduced. 381 Except for amendments clarifying the
exclusive regulatory authority of the FHLBB over the FSLIC when the
latter acts as receiver of a state thrift, the provision has remained basi382
cally unchanged.
Once again, however, the legislative history adds little to the text of
the Act. The overall plan of deposit insurance was obviously very close
to that of the bank deposit insurance scheme that had been created exactly one year before. 3 3 In hearings before the House Committee, the
General Counsel of the FHLBB described the insurance payout options
of the FSLIC as receiver as being "substantially the same thing as in the
Bank Deposit Insurance Corporation legislation, '38 4 and in the House
Committee Report the legislation is described as having made
"[a]dequate provision.., for the liquidation of insured institutions somewhat similar to the plan for the liquidation of banks which are under
Federal deposit insurance. 3 5 Beyond these sparse hints that the practice of the FDIC was to be the model, 3 86 the legislative history casts no
further light on the meaning of the words "settle, compromise or release," "do all other things that may be necessary in connection therewith," and "subject only to the regulation of the court or other public
authority having jurisdiction over the matter," that have been used in
7
section 1729(d). 38
380. Id. The Act draws no distinction between FSLIC Corporate and the FSLIC Receiver,
since the same provision also requires FSLIC Corporate to pay the failed thrifts insurance upon
being appointed receiver. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
381. National Housing Act § 406(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982) (quoted as originally enacted
supra at note 186). The Fifth Circuit inHudspeth incorrectly assumed that section 1729(d) had been
introduced by the Bank Protection Act of 1968. For background on the Bank Protection Act, see
infra text accompanying notes 407-12, See Hudspeth, supra note 103, 756 F.2d at 1101 n.2. The
court thus wrongly assumed that this provision was introduced in the context of legislation concerned with reducing delay and minimizing costs in FSLIC receiverships. The effect of the 1968 Act
was merely to extend section 1729(d) to receiverships involving state-chartered thrifts. See Pfeiler,
supra note 54, at 440-41.
382. See supra note 186; see also infra text accompanying notes 415-19.
383. See supra note 43.
384. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, 73D CONG., 2D SEss., HEARINGS ON

H.R. No. 9620, HOUSING ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1934, at 15, 18 (Comm. Print 1934) (statement of
Horace Russell, General Counsel, FHLBB).
385. H.R. REP. No. 1922, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934); see also 80 CONG. REc. 11,199 (1934)
(statement of Rep. Williams) ("[tihis plan is analogous to the bank-deposit insurance provided at the
last session").
386. See infra text accompanying notes 430-48.
387. Nor are the FSLIC's early reports much help. In its first annual report, the FSLIC merely
describes its receivership duties as including the responsibility to "liquidate [federal savings and loan
associations] in a normal manner." 3 FHLBB ANN. REP. 73 (Jan. 1-June 30, 1935). A perusal of
the early annual reports reveals that the FSLIC has always attempted to avoid liquidation where
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d. Judicial determination of disputed insurance claims.

Housing Act of

1954388

In the

Congress amended both the National Housing

Act and the Home Owner's Loan Act. A statute of limitations was

placed upon actions to enforce deposit insurance claims against the
FSLIC. 389 This is significant for our purposes because, though the
FSLIC has made some headway with the Hudspeth doctrine even in this
context,390

the statutory reference to judicial challenges wold seem to

indicate that, at least in the case of claims involving insured depositsthe most likely type of claim in a thrift liquidation, given the restricted
nature of thrift business at that time-Congress did contemplate the judi39 1
cial determination of claims where their validity was in dispute.
possible and, if liquidation is inevitable, to minimize the costs of liquidation. See, eg., 8 FHLBB
ANN. REP. 101, 120 (July 1, 1939-June 30, 1940); 9 FHLBB ANN. REP. 128 (July 1, 1940-June 30,
1941). But references to the process of liquidation were always couched in vague terms.
On the other hand, some indication that the FHLBB and FSLIC regarded the judicial process
as the appropriate means of resolving disputed creditor claims is evident from the fact that in early
receivership litigation the FSLIC made no objection to the courts' jurisdiction to determine the
validity of claims. See, eg., Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Salisbury, 130 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1942) (deciding dispute between bankrupt oil corporation and savings and loan for which FSLIC had been appointed receiver); Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fields, 128 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1942)
(deciding employment contract dispute between employee and savings and loan for which FSLIC
was the appointed receiver); Town of Texhoma ex rel. Versluis v. Neild, 9 F.R.D. 739 (W.D. Okla.
1943) (hearing motion to strike brought by FSLIC, receiver). In Fields, the receiver did object that
the claimant had failed to "file" the claim with the receiver, but the court appears to have accepted
that this had been done orally and that the claim had been rejected orally. 128 F.2d at 706-07. In
any event, the court then proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the claim itself.
388. Ch. 649, §§ 501, 503, 68 Stat. 590, 633-37 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725, 1464
(1982)).
389. Id. § 501(2), 68 Stat. at 633 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1728 (1982)) (adding
§ 405(c) to the National Housing Act).
390. The FSLIC's attempt to extend the Hudspeth doctrine to claims involving insured deposits
by arguing that the claimant is entitled not to review de novo, but only to APA-type review, was
rejected in Jugum v. FSLIC, 637 F. Supp. 1045, 1046-48 (W.D. Wash. 1986). The Jugum decision
has now been vacated as moot. Telephone interview with David A. Felt, Assistant General Counsel,
FHLBB (Apr. 28, 1988); cf Herbert v. NCUAB, 663 F. Supp. 833, 839-44 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
(NCUAB decisions pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1687(c)(1) are not subject only to arbitrariness review
under the APA) (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 468-72).
On the other hand, the FSLIC has successfully secured the application of the Hudspeth doctrine
in other cases involving insured depositors' claims. See eg., York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663
F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that any claim arising from the FSLIC's power as a receiver
is limited to remedies provided under the APA), vacated on other grounds, 851 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.
1988) (court divided 2 to 1 on this issue); Baskes v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358, 1365 (N.D. IlM.1986)
(claim of negligence brought against FSLIC dismissed because administrative remedies not exhausted); cf Wyatt v. FSLIC, 685 F. Supp. 196, 198 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Berz v. FSLIC, No. CA3-870681-R, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 1988) (APA-type review applied in granting summary
judgment to FSLIC on its determination of validity of insured depositors' claims).
391. This was one of the provisions of the National Housing Act that convinced the Ninth Circuit in Morrison-Knudsen that the judicial determination of other creditor claims could not have
been precluded. See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 1987),
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The Act also made provision for the FHLBB to secure enforcement
orders, administratively and judicially, against delinquent thrifts as an
alternative to placing them in conservatorship or receivership. 392 It
enunciated specific grounds for, and required formal administrative hearings in the case of, the appointment of conservators, receivers and supervisory representatives. 393 It is worth noting that here, where Congress
specifically addressed the question of administrative adjudication, it prescribed detailed procedures and principles upon which decisions should
be based.
e. Introduction of section 1464(d)(6)(C). In 1966, after the
FHLBB had been experiencing difficulty in securing the cooperation of
the managers of some delinquent thrifts, 394 Congress, in the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 39 5 granted the FHLBB power to
issue and seek enforcement of cease and desist orders, as an alternative to
the FHLBB's power to place thrifts in receivership and as an alternative
to the FSLIC's power to terminate the insurance of a delinquent institution, both actions being considered sometimes too drastic.396 Most importantly, the Act also inserted for the first time subsection
1464(d)(6)(C), which forbids the courts from "restrain[ing] or affect[ing]
the exercise of powers.., of a... receiver," except at the instance of the
Board. 397 Subsection 1464(d)(6)(C) is one of the bases upon which the
agencies assert exclusive claims adjudicatory power.
This preclusion of court jurisdiction is ambiguous. It was formulated within the context of a provision that is primarily concerned with
the appointment and removal of, and not the discharge of functions by,
conservators and receivers. Subsection (8) of the insertion made provision for court applications by the FHLBB, "in its discretion," for the
enforcement of notices issued by it under its extended powers, including
not only the issue of cease and desist orders but also the appointment and
petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987)
(No. 87-451).
392. Housing Act, ch. 649, § 503(2). 68 Stat. at 634-36 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464
(1982)) (amending § 5(d) of Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933).
393. Id. § 503(2), 68 Stat. at 635-36 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
394. See, eg., S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3532, 3537-38; HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISORY AND INSURANCE Acr, HEARINGS ON H.R. 17899, at 33,
37 (Comm. Print 1966) (statement of John E. Home, Chairman, FHLBB) [hereinafter Statement of
John E. Home]).
395. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)).
396. See, eg., Statement of John E. Home, supra note 394, at 36.
397. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act, Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 6(C), 80 Stat. at 1033 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C)).
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removal of receivers. 398 This would suggest that Congress was concerned, not with details such as the determination of valid creditor

claims, but with the creation, responsibility, and termination of receiverships, and the need to subject these concerns to the authority of the
FHLBB. What Congress appeared to have in mind in precluding courts
from "restraining" or "affecting" receiverships was the possibility that a
F-LBB-appointed receiver might be harassed in the exercise of its wide-

ranging discretionary powers by injunctions issuing from state courts at
the instance, for example, of aggrieved ex-directors. Viewed from this

perspective, subsection 1464(d)(6)(C) seems little more than a strengthening and codification of the principle of deference toward discretionary
receivership powers that had long before been developed by state and
federal courts in relation to statutory financial receiverships, 399 and the
provision does not necessarily imply that the validity of the credit obligations that the receiver is bound to pay should not, when in dispute, be
settled in court. 4°
Furthermore, wherever Congress expressly addressed the subject of
adjudication, it again made provision for the conduct of hearings 4° 1 and
provided for judicial review under the APA. 4°2 If administrative claims
adjudication and exclusion of the courts had been contemplated, one
might expect Congress to have been more explicit in expresing such intent: after all, the Chairman of the FDIC had specifically stated when
describing the purpose and contents of the House bill that "[tihere are
398. Id., § 101(a), 80 Stat. at 1028 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(8)) (adding new § 5(d)(8) to
Home Owners' Loan Act). The provision of this facility does indicate how much responsibility
Congress has been prepared to entrust to the FHLBB: few other agencies have authority to prosecute enforcement actions without the participation of an independent prosecutorial agent. See
Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcemen4 28 PuB. POL'Y 257, 287 (1980).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 347-53.
400. Cf Statement of John E. Home, supra note 394, at 38 ("As a matter of fact, there can be no
doubt that the approach of this bill markedly increases the role of judicial review in the process of
supervision of financial institutions. At the same time, the Board believes it essential for the supervisory agency that examines and is familiar with the developments in a financial institution to be able
tojudge when action is necessary and what action is appropriate, and to act promptly if the matter is
urgent."). If exclusive claims adjudicatory power had been sought by the Board, one would expect
the General Counsel, whose office actually drafted the bill, to have requested it. There is no mention
of the subject in the General Counsel's statement.
401. See Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, §§ 101(a), 102, 80
Stat. 1028, 1028, 1036 (inserting § 5(d)(7) into the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)
(1982), and amending § 407 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 17300)(2) (1982)).
402. See S. Rip. No. 1482, supra note 394, at 15, 25, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3546, 3557 (section-by-section analysis). The House bill, H.RL 17899, provided for
judicial review according to the "weight of the evidence" standard. See H.R. REP.No. 2077, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (the standard of review should be a "weight of the evidence" rather than
"substantial evidence" standard). But the Senate bill, S.3158, was passed in lieu of the House bill
and the modification was dropped. See also infra text accompanying note 504.
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carefully drawn provisions with respect to administrative hearings and
judicial review which fully protect the rights of individuals and insured
institutions against whom action may be taken by the supervisory
agencies."1403
f Introduction of section 1464(d)(11). On the other hand, the
1966 Act added more detail to the general power of the FHLBB to regulate the conduct of receiverships. It introduced the predecessor to the
present section 1464(d)(1 1),' 04 which is expressed in very broad terms. 40 5
The legislative history provides no indication as to the intention of Congress with regard to this provision, 40 6 so it is quite plausible that the
legislative intention was for the FHLBB to deal with claims adjudication
as a matter of administrative detail and agency expertise.
g. Extension of receivership appointment powers. The Bank Protection Act of 1968407 extended the powers of the FHLBB to appoint the
FSLIC as receiver of insolvent state thrifts. This was effected against a
background of obstruction on the part of the Illinois authorities, who had
refused to appoint the FSLXC as receiver in four cases even though the
FSLIC was the insurer of deposits in those thrifts and by far the major
creditor. 40 8 The state authorities had for a number of months denied the
FSLIC access to information concerning the thrifts; during this time
their financial condition deteriorated rapidly, to the ultimate cost of the
Insurance Fund.40 9 Congress was concerned that the FHLBB and the
FSLIC should be able to act quickly in such cases, 4 10 so it extended the
former's powers to appoint the FSLIC as receiver, and extended the operation of section 1464(d)(6)(C) to FSLIC receiverships involving state403. HousE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 394, at 27
(statement of K.A. Randall, Chairman, FDIC).
404. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act, Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 101(a), 80 Stat. at 1028 (inserting § 5(d)(l 1) in the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1 1) (1982)).
405. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1 1); see also supra text accompanying note 187.
406. See S. REP. No. 1482, supra note 394, at 15, reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 3546.
407. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729, 1881-1884
(1982)).
408. See S. REp. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEws 2530, 2536-37. The FSLIC was estimated to have a claim to at least 95% of the
receivership assets, see id at 2, 7, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2531,

2536, which again indicates how low a priority was given the concern for determination of other
creditor claims.
409. See id., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2531, 2536.

410. The Fifth Circuit in Hudspeth placed great emphasis on this concern, see Hudspeth, supra
note 103, 756 F.2d at 1101, 1102, but did not explain the context in which the FHLBB and FSLIC
powers were being extended to state thrifts.
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chartered thrifts.4 1 1 Given the fact that the claims of creditors other
than the FSLIC amounted to less than 5%,412 it is hardly likely that the
claims determination process was within the contemplation of Congress.

The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982413
granted the FHLBB the emergency power exclusively to appoint the
FSLIC as receiver for state-chartered thrifts in situations where the coop-

eration of state authorities had formerly been required, and it recodified
4 14
the discretionary powers enjoyed by the FSLIC as receiver.

h. Modification of section 1729(d).

Subsection 1729(d) was also

temporarily modified by the 1982 Act to make clear the FHLBB's exclusive regulatory authority over the FSLIC as receiver of state thrifts. 4 15
The basic power to "settle, compromise, or release" claims, and to "do

all other things as may be necessary in connection therewith" remained
unaffected; the intention was that the receivership powers of the FSLIC

over state thrifts should be "approximately equal to those which it now
has with respect to Federal Associations. ' 416,
Finally, the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987417 made the

emergency provisions of the Garn-St Germain Act, including the thensunsetted amendments to section 1729(d),4 18 permanent by deleting the
411. See Bank Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-389, § 6, 82 Stat. at 295 (modifying § 406 of the
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1982), and § 5(d) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982)). The Senate Report described § 1464(d)(6)(C) as preventing the "appointment of the FSLIC as receiver by the Board" from being "subject to judicial attack." See S. REP.
No. 1263, supra note 408, at 10, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS at 2539. The
Report then emphasized that the Board's regulatory authority was to be substituted for that "of any
State authority, administrative or judicial, which may previously have had regulatory authority," id,
and concluded that "[t]he effect of the legislation would be to enable the FSLIC to defend its appointment under Federal law instead of requiring it to defend the legality of the State savings and
loan administrator's determinations under State law," id at 11, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2540. Claims adjudication seems not to have been contemplated.
412. See supra note 408.
413. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.,
12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. and 20 U.S.C.).
414. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act § 122(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f) (1982).
415. Id § 122(g), 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982); see supra text accompanying note 186 (quoting the
temporary (and now permanent) wording in full); see also infra text accompanying notes 417-19.
416. S.REP.No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3054, 3102. It is significant that Congress emphasized that the Insurance Fund would not be
liable for the noninsured claims of creditors. See id at 49, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3103. This probably reflects awareness of the growing diversification of thrift
business and the increasing importance of noninsured creditor claims. It also suggests that it is only
at this point that legislators could have begun to address seriously the detail of creditor claims

adjudication.
417. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A.).
418. See supra text accompanying note 186 (quoting the final version of § 1729(d) in full).
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sunset clauses in the 1982 Act 4 19
This review highlights the ambiguity surrounding the receivership
claims determination power. It is very unlikely that Congress at any
stage directly addressed the matter, and neither section 1464(d)(6)(C)
nor section 1729(d) can seriously be regarded as direct authority for exclusive administrative adjudication. The court in Summertree Venture
III v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.420 was surely correct in
concluding:
The reasons the FSLIC can be appointed, the timing of the appointment, and the entity that is authorized to make the appointment have
changed throughout the years, but the powers and functions of the
receiver in connection with the liquidation have not been expanded
since the original acts.4 2 1
i. The irrelevance of sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d). Not
only do sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) provide a very dubious basis
for the adjudicatory powers claimed by the FHLBB and the FSLIC, but
reliance upon them also involves the agencies in self-contradiction, since,
ultimately, section 1464(d)(6)(C) proves too much and section 1729(d)
proves too little.
If section 1464(d)(6)(C) really does preclude the jurisdiction of the
courts in matters relating to claims determination, then, contrary to the
FSLIC's own arguments and the Hudspeth decision itself,422 judicial review "under the APA" 423 would not be available at all because the APA
expressly denies judicial review where the applicable statute precludes
it.424

Hence, to be consistent, the FSLIC should have argued, and the

Fifth Circuit in Hudspeth should have held, that judicial review is denied
altogether.4 25
On the other hand, section 1729(d) confers power on the receiver
(i.e., the FSLIC), not the FHLBB. If the power to adjudicate lies
therein, then the FHLBB, in creating a structure in which adjudication
really takes place only at the level of the Adjudication Division of the
419. Pub. L. No. 100-96, § 509(a), 101 Stat. at 635.
420. 742 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
421. Id. at 453.
422. See Hudspeth, supra note 103, 756 F.2d at 1103.
423. Id.
424. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1982).
425. This rule has some judicial qualifications, designed to avoid due process difficulties. See,
eg., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1974) (the no-review clause of laws administered by
the Veterans' Administration, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982), was designed to proscribe courts from
making benefit determinations, not to proscribe judicial cognizance of constitutional challenges to
veterans' benefits legislation). But these are exceptions, and it would be misleading to assume that
their effect is simply to reinstate "judicial review under the APA."
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Office of General Counsel of the Board,426 has to that extent usurped a
power conferred on the receiver. In other words, the FHLBB cannot, in
claiming adjudicatory power for itself, rely on power conferred upon another agency, even if that agency is subject to its direction.
j. Section 1464(d)(11) as the best basis for the Hudspeth scheme.
Yet it does not necessarily follow that there can be no administrative
adjudication. Such a conclusion would ignore the broad power conferred
on the FHLBB by section 1464(d)(1 1), which, under Chevron, would ordinarily create a strong presumption in favor of the Board's interpretation of the section.4 2 7 The Supreme Court has determined in certain
contexts that "receivership" powers do not entail a claims adjudication
power,428 but the receivership concept has been used in such widely varying contexts, and the thrift industry has been subjected to autonomous
regulation for so long, that it would be an exercise in sterile conceptualism to conclude that claims adjudication is inherently precluded by the
notion of receivership.
If the obfuscation of sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) is avoided,
and constitutional concerns are left aside, the claim that the FHLBB, in
the exercise of its general regulatory powers under section 1464(d)(11),
can establish a claims adjudication scheme becomes much more plausible. A court could conclude that since Congress has not directly addressed the issue, as it plainly has not, the conclusion by the Board that it
is empowered to establish a claims adjudication scheme is a "permissible" construction of its powers and therefore one that the court should
accept. 429
3. FDIC and NCUAB Analogues. Before leaving the question of
statutory power it is helpful briefly to review two possible analogies, one
of which might suggest that claims adjudication is not within the range
of FHLBB and FSLIC powers, and the other of which tends to support
the FHLBB's and FSLIC's claim. The first involves the FDIC, and the
second the NCUAB.
a. The FDIC. The practice of the FDIC may be of assistance for
a variety of reasons. First, the FSLIC insurance scheme was at least
426. See supra text accompanying note 250.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 325-36.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 326-27 (discussing the second stage of the Chevron analysis). In Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841-43 (1986), see infra text
accompanying notes 576-88, the Court held that the CFTC had the power to create a reparations
jurisdiction by rule, though there the statute seemed, in view of its direct reference to "reparation

orders," more clearly to contemplate that the agency would do so.
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partly modeled on that of the FDIC,4 30 and the techniques employed by
the FSLIC to assist troubled thrifts are very similar to those employed by
the FDIC.4 31 Second, Congress has often amended and extended the re432
ceivership powers of the FSLIC and the FDIC in the same legislation.
Third, the activities of banks and thrifts are becoming increasingly similar.4 33 The overlap is highlighted by the fact that the FDIC is appointed
by, and subject to the authority of, the FHLBB when it acts as receiver
for a failed federal savings bank.434 The FDIC has indeed adopted the
view that the Hudspeth doctrine applies to the determination of creditor
claims when it is liquidating such banks.435 Fourth, the FDIC has had
4 36
longer experience in dealing with the claims of non-insured depositors
and faces similar problems regarding the escalation of failed banks and
the depletion of its insurance fund. 4 37 Finally, some judicial decisions,
while fully acknowledging the controlling force of Chevron, have directly
drawn on the analogies between the two agencies in rejecting the
438
FHLBB's and FSLIC's interpretations of their statutory mandates.
The FDIC must be appointed receiver of failed federal savings
banks, in which case appointments are made by the FHLBB, and of
failed national banks, in which case appointments are made by the
Comptroller of the Currency. 439 The FDIC may also accept appointment as receiver of an insured state bank if such appointment is tendered
430. See supra text accompanying notes 384-85.
431. See supra note 182.
432. See, ag., Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 714(a), 101
Stat. 552, 654 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1787(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1988); Gan-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); Bank Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1729, 1881-1884 (1982)); see also supra notes 407-19.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
435. See supra note 181.
436. See Morrison.Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1221 (9th Cir. 1987),petition
for cert. filed sub nor. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87451).
437. See, ag., Nash, FDICFaces a Texas-Size Drain, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, at Dl, col. 3,
D6, col. 4 (city ed.).
438. See, eg., Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221 (the FDIC's practice of litigating disputed
claims in court supports the conclusion that the FSLIC did not have adjudicatory power); cf FAIC
Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361-64 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (applying Chevron
analysis and relying upon the "clarity of congressional intent expressed with regard to the FDIA" in
determining whether an inconsistent interpretation by the FHLBB of the "far from clear" National
Housing Act was a "permissible" one; concluding that it was not). Although FAIC involved the
definition of insured accounts, it is still relevant: the FDIC analogy was held to be guiding even at
.the second stage of the Chevron analysis.
439. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982). On the rare case of federal savings bank receiverships, see
supra text accompanying notes 167-69. For the grounds for appointing the FDIC as receiver of a
national bank, see 12 U.S.C. § 191 (1982).
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by the relevant state authority. 440
Upon appointment, the FDIC is required to pay insured deposits,
either by cash or by means of transferred accounts. 44 1 With respect to
insured national banks, the FDIC has a wide range of powers to provide
financial assistance to insured banks in order to avoid receivership, 442
and, upon receivership, may create new banks and "bridge banks" for the
purpose of implementing purchase and assumption transactions. 4 3
Here the similarities with the FSLIC end. In particular, the liquidation practice of the FDIC is very different: the FDIC, unlike the FSLIC,
does not assert the power to adjudicate the validity of creditor claims,
whether they be those of insured depositors or uninsured and general
creditors. The FDIC relies instead upon the courts to resolve these
claims. 4 4 As a result, the FDIC makes informal, ad hoc arrangements
in the case of each receivership; 44 5 it lacks guidelines similar to those that
have been created by the FHLBB for thrift receiverships." 6
The practice of the FDIC might therefore suggest that the assumption of adjudicatory authority by the FHLBB and the FSLIC is unjustified. But there are a number of important differences in the regulatory
and statutory contexts of each agency that might justify the difference.
First, while the FDIC, when acting as reviewer of a federal savings
bank, stands in the same relationship to the FHLBB as does the FSLIC
when acting as receiver of a thrift, the FDIC is no longer subject to the
Comptroller's regulatory authority when it is appointed by the Comptroller to act as a receiver for a closed national bank.44 7 Hence the appellate structure created by the FHLBB under the Hudspeth doctrine is not
available to the FDIC, except in the case of receiverships involving savings banks. The conflict of interest that would be involved were the
FDIC to adjudicate claims in its receiverships is therefore even more intense because of the absence of institutional separation.
Second, whereas the FHLBB has long been given exclusive regulatory authority over the FSLIC's receiverships even in the case of federally insured state thrifts, the "rights, powers and privileges" of the FDIC
440. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e).
441. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f).
442. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1982).
443. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(h)-(i) (West Supp. 1988); see also supra note 182.
444. By July 1987, the FDIC was involved in approximately 27,000 lawsuits involving claims
against its receiverships. Interview with Carroll Shiflett, Assistant General Counsel, FDIC, in
Washington, D.C. (July 21, 1987).

445. Interview with Roger Hood, Assistant General Counsel, FDIC, in Washington, D.C. (Oct.
22, 1987).
446. See supra text accompanying notes 201-05.
447. 12 U.S.C § 1821(d).

492
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as receiver are entirely governed by the relevant provisions of state law
when it is appointed receiver of a state bank. 448 This means that the
FDIC would have to abide by the claims adjudication provisions or practices of state law. Thrift receiverships stand in contrast: once under the
regulatory authority of the FHLBB, the FSLIC as receiver of a state
thrift is restricted only by the proviso to the jurisdictional provisions of
12 U.S.C. section 1730(k)(1).4 49 The section vests jurisdiction over suits
involving the FSLIC in the federal district courts, and it makes federal
law controlling. But it stipulates in its proviso
[t]hat any action, suit, or proceeding to which the [FSLIC] is a party in
its capacity as... receiver... of an insured State-chartered institution
and which involves only the rights or obligations of investors, creditors, stockholders, and such institution under State law shall not be
deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.4 50
Although it has been suggested that the proviso supports the argument
against claims adjudicatory powers because it indicates a "tacit assumption" on the part of Congress that such claims would be amenable to
judicial resolution, 4 51 the proviso addresses not the powers of the FSLIC
or the FHLBB, but only the law governing the criteria by which claims
452
should be resolved.
The guidance provided by practice at the FDIC is therefore inconclusive. At most it casts doubt upon the plausibility of the FHLBB's
assumption of powers, but, especially when one considers the jurisdictional differences between the FDIC on the one hand, and the FHLBB
and the FSLIC on the other, the FDIC's general practice of litigating
disputed claims in court is insufficient in itself to render the FHLBB's
4 53
interpretation of its powers "impermissible."
448. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e).
449. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) (1982).
450. Id.
451. See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1987),
petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987)
(No. 87-451).
452. Section 1730(k)(1) is really analogous to the fourth power established in 12 U.S.C. § 1819
(1982), which prescribes the governing law and jurisdiction in disputes involving the FDIC. Cf.In
re FSLIC, 837 F.2d 432, 435-36 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing section 1819 cases in support of section
1730(k)(1) issue); FSLIC v. Ticktin, 832 F.2d 1438, 1444 (7th Cir. 1987) (relying heavily on section
1819 caselaw in deciding § 1730(k)(1) issue), petitionfor cert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. May 12,
1988) (No. 87-1865); Polk v. FDIC, No. 87-C-9433 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL
19575) (cases involving FDIC removal and FSLIC removal can be cited interchangeably). But see
FSLIC v. T.G. Partners, Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (stressing differences between
section 1819 and section 1730(k)(1)).
453. The FAIC case, see supra note 438, can be distinguished in that it involved an interpretation
of depositors' substantive rights and not the means by which disputes concerning those rights should
be resolved-a concern that, in the absence of constitutional constraints and explicit legislative gui-
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b. The NCUAB. The receivership powers of the NCUAB are
something of a hybrid. The NCUAB is empowered to place federal
credit unions into liquidation and appoint itself the "liquidating
agent." 4 54 It is also authorized to accept appointment as liquidating
agent of an insured state-chartered credit union.455 As in the case of the
FDIC, in such situations it possesses the "rights, powers, and privileges"
granted by the applicable state law. 456 The NCUAB, in section 1788(c),
also enjoyed receivership powers that were framed, before the enactment
of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, 457 in terms identical to
those possessed by the FSLIC under section 1729(d) before the latter
provision was amended in 1982.458 In addition, the NCUAB, like the
FDIC and the FSLIC, must pay insurance to insured depositors when a
credit union is closed for liquidation and, like the FDIC and the FSLIC,
can require claimants to insurance to prove the validity of their claims in
court.

459

Unlike the legislation governing thrift liquidations, however, the
powers of an NCUAB liquidating agent were more explicitly articulated
by the Act of July 31, 1946, which amended the Federal Credit Union
Act.460 This legislation provides that a liquidating agent "shall have
power and authority, subject to the control and supervision of the
[NCUAB] and under such rules and regulations as the [NCUAB] may
prescribe,.., to receive, examine, and pass upon all claims against the
Federal credit union in liquidation, including claims of members on
member accounts."'4 61 The Senate Report accompanying this amendment stated that "[t]he provisions set out in this section. . .. are similar to
those which are customarily prescribed in other types of liquidations and
would authorize, for example, the appointment of a liquidating agent, the
receipt and adjudication of claims, and the distribution of dividends
dance, and in the presence of general regulatory authority (section 1464(d)(1 1)), might properly be
regarded as the preserve of the agencies involved.
454. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1787(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1988).

455. See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b) (1982).
456. Id
457. 12 U.S.C. § 1788(c) (1982) states:
In connection with the liquidation of any insured credit union, the Board shall have the
power to carry on the business of and collect all obligations to the credit union, to settle,
compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the credit union, and to do all other
things that may be necessary in connection therewith, subject to the regulation of the court
or other public body having jurisdiction over the matter.
458. On the 1982 FSLIC amendment, see supra text accompanying notes 415-19.
459. See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(c)(1).
460. Ch.711, § 8, 60 Stat. 744, 745 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1766(b)(3) (1982)).
461. 12 U.S.C. § 1766(b)(3)(B) (1982).
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thereon." 462
The 1946 legislation and the accompanying Senate Report were considered by the court in Morrison-Knudsen in its review of the practices
and legislation pertaining to the liquidation practices of other regulatory
agencies. 463 The panel concluded, however, that even if Congress had
really intended to suggest that the other agencies had exclusive claims
adjudicatory power (which is not at all clear from the wording used in
the Report), then Congress "was mistaken."" 4 In any event, the court
concluded, the NCUAB legislation and history was "so remote from the
cases at bar that it cannot affect our decision." 465
The Morrison-Knudsen court was surely correct to doubt that Congress intended to vest the liquidating agent with an exclusive adjudicatory power. The 1946 amendment had also inserted a provision that
expressly recognized that claims might be established through the judicial process. 466 The formulation employed was similar to that used in
legislation governing the receivership of national banks prior to the creation of the FDIC, with respect to which there had been no doubt that
creditors could resort to court to establish their claims. 467 It is therefore
most unlikely that Congress intended that liquidating agents should have
exclusive power to adjudicate claims to the preclusion of the courts.
Soon after Morrison-Knudsen, in Herbert v. National Credit Union
Administration Board,468 the exclusivity of the NCUAB's claims adjudicatory powers again became the subject of judicial scrutiny, this time
within the context of determinations involving the validity of deposit insurance claims. The NCUAB argued that its determinations could not
be challenged in court de novo, but were subject only to APA judicial
review. In support of its argument the NCUAB invoked two cases that
had expressly relied upon Hudspeth.469 In effect, the NCUAB argued for
462. S. REP. No. 1647, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1323,
1324 (emphasis added).
463. See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1219 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987),
petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987)

(No. 87-451).
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Section 1766(b)(4)(B), which was inserted by the 1946 Act, provides that the liquidating
agent shall "make a ratable dividend on all such claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction
or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction." 12 U.S.C. § 1766(b)(4)(B) (1982) (emphasis
added).
467. See, eg., Schulenberg v. Norton, 49 F.2d 578, 580 (8th Cir. 1931) (applicable legislation
required receiver to pay claims proven to his satisfaction or adjudicated in court of competent jurisdiction); see also supra text accompanying note 352.
468. 663 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
469. Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1987); Baskes v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358
(N.D. 11. 1986).
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an extension of the Hudspeth doctrine (concerning exclusive administrative claims adjudication) to the determination, in federal credit union liquidations, of the claims of insured depositors.
Finding no guidance in the relevant legislative history, and noting
the provision of elaborate procedural prescriptions elsewhere in the
Credit Union Act 470 and the absence of detailed administrative rules like
those promulgated by the FHLBB,4 71 the court rejected the NCUAB's
argument. Chief Judge Nangle was unimpressed by the references to
Hudspeth, which, he noted, "[did] not in any way involve an FSLIC in472
surance claim."
The decision in Herbert and the reference in Morrison-Knudsen to
the NCUAB's powers assume some significance in view of subsequent
legislation passed by Congress. Morrison-Knudsen was decided on February 25, 1987, and Herbert was decided on June 29, 1987. The Competitive Equality Banking Act, which amended the NCUAB's powers, was
enacted on August 10, 1987. The Act modified the NCUAB's receivership powers in two ways. First, it added a new subsection to the receivership appointment power,473 providing for judicial challenge to the
closure of a credit union, and adding a provision that serves as an analogue to section 1464(d)(6)(C). 474 Second, the 1987 Act transferred section 1788(c) (the NCUAB's equivalent of section 1729(d)) to section
1787, and amended it in terms identical to those that were used to amend
section 1729(d) by the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982.4 75
Congress had thus directly addressed one aspect of the receivership
powers of the NCUAB, so the legislative history has particular significance. And in the Senate Report we find, tailor-made for the adoption of
the Hudspeth doctrine, the following statement:
The Committee expects that liquidations conducted under this section
shall be accomplished as expeditiously as possible in order to achieve
minimal disruption to the financial system. Creditor, member and
other claimants must be dealt with in a fair manner. These amend470. See Herbert, 663 F. Supp. at 839-40.
471. Id. at 842.
472. IM. (rejecting suggestions to the contrary in Godwin, 806 F.2d at 1292 n.4).
473. Competitive Equality Banking Act, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 714(a), 101 Stat. at 654 (codified
at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1787(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1988)).
474. "Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, no court may take any action for or
toward the removal of any liquidating agent or, except at the instance of the Board, restrain or affect
the exercise of powers or functions of a liquidating agent." Id
475. Id § 714(b), 101 Stat. at 655 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1787 0) (West Supp. 1988)) (inserting the words "subject only to the regulation of the Board, or, in cases where the Board has been
appointed liquidating agent solely by a public authority having jurisdiction over the matter other
than the said Board, subject only to the regulation of such public authority"). On the Garn-St
Germain amendments, see supra notes 186, 415-19 and accompanying text.
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ments clarify the NCUA's authority to adjudicate liquidation claims.
Upon final agency action, a claimant may seek recourse in court under
the provisions of the APA. 476
While one should not place too much weight on legislative history,
much of which is manufactured, 477 the wording emphasized in the passage just quoted invites speculation as to the possible motives underlying
the amendments. Three possibilities suggest themselves.
First, the explicit reference to the APA as the statute governing the
scope of judicial review could be taken as a renunciation of the law espoused in Herbert. This is an unlikely interpretation, however, since the
amendments left completely unchanged section 1787(c)(1), which expressly provides for the judicial resolution of disputed insurance claims,
and upon which the court in Herbert explicitly relied. 478
Second, the NCUAB could have been concerned that the dicta in
the Morrison-Knudsen opinion had cast doubt upon what the NCUAB
believes to be the exclusive power of liquidating agents to adjudicate
claims. The amendments may have been intended to clarify the situation. 4 79 If such were the motivation, however, the NCUAB might not
have been successful. The amendments address sections 1787 and 1788,
and not section 1766(b)(3). Yet it is the latter provision that appears to
furnish the power to "adjudicate" claims and to which Morrison-Knudsen had referred. 480 Not only do the amendments fail to address the
actual subsection interpreted by Morrison-Knudsen (i.e., section
1766(b)(3)), but it would also have been far simpler for Congress to have
added an express provision to section 1777(b)(3) stating that the power
to adjudicate claims was exclusive, or subject only to APA review. It is
also difficult to understand why the NCUAB drafters chose to adopt the
very terminolog 481 that had been in issue in Morrison-Knudsen in the
FSLIC context, and which the court had interpreted so as to exclude the
476. S. REP. No. 19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprintedin 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 489, 515 (emphasis added).
477. Cf Starr, Conference on Statutory Interpretation: The Role ofLegislative History in Judicial
Interpretation-Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 376-77
(describing the "virtual cottage industry" engaged in fashioning legislative history "so that the Congress will appear to embrace their particular view in a given statute").
478. See 663 F. Supp. 833, 843 (E.D. Mo. 1987). Staff at the NCUAB assert that the Herbert
decision was not the motive for obtaining the amendment. Telephone interview with Leslie A. Conover, Staff Attorney, FDIC (May 11, 1988).
479. This is the explanation provided by staff at the NCUAB. Telephone interview~supra note
478.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 460-65.

481. The modification of the terminology to comport with the post-1982 wording of the FSLIC's
section 1729(d) adds nothing of substance to the legislation. See supra notes 186, 415-16 and accompanying text.
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power to adjudicate claims,4 82 was adopted. Instead, the amendments
could simply have incorporated the explicit terminology used in the Senate Report, thus avoiding the obscure and highly contentious verbiage of
sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d).
Given the similarity in wording and structure of the amended
NCUAB provisions to those applicable to the FHLBB and FSLIC, a
third possibility might be that the legislation and legislative history were
unwisely framed under the influence of the chaotic jurisprudence
spawned by the Hudspeth decision. This would explain why the drafters
chose to focus on the analogues to sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d).
In any event, because the 1987 amendments did address the
NCUAB analogues to sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d), and because
the amendments reformulated the NCUAB provisions in terms that are
virtually identical to pertinent parts of sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and
1729(d), the legislative history accompanying the amendments constitutes an endorsement of the contentions of the FHLBB and FSLIC. Yet
the strength of this endorsement will depend on how seriously one should
regard this legislative history and whether the reliance upon sections
1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) as the sources of adjudicatory power has any
48 3
merit at all.

In conclusion, we can assume that, while it is doubtful that the
FHLBB and the FSLIC enjoy exclusive claims adjudicatory authority by
virtue of the provisions of sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d), under section 1464(d)(1 1) the FHLBB could, in the absence of constitutionaldifficulties,48 4 enjoy authority, murky though it certainly would be, to

establish an administrative claims adjudication scheme. In order to complete the analysis of the legislative constraints, and before examining the
constitutional constraints, we need to consider the supplementary application of the APA.
4. Application of the APA. Given the wording of the FSLIC's
statutory mandate, it is unlikely that any of the formal procedural requirements of the APA 48 5 apply to the receiver when these claims are
482. The court in Morrison-Knudsen thought that Congress's failure to speak more explicitly in
the 1982 amendments actually detracted from the force of the agencies' arguments. See MorrisonKnudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1221 (9th Cir. 1987),petitionfor cer. filed sub non
FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
483. See supra text accompanying notes 422-26 (arguing that sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d)
are red herrings).
484. The principle of deference dictated by Chevron is balanced by the principle of strict construction when agency powers impinge upon constitutional protections. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
485. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1982).
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being adjudicated. Hudspeth adjudications are likely to be construed as
informal adjudications, and thus the only procedural requirements beyond those dictated by the FHLBB in its rules would be those dictated
48 6
by constitutional due process.
As to judicial review, the courts applying Hudspeth have assumed
that the standards articulated by the APA4 87 apply. The exact scope of
review is probably governed by the "arbitrary and capricious"
4 88
standard.
a. Adjudicatory procedure. Must the receiver follow the formal
adjudicative procedures of the APA? These are triggered only in the case
of "adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved.., a matter subject to a subsequent trial of law and the facts de
novo in a court. '489 Assuming the FSLIC is correct in asserting that
creditors are not entitled to de novo judicial determination of the validity
of their claims, we need to examine the statutory wording of the FSLIC's
adjudicative authority in order to determine whether formal APA proceedings are triggered.
The FSLIC relies on section 1729(d) for authority to adjudicate
creditor claims. Subsection 1729(d) contains no obvious terminology to
trigger the APA's requirements for formal adjudication. 490 There is no
provision for an "agency hearing," nor is there a requirement that the
determination be made "on the record." The Supreme Court has insisted
upon a literal or very clear triggering in the analogous case of formal
rulemaking4 91 and, although it appears that the courts might be more
willing to construe a requirement of formal procedures in the case of
adjudication, 492 the complete absence in section 1729(d) of any reference
to the form of procedure to be followed strongly suggests that formal
proceedings are not contemplated; on the contrary, the words "settle,
compromise, or release," and the preference for informal negotiation and
486. See infra notes 608-15 and accompanying text.

487. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
488. See id. § 706(2)(A).
489. Id. § 554(a)(1).
490. See supra text accompanying note 186 (quoting § 1729(d) in full).

491. See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).

492. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (Ist Cir.) (holding formal adjudication proceedings applicable under statute that did not contain words "on the record," but did
require the decision to be made "after opportunity for public hearing"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824
(1978). But cf United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 536 (D.C. Cir.

1978) (holding that, in the absence of a requirement that a hearing be conducted "on the record," no
formal adjudication was required by a statute that mandated "notice and hearing").
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settlement on the part of thrift receivers,4 93 suggest that the receiver is
not intended to be straightjacketed by formal adjudicative requirements.
Furthermore, the FHLBB has located the real adjudication of creditor claims above the level of the receiver.494 In doing so it must be relying upon its rulemaking authority under section 1464(d)(11),495 which
itself contains no triggering terminology. 4 96 Hence we can conclude that
the procedural provisions of the APA are triggered by neither the

FSLIC's

adjudicative

authority. 497

authority

nor the FHLBB's

rulemaking

b. Judicial review. The Home Owners' Loan Act and the National Housing Act are silent on the applicable scope of judicial review of
the receiver's claims determinations. When endorsing the FSLIC's claim

to exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction, the court in Hudspeth noted that
once the administrative process has been exhausted the claimant, "if un-

satisfied, can seek judicial review under the APA." 498 In fact, none of
the courts that have applied the Hudspeth doctrine have carefully analyzed the exact nature of this assumed review jurisdiction.4 99
493. See supra text accompanying note 250.
494. See supra text accompanying notes 278-97.
495. See supra text accompanying notes 427-29.
496. See supra text accompanying note 187 (quoting section 1464(d)(11) in full). In its proposed, interim and supplemental rules, see supra notes 201, 202, 205, the Board has relied variously
on sections 1437 (which establishes the FHLBB and states its general regulatory mission), 1464(a)
(which confers on the FHLBB its general chartering and supervisory powers), 1464(d)(ii) and
1729(d). See 53 Fed. Reg. 21,474, 21,475 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 13,105, 13,106 (1988); 50 Fed. Reg.
48,970, 48,971 (1985).
497. Another possible trigger is the Constitution's due process clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The isolated precedent for this is Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), in which the
Court held that the APA's requirement of formal adjudication was triggered if the hearings held by
the agency (in this case, on deportation) were held "by compulsion" as opposed to "by regulation,
rule, custom, or special dispensation." Id at 50. This suggests that the FHLBB and FSLIC should
conduct formal adjudicatory hearings. The trouble is that Wong Yang Sung is an unclear guide as to
when the Constitution might trigger formal proceedings; moreover, it appears to have little precedential force, at least where personal liberty is not at stake. Cf Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th
Cir. 1976) (refusing to extend the reasoning in Wong Yang Sung to prison disciplinary proceedings).
As the authors of a leading casebook have observed, "[i]n
practice... Wong Yang Sung appears to
have fallen into obscurity." W. GELLHORN, C. BYsE, P. STRAUSS, T. RAKoFF & R. SCHOTLAND,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 247 (8th ed. 1987); cf S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY 870 (2d ed. 1985); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKuIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4 (1985).

498. Hudspeth, supra note 103, 756 F.2d at 1103 (citing First Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D. Haw. 1981) (stating that judicial review "may be
available under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976)")).
499. More attention has been paid to the scope of review involved in judicial challenges to the
appointment of conservators and receivers. In this context, judicial review is specifically provided
for by the statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982), which uses the phrase "upon the merits." See,
eg., Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400, 1406-09 (5th Cir. 1987) (asserting that Congress did not
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The Ninth Circuit, in Morrison-Knudsen, took the view that, "[iln

the absence of specific congressional direction," the "arbitrary and capricious" standard "might well be applicable.., or at best the 'substantial
evidence' standard," which the court took to be more deferential than

"weight of the evidence" review5 °° Similarly, the Texas court of appeals
in Glen Ridge,501 ruling section 1729(d) to be an unconstitutional grant
of adjudicative power partly because of the low level of judicial scrutiny

on review, observed that neither of the APA's potentially applicable "arbitrary and capricious" 50 2 or "substantial evidence ' 50 3 standards were as
intense as the common law "weight of the evidence" or de novo review
5o4

standards.
Since Hudspeth adjudications are not required by statute to be made

"after a hearing on the record, ' 50 5 the scope of review is governed by the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review and not the "substantial
evidence" standard. This would follow from the express statement in the
APA that the"substantial evidence" standard should only apply "in a

case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title [i.e., formal adjudication]
or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by
statute. ' 50 6 In practice, however, because the FHLBB has developed a

recordkeeping requirement for Hudspeth adjudications,50 7 and, with the
development of "hard look" review,508 the scope of review is likely to be

as probing under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard as it would
intend for the district court to review the Bank Board's decision de novo, but rather that the decision
be reviewed on the basis of the administrative record in accordance with the APA's "arbitrary and
capricious" standard), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1221 (1988).
500. 811 F.2d 1209, 1221 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson
Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
501. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), writ
denied, 750 S.W.2d 757 (rex. 1988).
502. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
503. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
504. 734 S.W.2d at 380, 389. The district court in Lyons relied on legislative history in assuming
that the standard of review intended by Congress is actually the "weight of the evidence" standard.
See Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(quoting H. REP. No. 2077, supra note 402, at 6), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987); accord
Peoples' Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 677 F. Supp. 1104, 1107-08 (D. Kan.
1988). But Lyons is wrong in two respects. First, the legislative history referred to by the court
related to a specific "weight of the evidence" provision in the House bill, whereas the Senate bill,
which merely adopted the provisions of the APA, contained the review provisions that Congress
eventually enacted. Second, in the legislative history cited by the Lyons court, the House committee
was concerned only with the special adjudicatory procedures it had established in relation to cease
and desist orders and appointment and removal of directors. See supra note 402.
505. See supra text accompanying notes 489-93.
506. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
507. See supra text accompanying notes 262-69.
508. See generally, eg., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 497, § 7.5, at 377-88.
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have been under the "substantial evidence" standard.50 9
B.

ConstitutionalConstraints.

Even if there is statutory authority for the Hudspeth scheme, the
scheme will be invalid if it violates the Constitution. On the other hand,
this article considers not only whether the existing scheme might violate
the Constitution, but also with whether, if so, it can be modified so as to
comply with the Constitution. If the scheme violates article III, for example, we should then consider whether there is a way in which the procedures might be structured so as to comply with its requirements. If
there is not, then the FHLBB and the FSLIC must accept that the validity of creditor claims simply cannot be adjudicated administratively without judicial participation.
1. Constitutionalismin the Administrative State. The task of reconciling agency government with the constraints imposed by the Constitution has proven perplexing and recurrent. Something of a pattern has
emerged during the course of the past six decades. The Supreme Court
has first reacted against the presence of agency authority by vigorously
reasserting formal constitutional doctrines. Then, perceiving that it has
overreacted and thereby placed the orderly functioning of modern government in jeopardy, it has assumed a more pragmatic or "functional"
approach that has ultimately rendered the formal doctrine virtually
dormant.5 1 0
This pattern of resistance, followed by acquiescence, has manifested
itself in various contexts. The "constitutional fact" 5 11 and "jurisdictional
fact" 51 2 doctrines, which once appeared to create insuperable obstacles to
exclusive administrative decisionmaking, seem long moribund.5 1 3 The
509. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 68186 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Data Processing,Judge Scalia reasoned that the difference between the two
standards was related not to the level of rationality that must be exhibited by an agency's decision,
but to the material that may be considered by the court in its review: formal adjudications must be
judged solely by the closed record that the agency was required to develop. Apart from this, the

distinction between the standards is "largely semantic." See also R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P.
VERKUIL, supra note 497, § 7.3.3.
It is recommended, however, that judicial review be confined to the record, and therefore elevated to the "substantial evidence" standard, because of the fact-specific nature of creditor claims.
See infra text accompanying note 748.
510. Cf Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) (examining the dominant themes that emerge from an overview of the evolution of the federal regulatory system and the judicial response to each successive wave of regulatory change).
511.

See, eg., Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).

512. See, eg., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
513. See generally,e.g., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 497, § 5.2.2 (discuss-

ing the demise of the Ben Avon and Crowell doctrines).
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nondelegation doctrine, which wrought such havoc with the first phase of
the New Deal,5 14 now functions as no more than a docile admonition
against the expansive delegation of statutory power to agencies.5 15 The
restraints imposed upon agency adjudication by article III quite recently
seemed formidable; yet, even at a time when the Court has taken an unusually strict view of the Constitution in its application to the first
branch of government, 51 6 article III has subsequently proved remarkably
flexible.5 17 The application of procedural due process to agencies has
evolved into ad hoc judicial judgments as to the fairness of specific
procedures.518
In relevant respects, the Court appears to have shifted from a formalistic approach to a functional one. When deciding on the constitutionality of administrative institutions and schemes, the Court has
adopted an interest-balancing approach. 5 19 The new approach has made
it necessary to attempt to predict the likely outcome of constitutional
challenges by anticipating which interests the Court is likely to take into
account when performing its balancing exercise, as well as the relative
weight that each interest will receive. The results are likely to be heavily
dependent on the facts in each type of case.
2.

The Network of Constraints.

a. Delegationofpowers. The power to adjudicate creditor claims
could be challenged as an unconstitutional delegation on -two levels.
First, the basic authority to establish the claims determination scheme
might be attacked as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the
FHLBB. Alternatively, it might be claimed that, when adjudicating
creditor claims, the FHLBB and the FSLIC exercise a standardless discretion and that this constitutes an unlawful delegation of power by Congress. The courts in which the delegation issue has been raised have not
514. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See generally, eg., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 497, § 3.4.2 (discussing the New Deal
cases).
515. See infra notes 522-24 and accompanying text.
516. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
517. Cf Bruff, On the ConstitutionalStatus of the Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U.L. Rnv.
491, 502.04 (1987); Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestionsA Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
518. See infra notes 609-10 and accompanying text.
519. See, eg., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 576-88). See generally Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
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503

5 20
clearly distinguished between these two potential objections.
The entire Hudspeth scheme has been implemented as part of the
Board's general regulatory authority under 12 U.S.C. section
1464(d)(11).521 Broad though this regulatory authority is, however, an
attack upon its constitutionality has probably long been obviated by
Fahey v. Mallonee,522 in which such a challenge, made against the
FHLBB's original authority to make rules governing thrift liquidations,523 was unsuccessful. The Court held that broad legislation enacted

within the context of close and experienced regulation does not constitute
an unconstitutional delegation of power:
The remedies which are authorized are not new ones unknown to existing law to be invented by the Board in exercise of a lawless range of
power. Banking is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public callings. It is one in which accumulated experience of
supervisors, acting for many states under various statutes, has established well-defined practices for the appointment of conservators, receivers and liquidators. Corporate management is a field, too, in
which courts have experience and many precedents have crystallized
into well-known and generally acceptable standards. A discretion to
make regulations to guide supervisory action in such matters may be
constitutionally permissible while it might not 524
be allowable to authorize creation of new crimes in uncharted fields.
Although Fahey was concerned with the appointment of a conservator,
the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the FHLBB's regulatory

authority is probably dispositive in the present context as well, and has
been so regarded by those district courts that have been presented with
520. See, e.g., Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 78 (W.D. Wash. 1986); First Am. Sav. Bank, F.S.B.
v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93, 100 (W.D. Wash. 1986); American Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. C-85-323-C, slip op. (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4,
1986), reprintedin Stevenson Petition, supra note 142, at 48a-49a, rev'd, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v.
CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson
Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451).
521. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(11) (West Supp. 1988); see supra text accompanying note 187 (quoting § 1464(d)(11) in full).
522. 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
523. See supra text accompanying note 366. Congress has subsequently addressed the scope of
this regulatory authority more specifically. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(11) (West Supp. 1988)
(FHLBB may regulate thrift liquidations); see also supra text accompanying notes 404-06.
524. 332 U.S. at 250. Fahey represents one of the Court's first attempts to pull back from its
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine established in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court
was able to distinguish both cases easily. The Board's regulatory authority did not entail "a power
to make federal crimes of acts that never had been such before," it did not enable the Board "to
devise novel rules of law in a field in which there had been no settled law or custom," and it did not
involve the delegation of governmental power "to private groups as well as to public authorities."
Fahey, 332 U.S. at 249. On the contrary, the provisions were "regulatory," dealing "with a single
type of enterprise and with the problems of insecurity and mismanagement that are as old as banking
enterprise." Id. at 250.
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this issue. 525
The second line of attack seems equally futile and perhaps even misconceived. The argument here is that the adjudicatory power assertedly
conferred by section 1729(d) is standardless. This objection has some

credibility as a result of the decision in Thomas v. Union CarbideAgricultural Products Co., 5 2 6 in which nondelegation and article III challenges
were mounted against the Environmental Protection Agency's arbitral

jurisdiction under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act.5 2 7 The appellees had argued that the Act's standard for compensa-

tion was so vague as to give "a significant case-by-case lawmaking function to the arbitrator in compensation disputes"52 8 and that this

represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. While
noting that the legislation, which "appears vague on its face[,] 'may derive much meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its factual
background, and the statutory context,' "529 and that the legislative history of the legislation was "far from silent,"' 530 the Court left the issue
open for determination on remand.
Apparently confronted by a similar argument in the present context,
one district court has assumed, citing Union Carbide, that the nondelegation challenge is "inapposite" 531 since it more appropriately invokes article III than article 1.532 Nevertheless, the success of such a challenge
would depend upon the absence of any regulatory tradition, guiding case
law, or meaningful judicial review.53 3 The availability now of a growing
body of published reports on Hudspeth adjudications5 34 tends to undermine the argument that there are no adjudicatory standards. In any
event it is highly unlikely, given the reluctance of the Court to invoke the
525. See, e.g., Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69,78 (W.D. Wash. 1986); First Am. Say. Bank, F.S.B.
v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93, 100 (W.D. Wash. 1986); American Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, No. C-85-323-C, reprintedin Stevenson Petition, supra note 142, at 50a.
526. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
527. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136, 136a-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
528. 473 U.S. at 601-02 (Brennan, J., concurring).
529. Id. at 593 (quoting American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (as
modified)).
530. Id.
531. First Am. Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93, 100
(W.D. Wash. 1986); see also American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. C-85-323-C, reprinted in Stevenson Petition, supra note 142, at 48a-49a.
532. The court wrongly assumed that Union Carbidewas concerned with an article III challenge
alone, whereas in fact the Court in Union Carbide explicitly dealt with the nondelegation challenge.
See Union Carbide,473 U.S. at 593 ("Appellees raise article I as an alternative ground for sustaining
the judgment ....

).

533. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746, 759-62 (D.D.C.
197 1) (agency development of standards that facilitate public accountability and meaningful judicial
review saves broad delegation of power).
534. See infra text accompanying note 705.
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nondelegation doctrine, that such a challenge would succeed. 535
On the other hand, one of the trade-offs for tolerating broad delegations of power has been the intensification of judicial review; 536 hence the
article I objection, even if unsuccessful in itself, might serve to buttress
arguments in favor of formal adjudicatory structures and the maintenance of a reliable record for the purposes of judicial review. 537
b. Article III. The major constitutional objection to the
Hudspeth scheme so far is the charge that it violates the right of creditors
to adjudication of their claims by an independent judiciary enjoying security of tenure and salary, as guaranteed by article 111.538 This complaint played a decisive role, albeit in different ways, in MorrisonKnudsen 539 and in Glen Ridge. 540 In both cases the courts were aware of
the recent Supreme Court applications of article III to administrative
agencies. 541 Article III was also relied upon, without success, by litigants
in some of the other cases,5 4 2 including Hudspeth itself.543 The issue is
now before the Supreme Court.544
535. As Professor Strauss has put it, "delegation arguments are desperation arguments in the
current legal climate." Strauss, supra note 517, at 525.
536. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986). In Bowen, Justice Stevens
explained that "hard look" judicial review is necessary because
our recognition of Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to
assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it
the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its
decision, even though we show respect for the agency's judgment in both.
Id. at 627; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976). The Ethyl court held:
In the case of legislative enactments, the sole responsibility of the courts is constitutional
due process review. In the case of agency decision-making the courts have an additional
responsibility set by Congress. Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers
broadly-and the courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court review to
assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it
fleshes out objectives within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory. Nor is that envisioned judicial role ephemeral, as Overton Park makes clear.
Id. at 68 (Leventhal, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
537. See infra text accompanying notes 681-84.
538. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
539. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert.filed sub norn. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs.,
56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987) (No. 87-451); see supra text accompanying notes 124-31.
540. 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); see supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
541. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 545-88).
542. See infra text accompanying notes 545-88.
543. See supra note 107.
544. See supra note 18. It has long been settled that the discretionary power to place a financial
institution in receivership and appoint receivers, as opposed to the power to determine the validity of
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(i) The evolution of an articleIII balancing tesL After being unexpectedly rejuvenated as a formidable constraint on agency adjudicative
power in the early 1980s, article III has, since 1985 and with the emer-

gence of a pragmatic majority in the Court, again lost much of its constraining force.545 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co. 546 was the case in which a plurality of the Court

47

gave the

article its unexpected vitality; it was also the case in which the dissent 548
espoused the pragmatic view that has subsequently attracted a majority
in the Court.
In Northern Pipeline the Court declared unconstitutional a grant of

jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in

or related to cases under title 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act.549 This
jurisdiction had been vested in bankruptcy judges who enjoyed neither

life tenure nor protection from diminution of salary, both of which are
required by article III. Justice Brennan, speaking for the plurality, held
that the bankruptcy jurisdiction violated article III for two reasons.

First, it did not fall within one of the three established exceptions recognized by the Court in its article III jurisprudence.5 5 0 Second, bankruptcy
judges could not be regarded as mere "adjuncts" of article III courts.
In Justice Brennan's view, the only conceivably relevant exception
to the application of article III was the enigmatic "public rights" excep-

tion: if the subject matter of bankruptcy court jurisdiction involved socalled "public," as opposed to "private," rights, then article III would

not apply.5 51 But, while Justice Brennan accepted that the restructuring
individual creditor claims, may be vested by statute in an agency without violating article III. Kg.,
Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U.S. 684, 685 (1897).
545. For a critical analysis of the shift toward pragmatism in the Court's application of article
III to administrative agencies, see Fallon, Of Legislative Courts,AdministrativeAgencies, and Article
III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 916 (1988).
546. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
547. Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.
548. White, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., dissented.
549. 458 U.S. at 84-85 (plurality opinion). It is important to note that the Northern Pipeline
holding extended only to the jurisdiction to adjudicate "traditional" state common law actions "not
made subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law." Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (characterizing the suit in question (damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation)
as "the stuff of the traditional actions at common law").
550. The exceptions identified by Justice Brennan were those relating to territorial courts,
courts-martial, and the adjudication of "public rights." See id. at 64-67 (plurality opinion).
551. Id. at 69-70 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan, recognizing the uncertain distinction between "public rights" and "private rights," referred to Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), in
which examples of "public rights" were given. Such rights involved the "exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public
health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans." Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51
(plurality opinion). For a comprehensive review of the development of the problematic public
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of debtor-creditor relations itself "may well be a 'public right,'" public
rights "obviously" did not include "state-created private rights, such as
the right to recover contract damages." 5 52 Justice Brennan also declined
the invitation to recognize bankruptcy jurisdiction as a special new exception. Bankruptcy judges had jurisdiction over too broad a range of
questions, and the creation of further exceptions would erode the protection of article III. "Ad hoe balancing" was to be eschewed.M3
As to the possible "adjunct" status of bankruptcy courts, the plurality believed that to possess this status the adjudicative scheme had to
involve "congressionally created rights,"5 54 and that "the functions of
the adjunct must be limited in such a way that 'the essential attributes' of
judicial power are retained in the article III court. 5 55 Bankruptcy
judges, however, had been given jurisdiction over all civil proceedings
related to title 11 cases, they issued final, binding and enforceable judgments, and they were subject only to the deferential "clearly erroneous"
standard of review. Hence, too many attributes of judicial power had
556
been transferred to their hands.
Justice White's dissent focused on the impracticality of trying to
separate state and federal law claims in bankruptcy proceedings, 5 5 7 and
on the poverty of the "public rights/private rights" distinction.5 5 8 Justice White instead advocated a pragmatic balancing approach, involving
a weighing of the interest of Congress in "pursuing in this manner one of
its constitutionally assigned responsibilities" against the values preserved
by article III, with the Court retaining "the final word on how that balance is to be struck."5 5 9
Justice White also adverted to an associated factor that is important
for present purposes: namely, the interrelationship of article III with the
due process clause. In his view, if a situation were to arise in which
Congress might be tempted to influence the article I court, the due prorights/private rights distinction, see Young, Public Rights and the FederalJudicial Power From
Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 765 (1986).
552. 458 U.S. at 71.
553. See id at 72-74 & n.28.
554. Id. at 78. The relationship, if any, between "public" rights and "congressionally created"

rights was not explained.
555. Id at 81. For example, in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), where the Court had
treated a workers' compensation commissioner as an "adjunct," the Court retained fdl authority to
deal with matters of law.

556.
557.
558.
559.

See 458 U.S. at 84-86.
See id at 96-98 (White, J., dissenting).
See idl at 107-10.
See id at 113-16.
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cess clause itself might then dictate the use of an article III court.- 6°
The subsequent article III decisions, Thomas v. Union CarbideAgriculturalProducts Co. 561 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.

Schor,562 represent a major drift by a clear majority of the Court toward
the position advocated in Justice White's Northern Pipeline dissent.
In Union Carbide an arbitration scheme established by the Environmental Protection Agency for the purpose of compensating the suppliers
of data for use in subsequent registration proceedings was challenged.
The scheme was compulsory and provided for judicial review only where
the arbitrator's decision was alleged to be the result of "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct."
The emphasis of the Court 63 was upon the impossibility of applying
article III in an absolute fashion and the consequent need to focus instead on the underlying policies of the article: the maintenance of judicial independence and impartiality.564 Turning to the "public rights/
private rights" analysis employed by the Northern Pipeline plurality, the
Court noted that the "public rights/private rights" analysis had failed to
command majority support 565 and emphasized the pragmatic nature of
any test to be applied in the application of article III: "practical atten-

tion to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories
should inform application of article III. '' 566 Neither the extent ofjudicial
560. Id. at 117 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932). In Crowell, Justice Brandeis
had said, in dissent:
If there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be subjected
to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative courts, it is
not because of any prohibition against the dimunition of the federal district courts as such,
but because, under the circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a
requirement of judicial process.
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87.
On the other hand, this does not necessarily dictate de novo judicial review, since, as Justice
Brandeis had also observed in a later case:
The inexorable safeguard which the due process clause assures is not that a court may
examine whether the findings [of fact] are correct, but that the trier of the facts shall be an
impartial tribunal; that no finding shall be made except on due notice and opportunity to
be heard; that the procedure at the hearing shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial; and that it shall be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for a court
to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed.
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
561. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
562. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
563. O'Connor, J., wrote for the majority.
564. See 473 U.S. at 582-83.
565. See id.at 586.
566. Id. at 587.
In essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when
Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that "could be conclusively
determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches," the danger of encroaching on the
judicial powers is reduced.
Id. at 589 (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982)).
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review nor the identity of the parties should, on their own, function as
5 67
determinative factors.
Turning to the case at hand, Justice O'Connor articulated a number
of factors that, in combination, indicated that there had been no violation
of article III. First, compensable use of the registrants' data "serves a
public purpose as an integral part of a program safeguarding the public
health," and in this respect the right to compensation bore "many of the
characteristics of a 'public' right. '568 Second, the scheme represented "a
pragmatic solution to the difficult problem of spreading the costs of generating adequate information regarding the safety, health, and environmental impact of a potentially dangerous product," one that did "not
diminish the likelihood of impartial decisionmaking. '5 69 Third, given
"the nature of the right at issue and the concerns motivating the Legislature," and in view of the "obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a
prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a
class of questions of fact that are peculiarly suited to examination and
determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that
task, '5 70 the Court did "not think this system threatens the independent
role of the Judiciary in our constitutional scheme."15 7 1 Fourth, the
scheme incorporated "its own system of internal sanctions," relying only
tangentially upon the judicial branch for enforcement; in such cases the
danger of Congressional or Executive encroachment was at a minimum.572 Finally, there was some judicial review, "including whatever
review is independently required by due process considerations. 5 73 The
combination of these factors led the Court to conclude that:
Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly "private" right
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by
the Article III judiciary. To hold otherwise would be to erect a rigid
and formalistic restraint on the ability of Congress to adopt innovative
measures such as negotiation and
arbitration with respect to rights cre574
ated by a regulatory scheme.
567. See id at 587-89.
568. Id. at 589.
569. Id. at 590.
570. IdL (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
571. Id.
572. Id. at 591.
573. Id. at 592-93. In this regard Justice O'Connor somewhat vaguely referred to "review of
constitutional error," to the constitutional fact doctrine mentioned, equally vaguely, by Chief Justice
Hughes in Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46, and to Justice Brandeis' dissent in Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87 (quoted
supra note 559).

574. Id. at 593-94.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:422

Although eight Justices agreed that the arbitral scheme did not violate article III, the number supporting the "public rights/private rights"
analysis had dwindled to three 5 75 In the next case, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor,576 the balancing approach attracted the
concurrence of Justice Stevens as well and was therefore embraced by an
577
even greater majority of the Court.

Schor involved agency adjudication of a state-law counterclaim and

hence, unlike Union Carbide, where the claim was based on federal law,
involved claims that fell squarely within the zone of "private rights"
identified by the Northern Pipeline plurality. Justice O'Connor reiterated
that "practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on
formal categories should inform application of Article III,' 578 and that

"bright line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad principles
applicable in all Article III inquiries. ' 579 The constitutionality of the
adjudicative scheme should be "assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III," namely, the preservation of the
independence of the judiciary and assurance of an impartial adjudicator

in specific disputes.580 A pragmatic judgment had to be made, one that
involves weighing "a number of factors, none of which has been deemed

determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional
action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judici-

ary."'5 1 More specifically, the Court articulated four factors to be
weighed in the balance:
575. Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun) was able to concur by employing his Northern Pipeline "public rights/private rights" analysis, concluding that the determinative
feature of the claims in Northern Pipeline was the fact that they were created by state law and hence
were clearly private rights protected by article III. See 473 U.S. at 597 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The claim in the Union Carbide case, on the other hand, involved a public right, since the
dispute arose
in the context of a federal regulatory scheme that virtually occupies the field.... Although
a compensation dispute under FIFRA ultimately involves a determination of the duty
owed one private party by another, at its heart the dispute involves the exercise of authority by a Federal Government arbitrator in the course of administration of FIFRA's comprehensive regulatory scheme. As such it partakes of the characteristics of a standard
agency adjudication.
Id. at 600-01 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred on other grounds. Id. at 602
(Stevens, J., concurring).
576. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
577. Justice O'Connor again gave the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, was this time forced to dissent.
578. 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 587).
579. Id. at 857.
580. Id. at 848. The former purpose was primarily structural and nonwaivable, being concerned
with the constitutional scheme as a whole, and the latter primarily personal and waivable, being
concerned with protecting the immediate parties to litigation. The Court found that Schor had in
fact waived this latter right. See id. at 849-50.
581. Id. at 851.
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[(i)] the extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power" are
reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, [(ii)] the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts, [(iii)] the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and [(iv)] the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111.582
Applying this weighing process, Justice O'Connor noted that the jurisdiction to adjudicate common law counterclaims involved only a "single deviation from the agency model, ' 58 3 that the CFTC deals only with
a "particularized area of law" 584 that the review of the CFTC by article
III courts was closer than in Northern Pipeline, and that the range of
jurisdiction and powers exercised by the CFTC was much narrower than
that of the bankruptcy courts in Northern Pipeline.5 85 As to the nature of
the claim itself, the fact that it fell squarely within the zone of "private
rights" was not itself dispositive. Instead, the fact that it was a type of
claim that historically would have been adjudicated by article III courts
was merely an indication that the danger to the judicial power was
greater than would be the case with "public rights. ' 5 6 The availability
of a parallel article III jurisdiction invokable by the parties ameliorated
the significant threat to the judiciary. Finally, the congressional purpose
was honorable. 587 Hence "the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial
588
Branch can only be termed de minimis.11
(ii) Implications for the Hudspeth procedures. The Court has
thus articulated several factors that have to be weighed before coming to
a final judgment on the constitutionality of the Hudspeth administrative
scheme. The Texas court of appeals in Glen Ridge 58 9 thought that the
Hudspeth scheme simply fell short of meeting these requirements. The
FSLIC failed to satisfy the criteria necessary to be regarded an "adjunct"
of the courts. 590 There were insufficient safeguards to justify a departure
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85).
585. Id. at 852-53.
586. See id at 853-54.
587. "When Congress authorized the CFTC to adjudicate counterclaims, its primary focus was
on making effective a specific and limited federal regulatory scheme, not on allocating jurisdiction
among federal tribunals. Congress intended to create an inexpensive and expeditious alternative
forum. . . ." Id. at 855.

588. Id. (emphasis in original).
589. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd,
750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); see supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
590. See 734 S.W.2d at 385-86 (focusing primarily on the executive appointment and creation of
FSLIC officers and offices, the absence of supervisory control by article III judges and the narrow

scope of judicial review, the absence of contempt powers on the part of the FSLIC, the breadth of
subject matter jurisdiction asserted by the FSLIC, and the nonstatutory nature of the rights in issue).
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from normal article III requirements. Unlike Schor, creditors have no
choice in selecting who will adjudicate their claims.5 9 1 The allocation of
powers between the FSLIC and the article III courts is lopsided, with the
courts being totally precluded, if section 1464(d)(6)(C) is applicable,5 92
from exercising any supervisory review. 593 The limited judicial review
recognized in Hudspeth is much narrower than had obtained in Schor.594
Finally, whereas in Schor the parallel availability of access to the courts
had rendered fair the balance that had been struck between a proper respect for traditional "private" rights and the need for their expeditious
adjudication, the compulsory preclusion of the courts under the Hudspeth doctrine rendered FSLIC adjudication constitutionally
595
impermissible.
To these considerations one might add the fact that in neither Union
Carbide nor Schor was there serious dispute about the intention of Congress. The "concerns motivating the Legislature, ' 596 the "obvious purpose of the legislation, '597 and the explicit authority that Congress had
provided to adjudicate counterclaims, 598 were factors specifically relied
upon by the Court in adopting the view that a departure from article III
was justified. In the Hudspeth context, on the other hand, the legislative
purpose of Congress is far from evident. 599
The Glen Ridge court of appeals' analysis of the present Hudspeth
scheme seems fair. Yet the determinative criteria are interdependent in
the sense that subtle readjustments to the relevant procedures and structures might well produce a formula that, on balance, would satisfy the
cumulative demands of article III. With clear statutory authority, and
the provision of safeguards designed to ensure fair, impartial adjudication and adequate judicial supervision, it would be possible for Congress
and the FHLBB to construct a constitutionally acceptable administrative
claims adjudication scheme.6m
c. Due process. The Hudspeth doctrine has been challenged
under the due process clause for failure to provide an adequate hear591. See id. at 388.
592. See supra text accompanying notes 423-25.

593. 734 S.W.2d at 388-89.
594. Id. at 389.
595. Id. at 389-90.
596. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985); supra text
accompanying note 570.
597. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
598. See supra text accompanying notes 427-29.
599. See supra text accompanying notes 362-429.
600. This was recognized by the court in Morrison-Knudsen. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
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ing, 601 and for violating the principle of an impartial hearing.602 Both
challenges have failed in the lower courts thus far,6°3 although it is possi-

ble that the Supreme Court will address them.604 In any event, many
judges have only dismissed the due process claims on ripeness grounds,
so it is likely that these questions will return to the courts again.

It is important to distinguish between the two kinds of due process
challenge that have been made: the charge that the Hudspeth procedures

are inadequate implicates quite different considerations from those implicated by the charge that the FSLIC suffers from a conflict of interest

when determining the validity of creditor claims.6°5 Another general observation should also be made: as with the nondelegation doctrine and
article III jurisprudence, the Court has adopted a pragmatic approach
when judging these two facets of due process. The adequacy of adminis601. See FSLIC v. Florida 100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp. 1577, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (no opportunity to present testimony or cross-examine witnesses; claim dismissed as not being ripe); Baer v.
Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 78 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or present
testimony; claim dismissed as premature).
602. See Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564-5 (5th Cir.
1987) (claim that FSLIC will act as party and judge disposed of by decision in Woods v. FHLBB,
826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1221 (1988)), cert. granted sub nom. Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988); Florida100 Dev. Group, 670 F. Supp.
at 1583 (due process claim dismissed as not yet ripe); Baer, 648 F. Supp. at 78 (due process claim
that FSLIC is an interested adjudicator dismissed as premature); First Am. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v.
Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (W.D. Wash. 1986) ("assertion that
FSLIC is likely to prefer its own interests over their claims is rebutted by the presumption that
FSLIC acts in the best interests of the whole estate"); Modern Supply Co. v. FSLIC, 50 Wash. App.
194, 205, 748 P.2d 251, 257-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (charge that "it is unfair if the FSLIC is
empowered to hear claims where its interests are adverse to the claimant's" rejected because of
existence of adequate administrative appeal to FHLBB and recourse to judicial review under APA).
603. But cf Tocci Corp. v. Yankee Bank for Fin. & Say., FSB, No. Civ. A. 87-3121-K (D. Mass.
1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 70344). The Tocci court stated:
The conclusion[ ] ... [that the FDIC and FSLIC do not have exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate creditor claims in savings bank receiverships is] reinforced by the observation
that allowing any person or entity to adjudicate claims against itself is an extraordinary
arrangement because of the inherent conflict of interest implicit in such a dual role. An
interpretation of a statute that attributes to Congress a manifestation of intent to create
powers in an agency so likely to lead to impairment of impartiality in adjudication is inherently suspect.
Id.
604. Certiorari has been granted in one case that presents these issues directly. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), cert granted sub norm Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) (discussed supra at notes 17-18).
605. This distinction was not drawn by the Fifth Circuit in its decision in Coil See id. The
court relied on a decision involving the adequacy of a hearing in dismissing Coit's complaint based
upon conflict of interest. Id. at 565 (referring to Woods, 829 F.2d at 1410-13). Quite apart from the
relevancy of the Woods decision to the statutory context in question (Woods involved the procedures
governing the appointment of a receiver, whereas the present issue concerns the adjudication, by a
validly appointed receiver, of creditor claims), Woods did not deal with the question whether the
FSLIC's procedures required an impartial adjudicator. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19 n.8,
Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) (No. 87-996).
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trative procedures is judged by an ad hoe balancing test,6°6 and even in
cases of alleged conflict of interest the Court has indicated that ad hoc
7
evaluation is necessary ineach case.60
(i) Adequacy of the hearing. Procedural due promcrss, to the extent that it is triggered by the the kinds of claims filed by creditors,608
may well mandate certain procedural requirements even if the FSLIC's
determinations are regarded as a species of informal adjudication. Under
the balancing approach articulated by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,609 the requirements of procedural due process will vary from case
to case, according to the private interest at stake, the efficacy of the existing procedures and the extent to which new procedures will produce
more accurate decisions, and the cost to the government in implementing
6 10
these procedures.
The Mathews three-part balancing test has often been criticized; it

hardly suggests an obvious answer in each case. Instead, it dictates yet
another ad hoc balancing test to determine exactly what an agency is

required to do to meet constitutional requirements. Perhaps the most
widely accepted set of guidelines are those articulated shortly before the
Mathews decision by the late Judge Henry Friendly. 61 1 He thought the
following constitute, "roughly in order of priority, ' 6 12 the elements of a
fair hearing: an unbiased tribunal; notice of proposed action and the

grounds asserted for it; an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken; the right to call witnesses; the right to
606. See infra notes 609-10 and accompanying text.
607. See infra notes 622, 631-33 and accompanying text.
608. Claims grounded in contract would represent constitutionally protected property interests,
see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-601 (1972) (holding that a person may be deprived
of a right created by contract only if due process requirements have been met); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (holding that the requirements of procedural due process did not
apply to teaching appointment that did not create a property interest), but it is not clear whether
those grounded in tort would be sufficient to implicate either property or liberty interests. See eg.,
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (common law defamation does not rise to level of a constitutional cause of action unless it results in a deprivation of "liberty" or "property" recognized by state
or federal law). Nor, even if they are, is it clear whether anything more than a right of action in tort
is required by due process. See, eg., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682-83 (1977) (right to
bring action in tort deemed sufficient due process). Certainly those based on negligence would not.
See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (due process protection only implicated where intentional government deprivation of protected interests involved); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986) (same).
Given the sweep of the Hudspeth doctrine, however, the doctrine's coverage in relation to contractual claims alone justifies evaluation of the Hudspeth procedures against due process standards.
609. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
610. Id. at 335.
611. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
612. Id. at 1278.
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know the evidence against one; the right to have the decision based only
on the evidence presented; the right to counsel; the making of a record; a
6 13
statement of reasons; public attendance; and judicial review.
Judge Friendly also suggested a hierarchy of adverse governmental
action, 6 14 from most to least severe, that would demand adherence to
these procedures to a greater or lesser extent. 61 5 He ranked decisions
such as those involving personal liberty (e.g., parole) at the most severe
end of the spectrum, and decisions involving governmental benefits at the
least severe end. We can assume he would have placed receivership decisions near the middle of the spectrum, alongside those involving professional and trade licenses. In other words, receivership decisions rank as
moderately severe government action, and this would suggest that a substantial proportion of the elements of procedural due process identified
by Judge Friendly should be considered in applying the Mathews balancing test.
(ii) Impartiality. The agencies administering the Hudspeth
scheme are subject to two possible conflicts of interest. The first is pecuniary, and the second stems from the receiver's active involvement in
both the affairs of the receivership in general and the determination of
claims against the receivership.
The FSLIC, in its corporate capacity as insurer of thrift deposits, is
nearly always the largest creditor in any thrift receivership. Since the
FSLIC is also the receiver, this suggests a serious conflict of interest on
the part of the receiver when it is determining the validity of the claims
of other creditors. The potential conflict is rendered all the more acute
by the current pressure on the insurance fund. 6 16 Indeed, it is this very
financial crisis that is offered as the prime justification for the administra617
tive adjudicatory powers claimed under the Hudspeth doctrine.
Hence, even if adjudication only takes place at the FHLBB level, the
financial pressures might be too great to allow for impartial adjudication.
Since Dr. Bonham's Case618 at least, a financial interest, however
small, in the outcome of one's decision has been regarded as a disqualifi613. Id. at 1279-95.
614. The rejection of a claim ified against a receivership would be "adverse governmental
action."
615. See id. at 1295-304.
616. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
617. See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1216 (9th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert filed sub nom. FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Sept. 17, 1987)
(No. 87-451); Peoples' Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 677 F. Supp. 1104, 1108
(D. Kan. 1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
618. 8 Coke's Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:422

cation from decisionmaking. 61 9 The general proposition was restated in
Tumey v. Ohio, 620 where Chief Justice Taft observed: "That officers acting in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest
in the controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule. ' 621 Nevertheless, the Court has always found it necessary to focus upon the "degree or nature of the interest" 622 and this necessarily involves a renewed
assessment in each new set of circumstances in which a pecuniary interest is alleged to violate due process.
In Tumey, the Court found that the due process clause had been
violated for two reasons: first, because a mayor, who was also the judicial officer in cases involving prosecutions for violations of the state prohibition law, would only receive compensation for trying cases from the
fines levied upon conviction of the defendants. 623 Second, and more important for our purposes (since there is no suggestion that members of
the FHLBB or the FSLIC stand to gain in any personal way from the
outcome of decisions made by thrift receivers), the Court found that
there was a violation of due process because the legislative scheme had
been deliberately constructed so as to "stimulate small municipalities in
the country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize
and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. ' 624 In the absence of safeguards such
as trial by jury, opportunity for a retrial, or broad judicial review, and
given the mayor's inevitable interest "in the financial condition of~the
village, and his responsibility therefor," 625 the defendant could justifiably
claim that he had been denied due process.
The importance of this second basis for the decision in Tumey is
illustrated by the Court's more recent decision in Ward v. Village of
Monroeville.626 Here the Court held that, even though the mayor-adjudicator did not stand to benefit personally and directly from the outcome of
619. Even the decision of a Lord Chancellor was set aside on this ground. See Dimes v. Grand
Junction Canal, 3 H.L. Cas. 759, 10 Eng. Rep. 301 (1852). Financial interest should be contrasted

with other potential sources of bias, such as prejudgment or generalized hostility; in the latter case it
is much more difficult to establish a violation of due process. See, eg., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813 (1986) (while a judge's general hostility toward the insurance industry would be insufficient to constitute a violation of due process, the advantage the judge would gain from participating
in a decision that would enhance the prospects of success in his own litigation pending in other
courts was enough to vitiate the decision).
620. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

621. Id. at 522.
622. Id.

623. See id. at 531-32.
624. Id. at 532.

625. Id. at 533.
626. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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his decisions, the financial benefit to his municipality was so great as to
constitute "a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State
'627
and the accused.
The fact that both Tumey and Ward involved criminal prosecutions
is not a ground for distinguishing these cases. The Supreme Court has
expressly stated that Tumey and Ward apply with equal force to situa6 28
tions involving administrative adjudication.
A conflict-of-interest objection to the FSLIC acting as both "prosecutor" and "adjudicator" is more difficult to sustain. In Withrow v.
Larkin,629 the Court again articulated a pragmatic approach for evaluating complaints that an agency has combined both investigatory and adjudicative functions. Though recognizing that a pecuniary interest is one
of those situations "in which experience teaches that the probability of
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable, ' 630 Justice White noted that the problem of
separating investigative from adjudicatory functions had been addressed
by Congress in various ways 63 1 and that "[t]he incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing principle. ' 632 The test is whether the risk of bias or unfairness
'633
is "too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
This pragmatism again requires an evaluation of the actual Hudspeth structures and suggests the possibility of devising a scheme that
would satisfy constitutional constraints. The strictness with which the
Court regards potential pecuniary conflicts of interest indicates that substantial adjudicative independence, and a meaningful separation between
the receiver and adjudicator, are minimum requirements.6 34 These safeguards would also address the need to prevent a mixing of
627. I at 60 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (1927)). That the Court in Tumey expressly
extended the basis of its decision beyond the personal financial benefit enjoyed by the mayor was
overlooked by Justice White in his dissent in Ward
628. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
629. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).

630. Id at 47.
631. One general solution is the APA's requirement in formal adjudications that employees engaged in investigating or prosecuting may not also participate or advise in the adjudication. See 5
U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982).

632. 421 U.S. at 52.
633. Id at 47.
634. See infra text accompanying notes 700-08. The problem of striking the right balance when
creating an internal separation of powers in an agency is perennial, and it requires fine adaptation to
the circumstances of each case. See Asimow, When the CurtainFalls: Separationof Functionsin the
FederalAdministrative Agencies, 81 COLuM. L. REv. 759 (1981).
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"prosecutorial," or investigatory, and adjudicative functions. On the
other hand, such safeguards are probably also sufficient requirements. In
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. ,635 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
scheme in which the Employment Standards Administration was reimbursed for its costs from the civil penalties levied by the Administration
on child labor violators. Although the agency benefited financially from
the determinations of its assistant regional administrator, no individual
within the agency stood to benefit personally 636 and alleged violators
were provided with a full, de novo hearing before an independent administrative law judge. This procedure was deemed sufficient to satisfy the
637
neutrality requirements of due process.
d. Seventh amendment. The seventh amendment provides that
"[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Many of the
claims filed against thrifts in receivership 638 are plainly derived from
"suits at common law," or are based upon statutes that have created
"legal rights and remedies" normally "enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."' 639 Examples of the former are actions for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and civil fraud.
Examples of the latter are civil RICO claims predicated upon crimes alleged to have been committed by the thrift or its agents. Both types
would, in the absence of receivership, be tried to a judge and jury in state
or federal courts having jurisdiction. 64°
Hence it is not surprising that creditors challenging the Hudspeth
doctrine have charged that the doctrine violates their right to a trial by
jury. The first reported case in which this challenge was addressed (and
rejected) was Baer v. Abel 641 More recently the challenge was raised in
635. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).

636. I at 250.
637. Id. at 247-50.
638. See supra text accompanying notes 225-37.
639. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
640. The seventh amendment applies only to federal proceedings. See Minneapolis & St. L. R.R.
v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). See generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 256-58 & n.12 (1986).
641. 648 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Wash. 1986). Shareholders had commenced an action against a
thrift, alleging violations of federal and state securities laws, RICO, and the Washington State Consumer Protection Act in the sale of the thrift's stock. The thrift was then placed into receivership by
the FHLBB, and the FSLIC moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. Judge Rothstein granted the
motion, rejecting the charge that in so doing he was denying the plaintiffs their right to trial by jury.
He reasoned that the amendment "does not apply in actions against the Federal Government," and
that even if the United States had consented to be sued, it had not conceded the right to a jury trial.
Id. at 77 (quoting Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981)). Furthermore, the judge reasoned, the Supreme Court "has frequently affirmed congressional authority to commit factfinding
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Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth,FA.642 The Fifth Circuit
rejected the seventh amendment challenge in Coit Independence as not
being ripe, 64 a and the question is now before the Supreme Court.644 It is
unlikely, however, that this challenge will be successful, both because the
Court has proved tolerant of administrative adjudication with which a
jury would be incompatible, and because receivership claims are likely, in
any event, to be treated as "equitable."
(i) Supreme Court toleration. The seventh amendment challenge
appears, from the jurisprudential history of its application, to depend at
least partly on the success of the article III challenge. In other words, if
an adjudicative scheme could be devised that was authorized by Congress
and satisfied the constraints of article III, it is unlikely that the Court
would rule that it remained invalid because it denied the right to a jury
trial.
5
This view is reflected in a recent dictum in Tull v. United States,64
where Justice Brennan remarked that "the Seventh Amendment is not
applicable to administrative proceedings. ' ' 646 For, although it was once
conceded by the Court that the argument that "the right to a jury trial
was never intended to depend on the identity of the forum to which Congress has chosen to submit a dispute" was "well put," 647 the fact is that
where Congress has chosen to vest the adjudicative power in the hands of
an agency, the Court has refused to apply the seventh amendment.a4
Where, on the other hand, Congress has chosen to place adjudication of
functions and initial adjudications to an administrative forum without violating the seventh amendment." Id. at 77-78 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,

430 U.S. 442, 450-55 (1977)).
642. 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), cert grantedsub nom. Coit Independence Joint Venture v.

FSLIC, 108 S.Ct. 1105 (1988).
643. 829 F.2d at 565.
644. See supra note 18.
645. 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987).
646. Id. at 1835 n.4 (echoing prior dicta to the same effect); see, eg., Atlas Roofing 430 U.S. at
450 ("at least in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated... the Seventh Amendment does
not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible"); Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363,
383 (1974) ("the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings where
jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication"); see also
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINSRATIVE

AcToN 90 (1965) (observing that, even if to do so would satisfy the Constitution, it would not be
feasible to attach juries to agencies because "the concept of expertise on which the administrative

agency rests is not consistent with the use by it of a jury as fact finder").
647. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 457-58.
648. See id. at 460-61; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937); Block

v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921); cf Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-40 (1966) (bankruptcy
court).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:422

the rights it has created in the hands of a district court, the Court has
proved much more willing to find an infringement of the requirements of
the seventh amendment. 649
Various explanations have been offered for not requiring a jury trial
in the case of agency adjudication. In Block v. Hirsh the Court thought
that if a rent commission's statutory power was clear and constitutional,
the seventh amendment objection "amounts to little. To regulate the relation [of landlord and tenant] and to decide the facts affecting it are
hardly separable. ' 650 In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. the Board's power to order reinstatement of an employee and payment for time lost was described as "not a suit at common
law or in the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to
the common law. It is a statutory proceeding" involving the recovery of
damages only as "an incident to equitable relief. '65 1 In Atlas Roofing Co.
v. OccupationalSafety & Health Review Commission the Court relied on
the "public rights/private rights" distinction as a justification: the power
of the agency to determine violations of safety standards, to issue abatement orders, and to assess civil penalties, was described as involving
"public rights" based upon newly created "statutory obligations" and
not entailing a right to a jury trial. 652 These arguments probably also
apply to an otherwise constitutional administrative claims adjudication
scheme.
(ii) Equitable nature of the proceedings. The Court's relaxation
of the literal requirements of the seventh amendment has been criticized
as "seriously weakening the protection afforded by the seventh amendment. '65 3 But even if the Court were to adopt a stricter approach it is
unlikely that it would do so in the case of thrift receivership
adjudications.
In Katchen v. Landy, 65 4 a seventh amendment challenge was made
against the summary jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court to order the surrender of voidable preferences asserted and proved by a trustee in response to a claim filed by the creditor who had received the preferences.
The Court rejected the challenge, concluding that "there is no Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial for determination of objections to
649. See, eg., Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1835-39 (1987); Pernell, 416 U.S. at 363;
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 189.
650. 256 U.S. at 158.

651. 301 U.S. at 48.
652. See 430 U.S. at 449-61.
653. Kirst, Administrative Penaltiesand the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court'sAssault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1281, 1281 (1978).

654. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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claims. ' 65 5 The Bankruptcy Act "converts the creditor's legal claim into
an equitable claim to a pro rata share of the res" and "the proceedings of
bankruptcy courts are inherently proceedings in equity," to which the
right to a jury tial does not extend. 65 6 It is therefore unlikely that the
right to a jury trial would extend to the analogous situation of claims
adjudications in thrift receiverships. 657
3. The Importance of Clear Statutory Authority, Standards,Internal Separation of Powers, Procedural Fairness and Adequate Judicial
Scrutiny. The thrift industry is so intensely regulated 65 8 that the Hudspeth scheme might well pass the enigmatic "public rights/private
rights" test even though creditors' claims often involve rights created by
state law. 659 On the other hand, the Hudspeth scheme constitutes a
sweeping assertion of jurisdiction over a very broad range of claims 66°
and therefore constitutes one of the most daring challenges to article III
yet presented. 66 1 For this reason, Congress, the FHLBB and the FSLIC
have to ensure that they take fully into account the cluster of concerns
driving current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the constitutionality of
agency adjudication.
Though the Court has dictated general deference to agencies in the
construction of their statutory powers, 662 it has also relied upon the clarity of congressional purpose when accepting a departure from the requirements of article 111.663 Statutory ambiguity has also explicitly and
properly led the courts in Morrison-Knudsen and Glen Ridge to avoid the
constitutional problems by adopting a narrow construction of the agencies' powers. 664 This supports the recommendation that, even if the
655. Id. at 337.
656. See id. at 336-37.
657. Katchen is something of an exception in a pro-jury line of cases. See, eg., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-40 (1970) (emphasizing that the distinction between law and equity is not
itself determinative and that a jury trial might be available even where the procedural device employed was originally equitable). Nevertheless, since Katchen addresses bankruptcy, which is so
closely analogous to financial receiverships, it is likely that the case would control in the present
context.
658. See supra text accompanying notes 40-51, 342-419. As the Court once put it, the FHLBB
"has promulgated regulations governing 'the powers and operations of every Federal savings and
loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave.'
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982) (quoting People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311,
316 (S.D. Cal. 1951)).
659. See supra text accompanying notes 225-37.
660. See id
661. See supra notes 554-56, 584-85 and accompanying text (emphasizing the breadth of administrative jurisdiction as an important criterion).
662. See supra text accompanying notes 325-36.

663. See supra text accompanying notes 596-98.
664. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31, 135-37.
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FHLBB does have putative authority to establish the Hudspeth
scheme, 665 this authority, and the structure of the adjudicative scheme
666
itself, should be stated in clearer terms by Congress.
The absence of adjudicatory standards raises concern about the excessive delegation of powers 667 and might lead the Court to construe the
FHLBB's statutory mandate restrictively. Basic procedural fairness also
requires clear notice of the procedures to be followed in determining
claims. 66 8 Together, these concerns suggest not only the publication of
opinions arising out of Hudspeth adjudications (a practice that the
FHLBB has already begun to address 669 ) but also the desirability of detailed, final rules governing the detailed processes for creditor claims
6 70
determinations.
Although it is prepared to evaluate administrative arrangements on
an individual basis, 67 1 the Court is concerned about the availability of an
impartial adjudicator 67 2 and, in particular, potential conflicts of interest,
both financial and functional. 67 It is also concerned with the fairness of
the adjudicative procedure. 67'4 These concerns indicate that Congress or,
in the absence of congressional action, the FHLBB itself, should ensure
that there is a genuine internal separation of powers between the receiver
and the claims adjudicator, that the claims adjudicator should enjoy significant insulation from the pressures, both financial and administrative,
that might otherwise be brought to bear during the course of a receivership, and that creditors should not be prejudiced by ex parte material not
6 75
on the record.
With regard to article III, the Court has repeatedly expressed concern that there should be no attempt by Congress to aggrandize itself,
through agencies, at the expense of the judicial branch.6 7 6 This militates
strongly against the assertion by the FHLBB and the FSLIC that creditor claims that have already been adjudicated by a court should be sub665. See supra text accompanying notes 427-29.
666. See infra text accompanying notes 754-58 (Recommendation 1).
667. See supra text accompanying notes 526-35.
668 Cf. Friendly, supra note 611, at 1278 ("more elaborate specification of... [desirable procedural safeguards] may help to produce more principled and predictable decisions"). Judge
Friendly's set of guidelines are set forth supra in text accompanying notes 612-13.
669. See infra text accompanying note 705.
670. See infra text accompanying notes 764-65 (Recommendation 4).
671. See supra text accompanying notes 622, 631-33.
672. See supra text accompanying note 564.
673. See supra text accompanying notes 618-37.
674. See supra text accompanying notes 608-15.
675. See infra text accompanying notes 759-62 (Recommendation 2).
676. See supra text accompanying notes 570-72, 588.
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mitted to the receiver for adjudication de novo. 677 The attempt by an
agency not merely to assert primary jurisdiction but to place itself in an
appellate position vis-a-vis the courts is surely a flagrant "aggrandizement" of power at the expense of the courts.678 Furthermore, the notion
of a losing party having the opportunity to "readjudicate" the claim
against it surely raises the apparent conflict of interest to an intolerable
level. 679 The assertion of such jurisdiction therefore seems to go beyond
60
the constitutional limits of administrative adjudication.
Finally, one consistent concern, arising in the context of the
nondelegation doctrine,681 article 111,682 and due process, 683 is that there
be adequate judicial review of agency adjudication. If the administrative
adjudication scheme is valid, de novo judicial review would be wastefully
duplicative. But meaningful judicial review to guard against abuses of
power by the administrative adjudicator is a necessity. This entails the
development of a coherent and reliable record and clarification as to the
4
standard of judicial review. 68
IV.

EVALUATION OF THE HUDSPETH PROCESS

The basic contention of the FHLBB that an administrative adjudication process is preferable to the regular judicial process, has been accepted as a premise of this article. Yet this contention is itself a matter of
controversy. For example, while it seems probable that administrative
adjudication would ensure greater uniformity in the case of receiverships
that are faced with claims from different judicial jurisdictions, there is no
hard evidence to show that the Hudspeth process is indeed quicker, more
efficient and less expensive than the judicial alternative. In the absence of
public access to details concerning individual receiverships, which access
the FHLBB and FSLIC have so far refused to grant, 685 one is forced to
rely on the opinions in the agency itself.
Furthermore, even if it can be demonstrated that the Hudspeth process is more efficient and less expensive, this does not necessarily imply
that it is as fair a process as that available in the courts. Without some
677. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the FSLIC attempted
to avoid the effect of judgments already entered against thrifts).
678. See supra text accompanying notes 734-39.
679. See supra text accompanying note 630.
680. See infra text accompanying note 766 (Recommendation 5).
681. See supra note 536.

682. See supra text accompanying notes 556, 587.
683. See supra note 560.

684. See infra text accompanying note 767 (Recommendation 6).
685. See infra note 726.
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substantial restructuring, along the lines suggested in this article,68 6 it is
hard to accept that this can be possible.
As with any complex regulatory process designed to protect the
public, there has to be some tradeoff between the demands of fairness and
efficiency. This involves a fundamental policy judgment that in the present context, given the scale of thrift liquidations and the size, range and
variety of creditor claims involved, is one of national import. It is a judgment that should be made by the originator of the deposit protection
system itself, in other words, Congress. Hence the evaluation that follows in this article, and the recommendations for improvement to the
existing arrangements, are based on the assumption that Congress actually would expressly decide to authorize an administrative claims adjudication process.
A. Fairness and Flexibility.
The Hudspeth procedures are partly intended to assist the receiver
in maintaining a degree of flexibility when processing claims. Indeed,
section 1729(d) seems clearly to envisage this goal where it refers to "settling, compromising, or releasing" claims. Hence the FHLBB is anxious
to ensure that the FSLIC Receiver has an opportunity to accommodate
disputed claims before the parties confront each other in litigation. In
practice, many potentially complex claims are resolved at this level with
a minimum of formality and expense. 6 7 The receiver also needs time to
investigate the thrift's activities, many of which might have been concealed from the regulatory examiners before the thrift was seized. The
thrift's records might well be in disarray.
The FSLIC Receiver is carefully distinguished, both linguistically
and institutionally, from the FSLIC Corporate. Hence it is misleading to
assume that the FSLIC as insurer of deposits (and therefore as the major
creditor in any receivership) is identical to the FSLIC Receiver itself.68 8
Nevertheless, the FSLIC Receiver still has the ordinary receivership responsibility of preserving the assets of the receivership for the optimal
benefit of creditors. In practice the special representatives must surely
interact with policy formulators at the FSLIC Corporate in deciding
whether, as the best overall strategy, to participate in a purchase and
assumption transaction 68 9 or to transfer insured accounts. 690 The potential size of creditor claims must inevitably weigh heavily in their deci686. See infra text accompanying notes 687-719.
687. Interview, supra note 275.

688. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
689. See supra text accompanying notes 189-95.
690. See supra text accompanying note 193.
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sions. It is hard to accept, therefore, that the severe financial strictures
under which the FSLIC as a whole has been placed, as a result of the
depletion of its insurance fund and the escalation in administrative and
liquidation costs, 69 1 do not have a very strong influence when the FSLIC
Receiver's Special Representatives make their decisions to accept or reject claims.
1. "Receiver'sDeterminations." It is just these forms of prior involvement with the disputed claims that render the FSLIC Receiver virtually incapable of impartiality when it comes to adjudicating claims that
remain in dispute after efforts to "settle" or "compromise" those claims
have failed. To be sure, the mere fact that the FSLIC will inevitably
fulfill the role of both creditor and receiver, if the agency is looked at as a
6 92
unit, is not enough on its own to disqualify the FSLIC's appointment.
But the question is one of degree, and the degree of conflict at the receiv6 93
ership level is, in the present financial crisis, unacceptably high.
Indeed, the whole character of the Hudspeth rules themselves suggests that the receiver is conceived of as having a partisan role in the
claims determination process. The fact that fee counsel perform services
as and where needed by the Special Representatives, 694 the fact that they
provide confidential advice concerning claims to these representatives, 695
and the fact that the Special Representative is expressly charged to take
"cost savings" into account in the selection of the persons assigned to
review creditor claims,6 96 all suggest that at the receivership level the
review of claims is likely to be partisan, often unsympathetic, and certainly not detached.
If genuine adjudication were to take place at the receivership level,
the process could hardly be described as fair to creditors if they and the
receiver had moved beyond an atmosphere of "settlement" and "compromise." This is recognized by the FHLBB, which has changed the description of the receiver's decisions from "final determinations" to
"receivers' determinations.1 697 The alternative terminology conveys
more accurately what really happens in claims determinations, where the
691. See supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
692. See, eg., Womble v. Dixon, 585 F. Supp. 728, 733 (E.D. Va. 1983) (holding that the insufficiency of receivership funds to pay all claims did not constitute a sufficient conflict of interest to
warrant removal of the FSLIC as receiver), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 752 F.2d 80 (4th Cir.

1984).
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.

See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra note 275.

notes 621, 629-32 (discussing the due process test).
notes 248, 261.
notes 270-71.
note 261.
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first real "adjudication" only takes place before the Adjudication Divi698
sion itself.
It would be much more compatible with the concept of independent
adjudication and internal separation of powers to treat claims decisions
at the receivership level not as a species of "adjudication," but as what
they were probably always assumed to be, namely, the mere acceptance
or rejection of claims, the validity of which is to be determined by an
objective third party. This would help to reduce the importance of the
conflicts of interest, real and perceived, under which the receiver labors.
It would also liberate the receiver from the futile duty of trying to maintain an impartial posture in the administration of the receivership. And
it would permit the receiver to represent more unequivocally the interests
of the receivership as a whole when called upon to engage in some form
of mandatory alternative dispute resolution 699 or when opposing a creditor in a claims dispute before the Adjudication Division.
2. Administrative Adjudications ("Reviews"). The first real "adjudication" of creditors' claims takes place at the level of the Adjudication Division. 7°° This is also the first place at which significant
institutional separation might be assumed to take place, though even here
there is extensive prior and continuing involvement by staff of the Adjudication Division with the receivership team when a thrift is seized.7 01
The staff are warned to avoid discussing any details that might bear directly upon individual claims, 70 2 but there is little in the Hudspeth procedures that can prevent internal communication between Adjudication
Division staff and the adjudicator, ex parte contacts between the receiver's agents and the adjudicator, and pressure on the adjudicator from
the Board itself, on the one hand, and from the Director, OFSLIC (from
whom the adjudicator has received the delegated power to adjudicate),
on the other.
Perhaps a de facto Chinese wall has been created within the Adjudication Division. For administrative appeals, at least, 70 3 the initial rever698. Interview, supra note 275.

699. See infra text accompanying notes 715-17.
700. See supra text accompanying notes 278-97.

701. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
702. In particular, the attention of the Division's staff is drawn to Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v.
United States, 643 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1981). In Baltimore Contractors,the court held that the continuing involvement by the Architect of the Capitol and his staff with the House board and its members
created the appearance of unfairness and the possibility of improper influence in connection with the
board's adjudication of a dispute between the architect and a contractor.
703. Requests for expedited relief, see supra text accompanying notes 300-11, have been granted

in only 3% of the cases (i.e. 8 out of 304 cases, as of March 23, 1988). Letter from June 0. Stewart
to Lawrence A. Baxter (Mar. 23, 1988). One of the reasons given for this extremely low success rate
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sal rate of receiver determinations seems to suggest that this has
occurred. At present half of those receivers' determinations that have
been taken on appeal have been reversed. 70 4 The decisions of the Adjudication Division are now also accumulating and are becoming available in
Westlaw and LEXIS databases. 705 This development should aid in providing consistent guidance to the various receiverships and in subjecting
the claims decisions to public scrutiny. In itself, the publication of their
decisions should help to promote objectivity on the part of the
adjudicators.
Yet even if improper influences have not, as a matter of practice,
been brought to bear, it would still be appropriate to institutionalize the
adjudicators' independence by elevating the office to the status of an administrative law judge70 6 in order to provide the security of tenure and
insulation from external pressures that those officers enjoy. 70 7 This
70 8
might require specific statutory authorization.
The record presented to the adjudicator on appeal is also open to
criticism. The receiver is required by the Adjudication Division to assume an adversarial role in the appellate proceedings, 70 9 but there is
nothing to suggest that the privileged and confidential advice that she
receives from fee counsel, for example, does not find its way into the
office of the appellate adjudicator. If there is a possibility of this occurring, then there is a danger of unfairness to the creditor-claimant-who
will not be fully apprised of the information upon which the adjudication
will be based. Similarly, while internal staff memos might be acceptable
is that creditors have only the cost of a postage stamp to lose in filing such requests; as a result a very
high proportion of frivolous requests are filed. Interview, supra note 275.
704. That is, 43 out of 85 cases, as of March 23, 1988. Letter from June 0. Stewart, supra note
703.
705. These databases were added in 1988.
706. A model for this proposal is the West Virginia statute governing the regulation of failing
financial institutions, which contains comprehensive provisions for the determination by receivers of
the claims of creditors. W. VA. CODE § 31A-7-13 (1988). A person adversely affected by the complete or partial rejection of a claim is entitled to a formal hearing before an independent, qualified
hearing examiner appointed by the commissioner. Id §§ 31A-7-14, 31A-8-l. After this remedy has
been exhausted, the claimant may seek judicial review. Id § 31A-8-2.
707. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 3344, 5372 (1982) (procedures for appointing AL~s).
708. Although agencies are free to add to the procedural requirements of the APA, see, e.g.,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978), the Office of Personnel
Management will only assign to the agency as many ALIs as "are necessary for proceedings required
to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 and 557" of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 3105. Since
formal adjudication is not required by either the Home Owners' Loan Act or the National Housing
Act, see supra text accompanying notes 489-97, it is likely that OPM would not approve the assignment of ALJs for Hudspeth purposes.
709. See supra text accompanying notes 284-311.
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where they emanate from the same level as the adjudicator, 710 they surely
constitute an improper influence where they emanate from an adviser to
aparty to the proceedings. The rules should therefore be drafted so as to

ensure that only material disclosed in the record should form the basis of
the decision on appeal.
On the other hand, it should be recognized that large numbers of
creditor appeals can be, and have already been, resolved without full,

trial-type, oral hearings. The written record is often a sufficient basis
upon which to resolve the dispute. 7 11 Hence it would seem unduly bur-

densome to insist on the invariable adoption of all the formal adjudication requirements provided for in the APA. 7 12 A hybrid procedure,
which would permit the administrative law judge (or perhaps a preliminary adjudication officer of lesser status) to make an initial, reviewable
decision whether to order that the appeal be conducted on the basis of an

,oral, evidentiary hearing, seems appropriate. Such a "shortened" or
"modified" procedure has long been applied at the Interstate Commerce

Commission, where it appears to have successfully eliminated unnecessary formality and expedited decisions involving simple disputes. 7 13 The

Civil Aeronautics Board also successfully experimented with "expedited"
714

procedures.
Finally, on many occasions disputes between creditors and receivers
might better be resolved through alternative dispute resolution techniques (ADR). A great variety of such techniques is available, ranging
from arbitration, through mediation, to conciliation, 71 5 and many of
these are already employed by federal agencies. 71 6 Their adoption is
710. Cf United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1210-16 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that
there is no statutory basis in the APA for a separation-of-functions requirement in Occupational
Safety and Health Administration rulemaking procedures, and that a staff advocate need not isolate
herself from others within her agency), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
711. Interview, supra note 275.
712. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1982).
713. See Edles, The ICC HearingProcess: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Administrative Agency
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 16 TR"ANsP. L.J. 99 (1987). Some consideration would have to be
given to the criteria by which the preliminary decision is to be made. The "material issue of fact"
criterion is not always easy to apply at the initial decision stage, but placing a threshold on appealable claims according to the amount at issue carries its own potential for arbitrariness.
714. See id. at 103. Yet another illustration of the apparently successful use of multi-channel
adjudicatory procedure is provided by recent developments at the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, where the agency employs three types of procedures for its reparations adjudications:
voluntary, summary and formal. See Smythe, The ReparationsProgram of the Commodity Futures
TradingCommission: Reducing Formalityin Agency Adjudications, 2 ADMIN. LJ. 39, 56-60 (1988).
715. See, eg., Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Proceduresand the Administrative Process, 1 ADMIN. L.. 141, 144-45 (1987) (suggesting that full range of ADR techniques be
used to address the needs of the legislative process).
716. See Riggs & Dorminey, FederalAgencies' Use ofAlternative Means ofDispute Resolution, 1
ADMIN. L.J. 125, 137 (1987).
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strongly advocated by the Administrative Conference as a means of expediting agency proceedings and reducing costs. 7 17 The receiver's powers
under section 1729(d) are quite capable of accommodating ADR.
As argued in the previous section, 718 however, the receiver really
holds the posture of a committed party and for ADR to work where
attempts to "settle, compromise, or release" claims have already failed, it
would have to be imposed by a superior authority. The adjudicator in
the Adjudication Division would be well-placed to choose between arbitration or mediation, for example. 7 19 The rules should be drafted so as to
create the power to appoint an arbitrator, for example, and to order that
the receiver and claimant engage in compulsory arbitration, if such is the
most appropriate means of ADR.
B.

Efficiency and Cost.

The main motivation for developing the Hudspeth procedures has
720
been to save costs and expedite the determination of creditor claims.
Not only is this made possible by the informality of the claims processing
procedure, in which the receiver is able to "settle, compromise, or release
claims," 72 1 but the adjudicatory procedure before the Adjudication Division of the Office of General Counsel at the FHLBB is also thought to be
potentially quicker and less expensive than de novo judicial proceedings.
Does the Hudspeth process fulfill this promise?
1. The Receivership Level. An embarrassment to the agencies'
claim that FHLBB adjudication expedites claims determination is the
progress of the Hudspeth case itself since the Fifth Circuit's decision.
The court of appeals issued its final opinion on May 23, 1985, redirecting
Hudspeth's claims "to the administrative track." Yet almost three years
later Hudspeth had not been granted a receiver's determination of his
claim. 722 It was only after approaching his local Congressman that Hudspeth's attorney received any formal response to Hudspeth's request for a
717. Administrative Conference of the U.S., Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of Dispute
Resolution, Recommendation No. 86-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305,86-3 (1988). See generally A Colloquium on
Improving Dispute Resolution: Options for the Federal Government, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 399 (1987) (sponsored by the Administrative Conference).
718. See supra text accompanying notes 692-99.
719. The Director of the Adjudication Division is hospitable to the idea of using ADR. Interview, supra note 275.
720. See supra text accompanying note 92; see also Felt, FSLIC Receivership Claims Procedure,
in ALI-ABA, FAiLING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 529, 531-34 (1987) (study materials).
721. 12 U.S.C § 1729(d) (1982).
722. See supra text accompanying notes 273-77 (discussing "receiver's determinations").
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determination of his claim. 723 This came in the form of a proposed initial

determination, dated December 24, 1987, denying his claims. Since
Hudspeth's attorney has requested reconsideration, the matter has not
even reached the Board, or "appellate," stage. Hudspeth's attorney estimates that the original proceedings in chancery court and any possible
appeal "would surely have reached resolution long before 1988"!724

If the Hudspeth case itself were to be taken as a guide to the speed
and efficiency of the Hudspeth process, the agencies' arguments would
not be cogent at all. On the other hand, the FHLBB was really only in a
position freely to develop its procedures after its authority to do so was
recognized in Hudspeth. Hence the case might merely be an unfortunate
exception. Nevertheless, although statistical information is difficult to
compile 725 and not necessarily even available, 726 there do seem to have
been some considerable delays at the receivership level, 727 at least in the
723. Telephone interview, supra note 107. The details are now more fully documented in Hudspeth's amicus brief in the Coit case. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Joseph M. Hudspeth in Support of
Petitioner, Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 108 S.Ct. 1105 (1987) (No. 87-996); see
supra note 18.
724. Brief Amicus Curiae of Joseph M. Hudspeth at 4 n.2. As this article went to press, the
author was advised that the FSLIC had settled Hudspeth's claim. Telephone interview with Wylene
W. Dunbar, counsel for Hudspeth (Aug. 18, 1988). It should also be noted that the claims in the
Morrison-Knudsen group of cases have now been settled. Telephone interview, supra note 390.
725. Statistics are not easy to compile, partly because the performance of claims processors varies from region to region, Telephone interview, supra note 202, and partly because aggregate statistics do not reflect what happens in individual cases.
726. While I have experienced generous assistance from the Adjudication Division of the Office
of General Counsel, FHLBB, it appears that there is in some quarters of the agency a predilection
for secrecy. For example, an attempt by one attorney to use the Freedom of Information Act to
compile statistics from information concerning the claims processed in specific receiverships was
foiled because the FHLBB adopted the view that such information is not subject to disclosure under
the FOIA, creditor claims being "against the receiver, not the FSLIC." Letter from Ella P. Allen to
Sarah H. Comley (Apr. 8, 1988). The agencies' position in this regard sits somewhat awkwardly
with the FSLIC's argument that, as receiver, it enjoys sovereign immunity. See supra note 148. Its
legality is also debatable. Cf Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation subject to disclosure requirements even though it is self-financing). The "governmental control" of the FSLIC, whether FSLIC Corporate or FSLIC Receiver, is
surely even greater.
This refusal to disclose information concerning receiverships appears to be maintained even in
the face of requests from congressional committees. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON BANKING,
FINANCE & URBAN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL ASSET DISPOSITION AssOcIATION: REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO ITS OPERATIONS AND PERFORMANCE ch. XI (Comm. Print
1988), reprintedin 134 CONG. REc. H-2228-30 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988).
727. Some of the attorneys I interviewed complained of indordinate delays in receiving responses
from receivers. Cf Memorandum of Law of Third-Party Defendants at 33, FSLIC v. Greenbaum,
No. L-070020-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988). This memorandum of law asserts that delays in the administrative process "can be extraordinary." It then cites W-V Enters. v. FSLIC, 234 Kan. 354, 673
P.2d 1112 (1983), as a case in which the FSLIC commenced an interpleader action to enjoin enforcement of a judgment and attachment order against a thrift in receivership two years after the Kansas
Supreme Court had affirmed the judgment against the FSLIC as receiver.
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processing of contentious claims. 728 One probable source of this delay is

the failure to subject receiver's agents, at some points in the process, to
730
rigid time limits. 729 This should be remedied.

2. The Board Level. At the Board level it appears that the process is becoming more expeditious. As of March 23, 1988, the Adjudication Division had received 129 administrative appeals, 85 of which it had

completed.73 ' Almost half of these were completed in four weeks or

less. 732 It might be reasonable to assume, therefore, that as a general rule
the speed and informality of the adjudicative process, once fully implemented and staffed, would render the determination of claims less expensive and more efficient than it might be if the agencies had to rely on the
733
courts. Agency staff insist that this is the case.

3.

Previously Adjudicated Claims. Considerations of efficiency

and cost do not, however, justify the agencies' attempts to avoid the effects of judgments already entered against thrifts prior to their being

placed in receivership.734 The agencies' view that preexisting but unappealed or unexecuted judgments should be vacated is dictated by their

belief that section 1464(d)(6)(C) necessarily strips the courts of jurisdiction. 735 As has been argued, however, this view of section 1464(d)(6)(C)
is wrong. 736 In any event, the agencies' position raises very serious arti737
cle III problems.
Furthermore, the agencies' view could also place a potential litigant
in a hopeless position. For example, in Homestead Savings v. Life Sav728. As to overall efficiency, the Southern Region, for example, has greatly improved the speed
of its claims processing: in 1985, prior to the development of the Hudspeth procedures, the average
length of time for processing a claim was 494.6 days; this time had dropped, in January 1988, to 18.1
days. Telephone interview with Judith L. Friedman, Associate General Counsel, FHLBB (May 6,
1988). Yet this information can tell us little about nonroutine, contentious claims.
729. Cf. supra note 277.
730. See infra text accompanying notes 764-65 (Recommendation 4); cf Admin. Conference of
the U.S., Time Limits on Agency Actions, reprintedin 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-3 (1988).
731. Letter from June 0. Stewart, supra note 703.
732. Id.
733. See, eg., Felt, supra note 720, at 533.
734. See supra notes 118-20; supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
735. Telephone interview, supra note 390. An incidental argument is that a creditor with an
adjudicated claim should still be required to resubmit the claim for fresh determination by the receiver, because if the receiver were obliged to accept the claim as valid this might, at least psychologically, impede the settlement and negotiation process. Interview with David A. Felt, Assistant
General Counsel, FHLBB, and Mark Gabrellian, Trial Attorney, FHLBB, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 22, 1987).
736. See supra text accompanying notes 394-403, 422-25.
737. See supra text accompanying note 589-99.
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ings & Loan Association 738 the plaintiff had been awarded a jury verdict
against the defendant thrift of more than $6.2 million, which amount had
already been paid over to the clerk of the court. But the plaintiff then
found itself in a Catch-22 situation: because the verdict effectively
pushed the defendant into insolvency, the defendant was placed into receivership by the FHLBB, and the FSLIC Receiver moved that the court
vacate the judgment and relinquish jurisdiction. The motion was denied.
As Judge Roszkowski observed:
Accepting the FSLIC's argument [that the judgment should be vacated] would put plaintiffs like Homestead in an untenable position.
With the defendant savings and loan in a shaky position, a verdict for
the plaintiff would probably press the defendant into receivership. Of
course, the plaintiff could not pursue its administrative remedy until it
had actually forced the defendant into receivership. The plaintiff going
to trial either would get a soon-to-be-invalid verdict, a receiver, and a
de novo tour through administrative proceedings or the plaintiff would
verdict that would likely remain valid and res
get a defendant's
739
judicata.
Such circumstances create a potential temptation for the FHLBB to use
receivership appointments as a means of denying litigants their just
claims.
It is also difficult to understand why the receiver's ability to settle or
negotiate the claim would be impeded by recognition of previous judgments. Once the thrift is placed in receivership, section 1464(d)(6)(C)
effectively prevents the creditor from executing his judgment. He has no
choice but to take into account the same strategic considerations as any
other creditor with a valid claim. And the appellate process, even if incomplete, is unlikely to be more time-consuming or costly than readjudication of the claim by the receiver.
C. JudicialReview.
The jurisprudence relating to the nondelegation doctrine, 74° article
111,741 and possibly even due process, 742 dictates that there should be
meaningful judicial review of the adjudicator's and the FHLBB's final
738. 668 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (opinion vacated and removed from bound volume, but
appears in West's advance sheets). In terms of a settlement order, see No. 86 C 20268 (Dec. 2,
1987), the FSLIC, as receiver for Life Savings and Loan Association, agreed to acquiesce in the
order of the court and forgo all post-trial motions and appeals on the condition that the plaintiff
stipulate to the vacating of the judge's opinion. Consequently, West Publishing withdrew from its

final volume the original opinion issued by the court. Telephone interview with Jeffrey H. Hornstein, counsel for Homestead (May 2, 1988).

739. 668 F. Supp. at 1123.
740. See supra text accompanying note 520-37.
741. See supra text accompanying note 538-88.
742. See supra text accompanying note 601-37.
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74 3
decisions. In view of the ambiguity created by section 1464(d)(6)(C),
clear provision for judicial review should be made by Congress when
744
clarifying the FHLBB's statutory powers.
The value of judicial review, even under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, 745 will depend on the quality of the record before the
746
court,
so the exhortations made earlier7 47 are relevant in this context
as well. It is suggested, however, that the "substantial evidence" standard of review is merited in the case of creditor claims. The reason is
that the determination of the validity and amount of creditor claims is
likely to involve "adjudicative facts," as opposed to "legislative facts," 748
inasmuch as the specific details of thrift/creditor transactions will be in
issue, rather than more general questions of thrift regulatory policy.
Hence it seems appropriate that the reviewing court should be able to
evaluate the adjudicator's decision according to the evidence presented in
the adjudication record. If proper recordkeeping procedures are observed, there is no reason why the agency could not accommodate this
standard of review.
As review will take place with the benefit of a full record, jurisdiction to review should, in accordance with the recommendation of the
Administrative Conference, be placed in the courts of appeals. 749

D. ProceduralRules.
With the creation of a restructured claims adjudicatory process
there arises the need for the implementation of detailed procedural rules.
These are best devised by the agency, using a notice and comment
rulemaking process. 750 In the light of past experience, 751 the FHLBB
743. See supra text accompanying notes 394-403.
744. See infra text accompanying note 767 (Recommendation 6).
745. See supra text accompanying notes 498-509.
746. See, eg., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977) (emphasizing the importance of a coherent record, even in informal rulemaking proceedings, to meaningful judicial review); see also 1 C.F.R. § 305.77-3 (1988).
747. See supra text accompanying notes 709-10.
748. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3 (1979) (discussing the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts).
749. See Admin. Conference of the U.S., The Choice of Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action, reprinted in 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1988).
750. Because they deal with "procedure" and not substance, there may be doubt whether such
rules must be published in the Federal Register in accordance with § 553(d) of the APA. See 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982). Even if publication is not required by the APA, the FHLBB could justifiably be criticized if it failed to publish the rules when so many creditors are affected. Dealing with
interpretive rules and statements of general policy, the Administrative Conference has recommended
that agencies voluntarily publish any rules that are "likely to have substantial impact on the public."
See Admin. Conference of the U.S., reprinted in 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1988). One commentator has
already noted the relevance of this recommendation to the procedures adopted by the FHLBB. See
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should be particularly sensitive to the need for adequate public consultation and guidance on the administration of its adjudications.
If Congress were to create a claims adjudication process, or if the
Court were in Coit to declare that the authority to do so already exists,
the FHLBB should expeditiously set about the task of devising appropriate rules that incorporate the structural suggestions as well as the time
and jurisdictional limitations urged in the preceding sections of this article.752 In addition, the rules would have to be considerably more complex than those contained in the Interim and Supplemental Rules. 753 As
presently formulated, these make no provision for the consolidation of
claims, joinder of third parties and counterclaims, or for meaningful discovery and subpoenas (to give a few examples). Given the complex nature of most of the disputes that have already arisen in the reported
cases, it is hard to imagine how the FHLBB could adjudicate such claims
efficiently without these devices. In any event, the requirements of procedural due process would seem to dictate the provision of at least some
facilities whereby parties may adequately establish their claims and challenge adverse evidence.
CONCLUSIONS

In this article it has been argued that legislation upon which the
FHLBB and the FSLIC rely for the Hudspeth scheme is very dubious,
not only because of the vagueness and ambiguity of the statutory language concerned, but also because vague statutory authority is insufficient in the face of the numerous constitutional concerns that are raised
by the Hudspeth scheme as it is presently constructed. I have also tried
to show, however, that if Congress were to act unambiguously, it could
establish an administrative claims adjudication scheme that would survive constitutional challenge. To achieve this objective, Congress and the
FHLBB would have to institute a number of safeguards designed to provide the protections mandated by the Constitution. These safeguards are
encapsulated in the following recommendations.
Pfeiler, supra note 54, at 461 n.102. In any event, to the extent that the rules might deal with such
matters as the ranking of claims, see supra note 195, they would clearly have to be published in
accordance with the APA's notice and comment procedures.
751. During the preparation of this article as a report for the Administrative Conference, the
author encountered numerous complaints regarding the availability of, and reluctance on the part of
the FHLBB to finalize, the procedural rules governing the Hudspeth claims process. The FHLBB
has proven responsive to these complaints: it has published interim rules and supplemental proposed
rules, and has virtually finalized its present procedures. See supra text accompanying notes 200-05.

752. The rules presently devised by the FHLBB fail to address any of the concerns expressed in
the recommendations presented in this article.
753. See supra text accompanying notes 253-69.
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A. Recommendations.
1. Acquisition of Statutory Authority for Claims Adjudication.
While the FHLBB might have statutory authority under section
1464(d)(1 1) to create a claims adjudication system, 754 if such is the intention of Congress, it should be stated in express terms. This is necessary
for two reasons. First, notwithstanding the deference ordinarily shown
by courts to the construction by agencies of their statutory mandates, 755
vague statutory powers are interpreted restrictively where they infringe
on constitutional rights.756 Secondly, in accepting deviations from the
article III adjudicative model, the Supreme Court has relied partly on the
fact that Congress has expressed a clearly stated legislative purpose to
depart from the model. 75 7 This reliance seems particularly apposite in

the present context since, unlike the situation with receivership powers,
Congress, when it has directly addressed the issue of administrative adjudication, has always prescribed fairly detailed procedural rules. 758
To clarify the situation, the FHLBB should seek direct authority for
an administrative claims adjudication process. While Congress need not
go so far as to specify the detailed procedures, Congress should make a
basic policy decision as to whether an administrative adjudication process is preferable to the regular judicial process. If Congress does reach
such a conclusion, it should act to create adjudicative authority and an
adjudicative process, clearly and unambiguously, and along the following
lines.
2. Formalization of the Adjudicative Process. In order to meet
due process and article III concerns of impartiality and fairness, 7

59

Con-

gress should establish a bifurcated process for adjudicating claims.
Where hearings are required to resolve matters in dispute, administrative
law judges should adjudicate. The necessary authority to engage administrative law judges should be granted by Congress. 76° Where claims can
be resolved on the basis of written documentation alone, the FHLBB
should be permitted to use simplified, less formal procedures, independent of the receiver but not necessarily involving administrative law
judges. 761
754.
755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.

See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying

notes 427-29.
notes 325-36.
notes 129-31.
notes 596-98.
notes 393, 401-03.
notes 671-75.
note 708.
notes 711-14.
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The statutory scheme should make it clear that receivers do not "adjudicate" claims, and the rules should treat receivers as parties who are
762
on equal terms with claimants.
3. Procedures for Alternative Dispute Resolution. In order to
avoid unnecessary formality and delay, administrative law judges should
be empowered to order that parties (including receivers) engage in Alternative Dispute Resolution where this is appropriate.7 63
4. ProceduralRules. Once the claims adjudications process has
been authorized, the FHLBB should engage in a notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedure, setting forth comprehensive and adequate rules of
practice for claims adjudication 64
A probable source of delay in receivership determinations is the failure to subject receivers to fixed time limitations. 765 The FHLBB's final
rules should provide for strict, albeit reasonable, time limits that are applicable not only to claimants but also to receivers and their agents.
5. Jurisdictionover Claims Already Adjudicated in Court. In order to avoid agency aggrandizement at the expense of article III courts,
and in order to prevent the temptation to use receivership decisions as a
strategic device to the detriment of the creditors of thrifts, the FHLBB
and the FSLIC Receiver should not be permitted to override judgments
already given by federal and state courts, whether or not these remain
appealable. 766 The agencies' power to determine claims should not encompass judgments in favor of creditors if such judgments have already
been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction before thrifts have been
placed in receivership. The FSLIC Receiver should either acquiesce in
these judgments or pursue its ordinary post-trial remedies.
6. Judicial Review. Congress should make adequate provision
for judicial review of claims decisions by the FHLBB. 767 To this end,
Congress should specify that the courts of appeals have review jurisdiction and that the "substantial evidence" standard should apply.
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766. See supra text accompanying notes 734-39.
767. See supra text accompanying notes 740-49.
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B. General Observations.
It is important to conclude with a reminder of the limited scope of

this article. The resolution of creditors claims in receiverships takes
place within a much broader context that is itself controversial, or potentially so. No attempt has been made here, for example, to examine the
underlying causes of thrift failure and whether the problems that have
led to the adoption of the Hudspeth doctrine might be obviated altogether by a different system of thrift regulation. 768
Also beyond the scope of this article is the question of the discretionary power exercised by the FHLBB and the FSLIC in determining

whether to place a thrift in receivership and, once this has been done,
whether to liquidate its assets or transfer the assets and liabilities to another thrift. As was noted earlier, the FHLBB and the FSLIC exercise
an enormous amount of discretion, both when the FHLBB decides to
appoint a receiver and when the FSLIC Receiver decides whether to engage in some form of purchase and assumption transaction or to liquidate the assets of the receivership. These agency decisions have a major

impact on the rights of creditors. In the case of a partial purchase and
assumption transaction, for example, a creditor might quite arbitrarily be
omitted from the benefits of the transfer of assets and liabilities. 769 These
decisions are, of course, heavily laden with questions of policy, and so
they are not easily susceptible to codification. 770 Nevertheless, their significance strongly suggests that thought should be given to the means by
which creditors might be protected, 771 whether in the courts 772 or per768. For a discussion of suggested reform in bank regulation, see J. Macey & G. Miller, Bank
Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control (1988) (draft report to the ACUS); see
also supra note 24.
769. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95. In addition to affecting the procedural rights of
creditors and their prospects of fully recovering their claims, the decision to subject creditors to the
Hudspeth procedures may have a direct impact on the substantive rights themselves. For example,
the rights of parties to loan agreements may be significantly affected if these rights are determined by
Hudspeth adjudicators. See Pfeiler, supra note 54, at 448-57.
770. Cf Getty v. FSLIC, 805 F.2d 1050, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Considering pre-receivership
action by the FSLIC, the Getty court said, "Congress recognized that in authorizing acquisition of
distressed institutions FSLIC would need absolute discretion in some areas, e.g., determining who is
qualified to bid ... and calculating the cost of the bids." Id
771. Some attention has been given to protecting the rights of the officers of thrifts. See, eg.,
Malloy, Adjudication Practicesand Procedures of the FederalBank Regulatory Agencies, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1215,

1332-34 (1987) (recommending greater publicity of adjudications to help guide the officers of thrifts);
Student Project: Savings and Loan Insolvency in the '80's, 15 AKRON L. REv. 441 (1982). The
position of creditors has, however, been ignored.
772. Cf Getty, 805 F.2d at 1057-62 (applying an "arbitrary and capricious" standard in setting
aside award to competing bidder); Hartigan v. FHLBB, 746 F.2d 1300, 1310 (7th Cir. 1984) (reviewing FSLIC's calculation of cost of bids to ensure consistent application of economic methodology).
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haps through the use of guidelines. 773

773. The FDIC, for example, has published guidelines indicating when it will provide financial
assistance to a failing bank. See Statement of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Operating Insured
Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,122 (1986). As this article went to press the FHLBB published some guidelines with a similar purpose. See supra note 151.

